The Supreme Court made clear that the High-Powered Committee probing alleged police excesses against student protesters will report directly to it without any government intermediary, declined to alter the Committee’s composition, and set out the procedure it will follow.
New Delhi: The Supreme Court on Thursday made clear that the High-Powered Committee (HPEC) it constituted to examine allegations of excessive police force against student protesters will function independently and report directly to the Court, with Chief Justice of India Surya Kant emphasising that there was “no question of the Committee being represented by State counsel” and that it would operate “under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court” [Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India and Others].
A Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana heard the resumed matter, days after it had, on the Union’s request, quashed the FIRs registered across the country in connection with the July protests, while permitting the Delhi Police one fresh FIR concerning 2,873 individuals with alleged criminal antecedents. The hearing focused on the modalities of the Committee, its independence, composition and the procedure it will follow.
‘No question of representation by State counsel’
The first concern pressed by the petitioners was that the Committee must be, and be seen to be, independent of both sides. Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan submitted that the Committee should have its own amicus and Advocate-on-Record rather than being represented through government counsel, and must remain even-handed. The Chief Justice was categorical in response:
“There is no question of the Committee being represented by State counsel. It will report directly to us and function under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court. We will ask the Committee to communicate with us directly and submit its reports straight to the Court, eliminating any government intermediary.”
The Court added that if the Committee felt it required the assistance of an amicus, liberty could be granted to make such a request, and one could be appointed thereafter. When the Solicitor General suggested that the Committee could communicate through its Secretary and the Secretary General of the Supreme Court, the Court accepted that the Secretary, to be chosen by the Chairperson, would handle communication and coordination, and could liaise directly with the counsel the Court had earlier nominated.
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The procedure: akin to a Commission of Inquiry
Justice Bagchi indicated the procedural template the Committee would follow, observing that it “will follow a procedure broadly akin to Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,” and that ultimately the exercise was one of “ensuring natural justice.” The Chief Justice elaborated that the Committee would issue a public notice, and that anyone responding to it who wished to appear would be entitled to place their viewpoint, information, documents or evidence on record, all of which the Committee would consider.
On the mechanics, the Court said the Member Secretary would effectively act as the custodian of the entire record and place the complete material before the Committee, and that this Member Secretary could ordinarily be a retired District Judge or another judicial officer. Responding to a request that the Committee publicise its location, the Chief Justice agreed that adequate public notice, including through newspaper advertisements, should be given so that “everyone who wishes to participate must be given a fair opportunity.” The Court also clarified that the nodal counsel it had earlier appointed were only for the proceedings before the Supreme Court and had nothing to do with the independently-functioning Committee.
Court declines to alter the Committee’s composition
A significant part of the hearing concerned attempts to add to or reconstitute the Committee, which the Court firmly resisted. Senior Advocate Dr. A.M. Singhvi suggested that the Solicitor General might consider one or two names he proposed, which he said would “add greater stature and weight to the Committee.” The Solicitor General declined to engage, submitting: “Please do not give us names and put us in a position where we have to say yes or no. I would rather not even see the names, because I do not want to be seen as opposing any particular individual.”
The Chief Justice made the Court’s position plain:
“We are not inclined to make any change to the Committee. It has been constituted by this Court, is meant to assist us, and will function directly under the supervision of the Supreme Court. This is not a case where we have constituted a committee and then disposed of the matter. If at any stage you feel the Committee has ignored material, proceeded incorrectly, or gone wrong in any respect, you can bring that to our notice. We are not going anywhere.”
The conflict-of-interest allegation
Advocate Prashant Bhushan raised what he described as a conflict-of-interest concern regarding at least one member of the Committee, submitting that the member had been a batchmate and close friend of one of the persons likely to come under inquiry, and that questions had been raised about his integrity. He urged that the Committee comprise persons known for strong and demonstrable independence. The Solicitor General resisted, remarking that by that standard “apparently the whole country is dishonest except one or two people,” and another counsel noted that, save for the allegation concerning the DGP, there was no specific allegation against any other member, and there could be no presumption of bias against the Committee.
Justice Bagchi struck a measured note, indicating the Court would look into the specific reservation without accepting a starting presumption of bias:
“We will examine the reservations you have raised regarding that particular member. But we cannot accept the suggestion that a member of a Committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge and constituted by this Court should begin with a presumption of bias.”
When Sankaranarayanan raised a related concern, that if the chain of command examined by the Committee extended up to the Home Ministry, the junior-most officer on the Committee might struggle to function with complete independence, the Chief Justice cautioned against politicising the exercise: “Let us not turn this into a political issue. The Committee’s task is to examine the allegation of excessive police action.”
An extended arm of the Court
Through the hearing, the Court repeatedly characterised the Committee as an “extended arm” of the Supreme Court, whose opinion would assist it in passing final orders, with all material ultimately returning to the Court. It clarified that parties were free to place all relevant material, including the issues identified for priority consideration in its August 18 order, directly before the Committee, and that its earlier order already permitted anonymous complaints and submissions so that the identities of complainants and witnesses could be protected. Suggestions for an online portal to allow people across the country to submit material remotely were left for the Committee itself to decide.
Why the hearing matters
The hearing is significant for the care the Court took to insulate the Committee from the perception of being an arm of the executive it is meant to scrutinise. By stripping out any government intermediary, routing the Committee’s communications straight to the Court, and rejecting attempts by both the government’s law officer’s interlocutors and the petitioners to reshape the panel, the Court sought to preserve the Committee’s neutrality on a matter where the allegations run against the police and, potentially, the chain of command above them. That insistence on direct supervision, coupled with the “extended arm of the Court” framing, is the mechanism by which a fact-finding body retains credibility in a politically-charged inquiry.
Equally instructive is the Court’s handling of the bias objection. Rather than either dismissing the conflict-of-interest allegation outright or reconstituting the panel, the Court undertook to examine the specific reservation while refusing to let a Committee headed by a former Supreme Court judge begin under a cloud of presumed bias, a balance that protects both the integrity of the inquiry and the reputation of its members. With the Committee to issue public notice and begin its work, and the Court retaining continuing supervision, the framework now moves from constitution to operation, the substance of the inquiry, and its findings, still to come.
Case Title: Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India and Others
Bench: Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana
Date of Hearing: September 10, 2026