Today, On 29th December, The Supreme Court stayed the Delhi High Court’s December 23 order and said Kuldeep Singh Sengar “shall not be released,” noting, “Notice issued… several substantial questions of law arise,” and seeking a counter-affidavit within four weeks.
NEW DELHI: A three-judge vacation bench of the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Augustine George Masih heard the Central Bureau of Investigation’s appeal against the suspension of former BJP MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar’s life sentence .
The apex Court took a strong view while examining the challenge to the Delhi High Court’s order suspending the life sentence of the convict in the Unnao rape case.
After hearing arguments, the Supreme Court issued notice and CJI Surya Kant announced,
“Notice issued. We have heard SG Mehta for the CBI and senior counsel for the convict. Several substantial questions of law arise in this case. The counter-affidavit shall be filed within four weeks. While the Court generally does not stay release orders without hearing the person concerned, given the peculiar facts that the convict is already serving a sentence for a separate offence, we stay the operation of the Delhi High Court order dated December 23, 2025, and the respondent shall not be released pursuant to that order.”
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During the hearing, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta repeatedly stressed that the crime was very serious and involved the rape of a minor.
He said,
“This is an extremely grave case involving the rape of a minor, in which charges were framed under Section 376 of the IPC and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act.”
He also explained that there were two separate convictions and added,
“The conviction is on two counts, and all relevant portions have been placed on record; paragraph 3 of my note contains the conviction order. There is a clear finding that the victim was below 16 years, 15 years and 10 months and an appeal against the conviction is pending.”
Justice J.K. Maheshwari noted that the part related to Section 376 IPC had already been addressed. SG Mehta responded by explaining how Section 376 covers different forms of rape and stated,
“Section 376 has multiple facets while rape is defined under Section 375, the conviction here is for rape committed by a person in a position of dominance, which attracts a minimum sentence of 20 years, extendable to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life.”
Chief Justice Surya Kant clarified the submission by observing that even if the victim were not considered a minor, the minimum punishment under law would still apply.
He said,
“You are submitting that it falls under Section 376(2)(i), even assuming the victim were not a minor, the minimum sentence prescribed under Section 376 would still apply.”
SG Mehta pointed out that the law had been updated and added,
“The provision has since been amended to stipulate a minimum of 20 years imprisonment.”
Justice Maheshwari then reminded that the amended provision did not exist at the time of the incident and said,
“That amendment was not in force at the time of the offence therefore, clause (i) would apply as it stood then.”
SG Mehta stressed that the trial court had already clarified the punishment and argued,
“The Court has recorded that the sentence is to continue till the end of biological life. In the facts of this case, life imprisonment is the minimum sentence warranted.”
The CJI also asked whether the question of being a public servant becomes irrelevant in a case involving a minor, saying,
“Are you suggesting that the concept of a public servant being in a position of dominance is irrelevant when the victim is a minor?”
SG Mehta then explained how POCSO categorises offences and said,
“POCSO offences broadly fall into two categories penetrative sexual assault, which is an offence per se with punishment under Section 4, and aggravated forms. Even prior to the 2019 amendment, the minimum was 10 years extendable to life, and where the offender is in a dominant position, it is treated as an aggravated offence.”
He illustrated this with practical examples and stated,
“For instance, if a constable commits such an act in the course of duty, it would amount to aggravated sexual assault similarly, an army officer on duty would also attract the aggravated category. Though ‘public servant’ is not defined under POCSO, it borrows the IPC definition, which must be read contextually.”
The CJI then summed it up by saying,
“So your submission is that a public servant is one who enjoys a dominant position at the relevant time say, when a person approaches an MLA for assistance and any such act committed from that position of dominance would qualify as aggravated.”
SG Mehta added that even without this classification, the offence remains serious and said,
“Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that he is not a public servant under Section 5, the offence would still fall under Section 3. The amendment did not introduce a new offence but only enhanced punishment, while a new offence cannot apply retrospectively, that is not the situation here.”
The CJI said the amendment only reflected a stronger intent of the legislature and noted,
“In other words, the amendment does not erase the offence but reflects the legislature’s intent to treat such crimes with greater seriousness, guiding courts to impose stricter sentences after conviction.”
SG Mehta stressed on the overriding power of POCSO and submitted,
“Section 42A of the POCSO Act makes it clear that in case of any inconsistency with other laws, POCSO will prevail, an aspect the High Court failed to consider. The convict has also been held guilty of murdering the victim’s father and continues to remain in custody for that offence. I appeal to the conscience of this Court to stay the impugned order in the interest of the child victim.”
Senior Advocate Sidharth Dave, appearing in the matter, pointed out another clause and said,
“Section 2(2) of the POCSO Act, which was not cited, is relevant. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the IPC definition of ‘public servant’ applies since it is specifically referred to.”
CJI Surya Kant questioned how this applies when the conviction is under two statutes and asked,
“But where the conviction is under two penal statutes and the High Court proceedings are confined only to POCSO?”
The CJI then indicated the Court’s initial view and said,
“Tentatively, we are inclined to stay the order. Usually, the Court does not curtail liberty once a person has been released, but this case is unusual since the accused remains in jail for another matter.”
Justice Maheshwari further asked,
“Show us where the High Court has considered whether he is guilty under Section 376(2)(i).”
