Does the President’s power to commute death sentence extend to barring remission for the rest of the convict’s life? The Delhi High Court has said yes, dismissing a challenge to the President’s 2016 decision and holding that the Constitution Bench ruling in Union of India v. V. Sriharan recognises the special category of life imprisonment without remission.

New Delhi: The Delhi High Court has rejected a plea challenging the condition attached to a presidential commutation of a death sentence, holding that the President can commute the death penalty to imprisonment for the remainder of a convict’s natural life without further remission [Jitendra @ Jitu Nainsingh Gehlot v. Union of India & Anr.].
A Division Bench of Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja dismissed the writ petition on November 17, 2026. The petitioner had questioned the September 18, 2016 decision of the President of India, which commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment but directed that he remain in prison for the rest of his natural life, with no further remission by any authority.
The Sriharan question
The petitioner’s core attack was that a sentence for the remainder of natural life without remission is unconstitutional. The Bench did not accept this. It relied on the majority view of the five-judge Constitution Bench in V. Sriharan, which upheld the validity of a special category of sentence under which life imprisonment may be imposed without the application of statutory remission.
The High Court drew a line between an ordinary life sentence and one expressly imposed without remission. Where a sentence carries no “without remission” qualifier, the State’s statutory power under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remains available. The special category recognised in V. Sriharan sits outside that statutory remission framework, while the Constitution Bench had separately recognised that the constitutional clemency powers under Articles 72 and 161 stand on a distinct footing.
In paragraph 12, the Bench observed that the Constitution Bench had already upheld the validity of such sentences and characterised the attempt to challenge that settled position before a two-judge Bench as a misuse, if not an abuse, of the process of law. It further held that the President’s power to commute the death sentence with the condition imposed in this case existed under Article 72.
From the death sentence to a conditional commutation
The petitioner and a co-accused were convicted in connection with the murders of members of a family in Pune. The trial court imposed the death sentence in February 1998, the Bombay High Court confirmed it in July 1999, and the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeals in September 2000 and the review petitions in November 2000.
The petitioner submitted a mercy petition to the President on June 27, 2001, followed by a further representation in November 2004. The record, as set out in the High Court judgment, shows prolonged correspondence between the Union and Maharashtra authorities over the processing of the plea. The Governor of Maharashtra rejected the mercy petition on March 15, 2014.
In 2015, the Home Minister recommended rejection of the petition. The President’s Secretariat then sought the Attorney General’s opinion on the effect of the delay in deciding the mercy plea. The Attorney General advised in February 2016 that there had been a “huge unexplained delay” at every stage and recommended commutation of the death sentence. The Home Minister maintained the recommendation for rejection.
Having considered the differing views, the President commuted the death sentence on September 18, 2016 to life imprisonment, on the condition that the petitioner would remain in prison for the remainder of his natural life, without further remission. The decision was communicated to him on October 15, 2016.
The arguments on both sides
Senior Advocate Rajshekhar Rao, appearing for the petitioner, argued that the delay in deciding the mercy petition violated Article 21 and warranted an unconditional commutation. He contended that the first mercy petition had not been considered and that the subsequent process took more than 15 years. He also relied on the petitioner’s claim that he had spent over 18 years in solitary, single-cell confinement and had acquired educational and vocational qualifications during incarceration.
The petitioner further argued that the President’s power under Article 72 of the Constitution could not extinguish the constitutional or statutory powers of remission vested in other authorities. He relied on the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. V. Sriharan to contend that constitutional remedies under Articles 72 and 161 remained available even in cases involving imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.
The Union of India opposed the petition. It submitted that the President’s clemency power is a constitutional power and that judicial review is confined to exceptional grounds such as non-application of mind, mala fides, consideration of irrelevant material or arbitrariness. It also argued that the petitioner could not accept the benefit of commutation while challenging the condition attached to it.
Review, not appeal
On jurisdiction, the High Court rejected the objection, noting that the challenged decision was made by the President, whose office is situated in Delhi. It then turned to the limits of judicial review over the exercise of powers under Articles 72 and 161.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions on clemency, the Bench held that a court cannot reassess the decision of the President or Governor as if in appeal. The manner in which the constitutional power is exercised can, however, be reviewed on limited grounds, including mala fides, failure to consider relevant material, reliance on extraneous considerations or arbitrariness.
The Court reiterated that the constitutional authority must consider relevant material, including supervening circumstances such as delay. It noted that the mercy petition had remained undecided for more than 15 years and observed that such delay could have been a sufficient ground to commute the death sentence. The record, however, showed that the President had specifically sought the Attorney General’s opinion on the delay, weighed that advice against the Home Ministry’s contrary recommendation, and ultimately commuted the death sentence.
The Bench therefore held that it could not substitute its own assessment for the President’s decision merely because it might have reached a different conclusion. As the Court put it, “the power exercised by this Court is not of appeal but of judicial review”.
The outcome
Finding that the President had the relevant inputs before him and had considered the material factors, the High Court held that no ground for judicial interference was made out. It dismissed the writ petition and disposed of the pending application as infructuous, with no order as to costs.
The judgment does not hold that every life sentence automatically excludes remission. Its ruling concerns an express sentence for the remainder of natural life without statutory remission, imposed through the President’s exercise of Article 72 powers. The decision also underscores the distinction between reviewing the legality of the clemency process and sitting in appeal over the constitutional authority’s assessment.
Case Title: Jitendra @ Jitu Nainsingh Gehlot v. Union of India & Anr.
Case Number: W.P.(CRL) 3053/2017 & CRL.M.A. 17911/2017
CNR Number: DLHC014761502017
Court and Bench: Delhi High Court; Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Ravinder Dudeja
Decision Date: November 17, 2026
Citation: No neutral citation is displayed in the official judgment PDF
Outcome: Writ petition dismissed; presidential commutation to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without further remission left undisturbed.
