The bar under Article 311(1) of the Constitution is attracted only where an employee is dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate in rank to the one that appointed him, the Supreme Court held, restoring the 1983 removal of an RPSF constable after finding that the removing officer was of the same rank as the appointing authority.
New Delhi: The Supreme Court has held that the constitutional protection under Article 311(1), which prohibits the dismissal or removal of a civil servant by an authority subordinate in rank to the authority that appointed him, is not attracted where the removing authority is of the same rank as the appointing authority, and has restored the 1983 order removing a constable of the Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF) from service [Union of India and Others v. Ramdhani Prasad].
A Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi allowed the Union’s appeal, setting aside a January 2023 judgment of the Allahabad High Court and the judgment of the First Appellate Court, both of which had held the removal to be unconstitutional, and restored the trial court’s dismissal of the employee’s suit, bringing a service dispute that had run for over four decades to a close.
The dispute
The respondent was enlisted as a recruit for the post of Rakshak (constable) in the RPSF and called for training by a call letter of May 1979 issued by the Commandant. On completing his initial training, a Battalion Order of December 4, 1979, issued by the Assistant Commandant of the 2nd Battalion, appointed him as a Rakshak with effect from that date and posted him. While in service, he was granted leave in May 1982 but failed to resume duty on its expiry and remained absent for 72 days without intimation. A charge-sheet for gross negligence and breach of discipline followed; a departmental enquiry was held ex-parte after he failed to appear; the charges were found established; and, after a show-cause notice to which he did not respond, the Adjutant passed an order removing him from service in March 1983, which a departmental appeal to the Commandant later upheld.
The employee’s civil suit challenging the removal was dismissed by the trial court, which held that he had been validly appointed by the Assistant Commandant and validly removed by the Adjutant, an officer not below that rank. The First Appellate Court reversed that, holding that he had been appointed by the Commandant (a higher authority) and so his removal by the subordinate Adjutant violated Article 311(1), and that the ex-parte enquiry had denied him a fair opportunity given his illness. The Allahabad High Court affirmed that view. The Union appealed to the Supreme Court.
Who was the appointing authority?
The crux of the case was the identity of the appointing authority, since Article 311(1) is breached only if the removing officer is subordinate to whoever appointed the employee. The Court held that the operative appointment was made not by the Commandant’s call letter but by the Assistant Commandant’s Battalion Order of December 4, 1979. The call letter, it held, was “only a communication requiring the selected candidates to report for and undergo the prescribed initial training and did not constitute the operative appointment order”; it was the Battalion Order, issued on successful completion of training, that “operated as the appointment order as well as the posting order.”
On the rank question, the Court noted the trial court’s finding, undisputed by the employee, that the Adjutant who passed the removal order was of the same rank as the Assistant Commandant who had appointed him. Since the removing authority was not subordinate to the appointing authority, “this essential ingredient of Article 311 is absent in the facts of the present case,” and the removal could not be struck down on that ground.
Appointment power not confined to the Chief Security Officer
The Court also addressed the argument, underlying the lower appellate courts’ reasoning, that appointment power vested exclusively in the Chief Security Officer. Interpreting Section 6 of the Railway Protection Force Act, it held that while the Act provides that the “appointment of members of the Force shall rest with the Chief Security Officer,” the word “rest” conveys “overall control” of appointments subject to the Rules, not an exclusive personal power. The proviso to Section 6, and the Rules made under the Act, validly contemplate appointments being made by other authorised superior officers.
Reading this with Section 9 of the Act, which empowers superior officers to impose penalties subject to Article 311 and the Rules, the Court held that if only the Chief Security Officer could appoint and dismiss, Section 9 would not have been worded as it was. The Assistant Commandant, Assistant Security Officer and Adjutant were therefore all competent, under the Rules, to appoint and to remove a Rakshak.
No violation of natural justice
The Court rejected the contention that the ex-parte enquiry had violated the principles of natural justice. On the record, the employee had acknowledged the charge-sheet and submitted a reply; the enquiry was then fixed and notice communicated to him; he failed to appear, whereupon the enquiry proceeded ex-parte; and he did not respond to the subsequent show-cause notice proposing removal. The principles of natural justice, the Court held, require that a reasonable opportunity of defence be afforded, and here the employee was made aware of the proceedings and given the opportunity to participate. The enquiry could not be held vitiated “merely on the ground that it proceeded ex-parte,” and the natural-justice objection was rejected.
Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the First Appellate Court, upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the suit, and restored the order of removal dated March 18, 1983.
Why the judgment matters
The judgment is a clear restatement of the precise, and often misunderstood, scope of the safeguard in Article 311(1). That protection is narrow: it does not require that a government servant be dismissed only by his appointing authority, nor by any particular high functionary; it requires only that the dismissing or removing authority not be lower in rank than the appointing authority. Removal by an officer of equal rank, or higher, is therefore constitutionally unobjectionable on this ground. The decision turns on correctly identifying the true appointing authority, and the Court’s holding that a call letter for training is not an appointment, whereas the post-training battalion order is, is a useful clarification for service jurisprudence involving forces recruited through a training-then-appointment process.
The ruling is equally significant for its reading of the RPF Act: the statutory statement that appointment “rests with” the Chief Security Officer denotes overall control exercised through the Rules, not an exclusive power, so that duly authorised officers may appoint and discipline members of the Force. Finally, the Court’s treatment of the natural-justice point reaffirms the settled position that an ex-parte disciplinary enquiry is not, by itself, a denial of natural justice where the employee had notice and a fair opportunity but chose not to participate. Coming more than four decades after the removal, the judgment also illustrates how long service disputes can take to reach finality, and restores an order that had been undisturbed through two rounds of appellate reversal.
Case Title: Union of India and Others v. Ramdhani Prasad [Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 13645 of 2023]
Bench: Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi
Citation: 2026 INSC 1047
Date of Judgment: September 24, 2026