Allahabad High Court: Decree Cancelling Sale Deed Without Eviction Order Cannot Justify Dispossession, Grants Injunction

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The Allahabad High Court has held that a decree cancelling a sale deed does not, by itself, allow the occupants to be dispossessed, and that even a rightful owner must seek eviction through a court order.

Allahabad High Court judgment on a sale deed cancellation decree and dispossession without an eviction order

Lucknow: The Allahabad High Court has granted a temporary injunction to a widow and her minor daughter, restraining their dispossession from a house they have occupied since 1987, after finding that the 2001 decree cancelling the sale deed under which the family held the property contained no direction for eviction or dispossession [Rekha Saxena and Another v. Roman Catholic Diocese, Allahabad Pvt. Ltd. Through Director General the Bishop and Another].

Justice Prashant Kumar allowed the First Appeal From Order and set aside the order dated July 3, 2025, of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Raebareli, which had rejected the appellants’ application for temporary injunction in Regular Suit No. 238 of 2023.

Background

According to the record, a power of attorney executed on June 2, 1987, authorising one Augustine Paul to sell the property, was cancelled on September 18, 1987. On September 22, 1987, before the cancellation was registered on September 29, 1987, Paul executed a sale deed under the power of attorney in favour of the late Savitri Srivastava, the mother-in-law of the first appellant, who built a house on the land. The buyer is recorded as having been unaware of the cancellation.

The Roman Catholic Diocese, Allahabad, later filed Original Suit No. 100 of 1991 seeking cancellation of the sale deed. The suit was decreed ex parte on April 21, 2001, cancelling the sale deed and restraining further construction, but the decree was drawn up only on April 7, 2023. In September 2023, the appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction, along with an application for temporary injunction, which the trial court rejected on July 3, 2025. The first appellant is a widow and the second appellant is her minor daughter, and the property is their residence.

What the 2001 decree did not say

The High Court examined the 2001 decree and found that it dealt only with the sale deed and further construction:

“the judgment dated 21.4.2001 which was passed by the Trial Court only pertains to the cancellation of the sale deed and any further constructions on the disputed land in question, but do not contain any direction or order for eviction or dispossession.”

Due process, even against an alleged trespasser

Referring to the principle that possession is good against all but the rightful owner, the Court held that even a person alleged to be a trespasser cannot be removed by force:

“this court has no embargo to hold that even where the person in long standing possession and is alleged to be a trespasser, the majesty of law cannot be supplanted by the impulse of force. Due process of law must be followed for his eviction; the rightful owner, however strong his title or just his claim, must seek the aid of law and cannot take the law into his own hands.”

It added:

“Possession can only be disturbed only by due procedure sanctioned by law i.e., any direction or order for eviction or dispossession from competent court.”

Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury

The Court found that the appellants had made out a prima facie case, noting that they were “in long lasting, settled and peaceful possession of the suit property since 1987 through predecessor in interest.” It also noted that the respondents’ own counter-affidavit referred to the appellants’ occupation, which implicitly acknowledged their possession.

On the balance of convenience and irreparable injury, the Court observed:

“Their possession for more than three decades, appellant no.1 being a widow and appellant no.2 being a minor daughter and the property in dispute is their residential house, thus, if disturbed during the pendency of the suit, would cause them irreparable injury and loss which cannot be adequately compensated in terms of money or subsequently cannot be restored if they wins the suit.”

The directions

Setting aside the trial court’s order dated July 3, 2025, the High Court allowed the appeal and granted a temporary injunction in favour of the appellants for the pendency of the suit. It warned:

“Any attempt to forcibly dispossess the appellants, otherwise than in accordance with the procedure established by law, cannot be permitted and may attract consequences under the applicable penal laws.”

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the limited purpose of deciding the temporary injunction application and would not prejudice the merits at trial, which the trial court must decide independently in accordance with law. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Why The Allahabad High Court Judgment Matters

The ruling restates that a decree setting aside a title document is not the same as a decree for possession. A party that wins cancellation of a sale deed must still obtain, and execute, an order for eviction or dispossession before an occupant can be removed, and cannot rely on the cancellation alone to retake the property.

The judgment also shows how courts weigh long, settled possession of a family home at the interim stage. It rests on a prima facie assessment only and leaves the dispute over title and the effect of the 2001 decree to be decided at trial.

Case Title: Rekha Saxena and Another v. Roman Catholic Diocese, Allahabad Pvt. Ltd. Through Director General the Bishop and Another [FAFO No. 354 of 2025]
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar, Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)
Date of Judgment: September 23, 2026
Appearances: Sridhar Awasthi and Aryan Arora for the appellants; Amrendra Nath Tripathi, Akshata Singh, Bipin Dutt Dixit and Dharmendra Kumar Trivedi for the respondents

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