The Supreme Court has agreed to examine whether the closure of 17 Delhi Metro stations during the July student protests was a proportionate measure, issuing notice on a plea that argues no law permits shutting down a public utility to curb protests.
New Delhi: The Supreme Court has issued notice to the Union on a writ petition challenging the closure of 17 Delhi Metro stations during the July student protests, agreeing to examine whether shutting down a public utility to curb a protest was an illegal and disproportionate measure, and observing that while courts ordinarily defer to the executive on law-and-order decisions, judicial scrutiny may be warranted when the exercise of that discretion becomes disproportionate [Sparsh Kant Nayak v. Union of India and Others].
A Bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana heard the matter alongside the other petitions concerning the student protests, and sought responses from the Delhi Police, the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC).
The challenge: no law to shut a public utility
Appearing for the petitioner, Advocate Sanjiv Narang framed the case not as one about the rights of protesters, but about the constitutional standards that govern the shutting down of a public utility and the restrictions such a closure imposes on the general public. The core contention was that there is simply no statutory provision authorising the closure of Metro stations on account of protests.
Counsel pointed to the Metro Railways (Operation and Maintenance) Act, submitting that it contains no power to shut stations in such circumstances, and drew a distinction between regulating a protest and disabling a public service: “The police can regulate a protest, but they cannot issue orders directing a public utility to be shut down.” He also raised a pointed objection to the manner in which the closures were communicated:
“There is no particular statute under which these orders were passed. In fact, no order itself was passed. There were only posts on X communicating the decision to the public. Most of the public don’t know what are the posts on X.com.”
The petitioner submitted that no specific reason had been given for the shutdown beyond a generic invocation of “security reasons,” and sought a direction for a standard operating procedure (SOP) to govern the closure of Metro stations during protests.
The proportionality argument
At the heart of the petition is the doctrine of proportionality. The petitioner contended that the closure violated the requirement that any restriction on constitutional rights must adopt the least restrictive, or least invasive, measure available to achieve its aim, and relied on the principles the Supreme Court has developed in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, which laid down the proportionality framework for internet and communication shutdowns, and in In Re: Ramlila Maidan Incident, concerning restrictions on the right to assemble.
The invocation of Anuradha Bhasin is significant: that judgment held that orders imposing restrictions on fundamental rights must be published, must be reasoned, and must satisfy the test of proportionality, and that an indefinite or blanket suspension of a service is impermissible. The petitioner’s case, in essence, seeks to extend that logic from the shutdown of internet services to the shutdown of a mass-transit utility, arguing that the same constitutional discipline, a legal basis, a reasoned and published order, and the least-restrictive-means test, should apply before a Metro network serving lakhs of commuters is switched off.
The Court: deference, but not without limit
The Bench’s oral observations mapped the tension the case presents. Justice Bagchi noted that the regulation of movement in a law-and-order context is ordinarily carried out through directions issued by the police under the relevant police laws, and questioned whether the Metro closures would fall within the State’s law-and-order powers. He acknowledged the traditional judicial deference to the executive in this sphere, but marked its outer limit:
“Standard Operating Procedures in such cases is actually a mirage. When it comes to such questions, courts have deferred to the executive authority. It is only when it becomes disproportionate that courts step in.”
On that basis, the Court indicated that the real inquiry would be into the manner in which the discretion had been exercised in this particular instance, “we will have to examine the way in which the discretion is being exercised,” Justice Bagchi said, before the Court issued notice. The framing is telling: rather than accept the petitioner’s call for a blanket SOP, which the judge doubted the utility of, the Court signalled it would test the specific closures against the proportionality standard, the point at which deference yields to scrutiny.
Why the case matters
The petition raises a question of growing practical importance: the legal basis on which authorities shut down public infrastructure, Metro stations, roads, and the like, as a tool of crowd control, and the standards that should govern such decisions. Closing Metro stations is a blunt instrument that affects not the protesters alone but the entire travelling public, and the petitioner’s argument that it lacks any specific statutory foundation, and is often communicated only through social-media posts rather than a formal, reasoned order, exposes a genuine gap between the reach of the measure and the legal architecture supporting it. If the Court accepts that proportionality applies with full rigour, authorities may in future have to justify each closure by reference to a legal power, a stated reason, and the absence of a less drastic alternative.
Equally, the case tests the boundary of judicial deference in law-and-order matters. Justice Bagchi’s observation, that courts step in only when a measure becomes disproportionate, captures the settled position that the executive is ordinarily best placed to assess security risks, while leaving open the possibility that a particular exercise of that power can be struck down as excessive. The Court’s decision to examine “the way in which the discretion is being exercised,” rather than to lay down a general SOP, suggests a fact-specific scrutiny of the July closures. With notice issued and responses awaited from the Union, the Delhi Police, the Delhi Government and the DMRC, the matter now proceeds to a fuller hearing, where the outcome could shape how public utilities may lawfully be shut during future protests. Nothing has been decided; the Court has only agreed to examine the question.
Case Title: Sparsh Kant Nayak v. Union of India and Others [W.P.(C) No. 1066/2026]
Bench: Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana
Date of Hearing: September 10, 2026