Senior Advocate Hariharan argued about borrowing definitions and said,
“A penal statute cannot borrow definitions from another law.”
Justice Maheshwari replied that the trial court had examined it and said,
“We are merely pointing out that paragraph 14 of the trial court order addresses this, but the suspension order does not. Please indicate where it has been considered.”
The CJI then raised a broader concern about interpretation and stated,
“This legal issue requires careful consideration. Even the High Court judges who passed the order, among the finest, can err. We are concerned that under POCSO, a constable is treated as a public servant while a legislator may be excluded.”
Hariharan objected to public discussion and said,
“Is this becoming a media trial? The doctrine of separation of powers applies here.” Dave added, “Photos of the judges are circulating in the media.”
In the end, the Supreme Court issued notice and CJI Surya Kant announced,
“Notice issued. We have heard SG Mehta for the CBI and senior counsel for the convict. Several substantial questions of law arise in this case. The counter-affidavit shall be filed within four weeks. While the Court generally does not stay release orders without hearing the person concerned, given the peculiar facts that the convict is already serving a sentence for a separate offence, we stay the operation of the Delhi High Court order dated December 23, 2025, and the respondent shall not be released pursuant to that order.”
Earlier, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) appealed to the Supreme Court against the Delhi High Court’s decision to suspend the life sentence of Kuldeep Singh Sengar, a former Uttar Pradesh BJP MLA, in the 2017 Unnao rape case involving a minor girl.
The CBI contests the High Court’s ruling, which suspended Sengar’s sentence under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure while his criminal appeal is still pending.
In December 2019, Sengar was convicted by a trial court and sentenced to life imprisonment for rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act).
The trial court noted that there were no mitigating factors and emphasized that, as a public servant in a democratic society, Sengar betrayed the trust of the people.
While his appeal is still ongoing, Sengar sought suspension of his sentence and bail, which the High Court granted on December 23. The suspension was based on the Court’s preliminary finding that the charge of aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act was not applicable in his case.
Earlier, on December 23, the Delhi High Court suspended Sengar’s sentence in relation to the 2017 case. The survivor, a minor, was reportedly kidnapped and raped by Sengar between June 11 and June 20, 2017, after which she was sold for Rs.60,000 before being recovered at the Maakhi police station.
According to Section 5 of the POCSO Act, the definition of aggravated penetrative sexual assault includes offenses committed by public servants, police officers, or others in trusted positions.
The trial court labelled Sengar as a public servant under this definition.
However, the High Court’s Division Bench, consisting of Justices Subramonium Prasad and Harish Vaidynathan Shankar, concluded that Sengar did not qualify as a public servant under Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act or Section 376(2)(b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The Court ruled that Sengar did not fit within the provisions of Section 5(p) of the POCSO Act, which addresses offenses committed by individuals “in a position of trust or authority.”
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, the CBI asserts that the High Court made a legal error by ruling that aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act was not established in Sengar’s case.
The CBI argues that a sitting MLA holds a constitutional position of trust and authority, responsible for public duties that impact both the State and the community.
According to the petition,
“High Court failed to consider that a sitting MLA, by virtue of holding a constitutional office, is vested with public trust and authority over the electorate, and that such position carries heightened responsibility arising from duties owed to the State and society.”
The CBI further claims that the High Court did not apply a purposive interpretation of the POCSO Act, aimed at protecting children from sexual offenses.
They assert that Section 5(c) is designed to penalize the sexual exploitation of minors by individuals who abuse their positions of power or authority.
Additionally, the CBI has expressed concerns for the safety of the survivor and her family, indicating that Sengar’s influential status could threaten their security and undermine public faith in the justice system.
Previously, the Unnao rape case survivor announced that she would move the Supreme Court to challenge the Delhi High Court’s order granting conditional bail to convict Kuldeep Singh Sengar.
Reacting to the decision, the survivor said the judgment had deeply shaken her faith in the justice system. She stated that the ruling left her emotionally devastated but reaffirmed her resolve to continue fighting for justice for the sake of her children and family.
Questioning the fairness of the legal process, she pointed out that her uncle remains in jail despite repeated bail pleas in a case she alleges was falsely lodged by Sengar’s brother, while Sengar himself has been granted bail. She claimed the decision reflected the influence of power and money.
The survivor also alleged political interference in the case, claiming that influential leaders backed Sengar and asserting that powerful interests played a role in the outcome. She said she would approach the Supreme Court seeking justice.
Background
The Unnao rape case has been marked by a series of tragic and controversial incidents involving the survivor’s family:
- April 2018: The survivor’s father was arrested under the Arms Act after an alleged complaint by Sengar’s associates. He later died in police custody. A post-mortem revealed 14 injuries on his body.
- July 2019: A day after the survivor wrote to the then Chief Justice of India seeking justice, a truck rammed into the car carrying her and her lawyer. Two of her aunts were killed in the crash. The survivor and her lawyer were seriously injured, and the lawyer later died.
- December 2019: Kuldeep Singh Sengar was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by a trial court.
The case dates back to 2017, when Sengar, who was later expelled from the BJP, allegedly kidnapped and raped a minor girl. In 2019, the Supreme Court transferred the rape case and related cases from a trial court in Uttar Pradesh to Delhi for impartial proceedings.
Case Title: CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION V KULDEEP SINGH SENGAR, SLP(Crl) No. 21367/2025
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