The Centre has urged the Supreme Court to limit judicial interference in religious practices and rethink key doctrines like “constitutional morality” and essential religious practices. Its 10-point submission could significantly reshape how courts handle faith, PILs, and religious rights in India.
The Union government has placed detailed written submissions before the 9-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in the long-pending Sabarimala reference, seeking a clear and consistent judicial approach to religious disputes in the country.
Appearing through Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, the Centre has urged the Court to lay down a lasting framework on how constitutional courts should deal with Public Interest Litigations (PILs), interpret the freedom of religion, and define the limits of judicial interference in matters of faith.
The government’s core position is that courts must maintain a stricter boundary between secular law and religious practices. It argues that recent judicial trends have blurred this line, leading to unnecessary intervention in deeply rooted religious customs.
One of the Centre’s strongest arguments is against allowing non-believers or outsiders to challenge religious practices through PILs. It states that PILs were originally designed in the 1980s to help disadvantaged and voiceless sections of society, not to enable individuals with ideological motives to question traditions they do not follow.
According to the government, such petitions create unnecessary litigation and burden the judiciary. It emphasizes the principle of locus standi, arguing that a person who does not belong to a particular religious denomination or does not worship the deity should not have the legal right to challenge its internal practices.
The Centre has also questioned the growing reliance on the concept of “Constitutional morality.” Referring to past judgments including the 2018 adultery ruling, it argues that the Constitution uses the term “morality” to mean societal or public morality, not an abstract judicial standard. It contends that the Court, by relying on “Constitutional morality,” has at times overridden traditional Indian values using concepts borrowed from foreign jurisdictions.
The submission points out what it calls a judicial error in relying on a minority opinion from the US Supreme Court in the adultery case, suggesting that such reasoning should not be used to interfere with long-standing religious practices in India.
Another major submission is the demand to completely scrap the Essential Religious Practices test. The Centre argues that this test, used by courts since the Shirur Mutt case, has no basis in the Constitution and was introduced through judicial interpretation rather than clear legal text. It states that judges are not equipped with the theological knowledge required to decide what is essential to a religion.
Quoting HM Seervai, the government highlights that what may appear as “superstition” to one person could be a core belief for another, and therefore courts should avoid acting as interpreters of religious doctrine.
Expanding on this point, the Centre argues that the current legal framework unfairly disadvantages Hinduism due to its diverse and decentralized nature. Unlike religions with a single holy book or central authority, Hindu practices vary widely across regions and traditions.
The government claims that existing legal tests for identifying a religious denomination are based on a Eurocentric, church-style model, which does not fit India’s unique religious structures such as sampradayas and guru-shishya traditions.
In defending the Sabarimala practice, the Centre has stressed the unique character of Lord Ayyappa. It explains that under Indian law, a Hindu deity is treated as a juristic person. Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala is worshipped as a Naishtika Brahmachari, meaning an eternal celibate.
The government argues that the restrictions in the temple are based on this specific nature of the deity and are not rooted in discrimination against women. It adds that courts cannot judge the attributes of a deity using standards of secular rationality, just as they would not question the choices of a legal minor.
On the issue of equality under Article 25, the Centre has taken a clear stand that the provision guarantees inter-faith equality, not intra-faith equality. It argues that the Constitution ensures that all religions are treated equally by the State, but it does not authorize courts to enforce gender equality within specific religious practices.
According to the government, the intention of the Constituent Assembly was to maintain secular balance between religions, not to reform internal religious norms through judicial intervention.
Addressing the conflict between individual rights and community beliefs, the Centre has proposed the “doctrine of optimization.” It argues that allowing unrestricted entry into Sabarimala would completely destroy the religious character of the temple as understood by its devotees.
The submission states that a single individual’s right cannot override the collective faith of millions. It also points out that devotees have access to many other temples, and therefore, denying entry in one specific temple does not amount to a complete denial of religious freedom.
The government has further argued that religious reform is the responsibility of the legislature, not the judiciary. Under Article 25(2)(b), the State has the power to enact laws for social reform in Hindu religious institutions. The Centre emphasizes that this power was intentionally given to elected bodies, indicating that courts should not take up the role of reforming religion on their own.
On the issue of temple entry laws, the Centre clarifies that provisions allowing access to “all classes and sections of Hindus” were introduced to eliminate caste-based discrimination, not to enforce gender equality. Referring to historical movements like the Mahad and Guruvayur Satyagrahas, it argues that these reforms were aimed at ending untouchability and not at changing gender-based practices in temples.
Finally, the Centre has suggested replacing the Essential Religious Practices test with a global standard known as the “sincerity test.” It points out that countries like the United States, Australia, and European nations do not require courts to determine whether a practice is essential to a religion.
Instead, courts only check whether a belief is genuinely and sincerely held by the community. Once sincerity is established, the State and judiciary should give the religious group a “margin of appreciation” to manage its own affairs without interference.
Through these submissions, the Union government has made a strong case for judicial restraint in matters of religion, urging the Supreme Court of India to adopt a more hands-off approach that respects the autonomy of religious communities while maintaining constitutional balance.
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