During the Supreme Court of India hearing on the Sabarimala Temple issue, Justice Nagarathna highlighted how society’s views on morality have evolved over time. Her remark signals a major constitutional shift in how courts may assess religious practices and gender equality.
The Supreme Court of India on Wednesday made an important observation that it has the authority and jurisdiction to decide whether a particular religious practice can be considered superstitious. This observation came during the hearing of a batch of petitions dealing with women’s entry into religious places, including the Sabarimala Temple, and broader questions related to the scope of religious freedom under the Constitution.
A nine-judge Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant is currently examining complex constitutional issues involving equality, religious practices, and the extent of judicial review in such matters. The case stems from the long-standing dispute over the entry of women into Sabarimala and has now expanded into a larger constitutional debate on how courts should approach religious practices across different faiths.
At the beginning of the hearing, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the Central government, questioned the role of courts in determining what qualifies as superstition in religion. He argued that even if a practice appears superstitious, it is not for the judiciary to declare it so. According to him, such decisions fall within the domain of the legislature, especially under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, which allows the State to bring reform in religious practices.
He stated,
“Even assuming that there is a superstitious practice,” and further added, “It is not for the court to determine that it is superstition. Under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, it is for the legislature to step in and enact a reform law.”
He also highlighted that several states have already enacted laws targeting harmful practices, including those related to black magic and superstition. Strengthening his argument, he told the Bench,
“The legislature can say that a particular practice is superstition and requires reform. There are several such statutes and laws, for the prevention of black magic and other such practices.”
However, the Bench did not fully agree with this position. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah responded by stating that the argument made by the Centre was too simplistic and that courts do have the authority to examine such issues when they arise in constitutional cases.
He remarked,
“What will follow is for the legislature to deal with. But, in court, you cannot say that whatever the legislature decides is the last word. That cannot be,”
clearly asserting the role of the judiciary in constitutional interpretation.
Continuing his submissions, Mehta emphasized that courts, being secular institutions, may not have the necessary expertise to determine whether a religious practice is superstitious. He pointed out the diversity of beliefs across India and how perceptions of superstition can vary from region to region.
He said,
“Your Lordships are experts in the field of law, not religion,” and further argued, “Something religious for Nagaland may be a superstition for me. We are in a greatly diverse society. Maharashtra has Black Act. They may say this is the practice prevalent in our area and that’s why we protect it under Article 25(2)(b).”
During the exchange, Justice Joymalya Bagchi raised a critical question regarding extreme practices like witchcraft. He asked whether such practices, if claimed as part of religion, could still be protected under the Constitution.
He posed the question,
“Your argument is that it is for the legislature to take up and prohibit any practice that promotes it (witchcraft). Let us say the court is approached under Article 32 of the Constitution, saying that a religious practice of witchcraft exists, and the legislature is silent. Can the court not use the ‘doctrine of unoccupied field’ to give directions to prohibit such a practice, keeping in mind … health, morality and public order?”
In response, Mehta clarified that courts can indeed exercise judicial review in such situations, but only on the grounds of public health, morality, and order, and not simply because a practice is labeled as superstition.
Adding another dimension to the discussion, Justice B V Nagarathna stressed that courts must evaluate religious practices based on the philosophy and beliefs of that particular religion, rather than comparing them with practices of other religions.
She observed,
“You cannot apply (the views of) some other religion and say this is not essential religious practice. The approach of the court is to apply the philosophy of that religion, subject to health, morality and public order.”
The matter is still being heard, and the outcome is expected to have a far-reaching impact on how courts in India interpret religious freedom and balance it with fundamental rights.
The present proceedings are rooted in earlier landmark developments. In 2018, the Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, struck down the restriction on entry of women aged 10 to 50 at Sabarimala, declaring the practice unconstitutional.
Later, in 2019, a Bench headed by former Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi referred broader questions concerning discrimination in religious practices across different faiths to a larger bench, noting that such issues require deeper constitutional examination beyond individual cases.
This ongoing hearing is likely to shape the future legal framework on the intersection of religion, superstition, and constitutional rights in India.
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