The bench, led by Chief Justice of India D Y Chandrachud and comprising Justices J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, conducted extensive hearings for nearly two days.
New Delhi: (On Oct 22nd): The Supreme Court reserved its verdict regarding pleas challenging the Allahabad High Court’s judgment, which struck down the 2004 Uttar Pradesh law governing madrasas, deeming it unconstitutional for violating the principle of secularism.
The bench, led by Chief Justice of India D Y Chandrachud and comprising Justices J B Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, conducted extensive hearings for nearly two days.
“Religious instruction is not exclusive to Muslims; our country is a melting pot of cultures, civilizations, and religions, and we should strive to preserve that diversity. The purpose of this Act is to integrate these communities into the mainstream. Otherwise, we risk isolating individuals,”
CJI Chandrachud stated.
The Court emphasized that India encompasses various forms of religious education, citing examples like Madrasas and Vedic patshalas.
“If Parliament enacts a law to regulate these institutions to establish certain standards, what is wrong with that?”
the Court asked.
It further noted that medicine also encompasses numerous disciplines with different origins.
“For instance, we have Ayurveda rooted in Hindu texts, Siddha from Jain traditions, and Unani, which is Persian. If Parliament seeks to regulate these practices, provided it does not harm anyone, then what is the issue?”
CJI Chandrachud remarked.
In May, the Supreme Court had stayed the High Court’s ruling declaring the Act unconstitutional.
It heard arguments from several lawyers representing eight petitioners, along with Additional Solicitor General K M Natraj, who appeared for the Uttar Pradesh government.
On Monday, senior advocates Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Salman Khurshid, and Menaka Guruswamy presented their arguments on behalf of the petitioners. The following day, the court also heard submissions from senior lawyers Mukul Rohatgi, P Chidambaram, and Guru Krishna Kumar, representing various stakeholders.
Today, Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi commenced arguments on behalf of the petitioners, asserting that Article 28(2) of the Constitution serves as an exception to Article 28(1).
According to Article 28(2), the prohibition on providing religious instruction in state-funded institutions does not apply to an educational establishment managed by the State if it has been created under an endowment or trust requiring such religious instruction. Therefore, Rohatgi argued that religious instruction is permissible in institutions overseen by trusts.
CJI Chandrachud noted that Article 28(3) allows students to voluntarily receive religious instruction, with the only stipulation being that there should be no compulsion.
Rohatgi also criticized the High Court’s decision to rule on a Public Interest Litigation (PIL), contending that the judgment contradicts the principles of secularism by potentially depriving minority students of their rights.
“Hundreds of students are enrolled… you cannot impose this on anyone. This isn’t secularism,”
he stated.
In response, CJI Chandrachud remarked,
“Secularism means live and let live.”
The State of Uttar Pradesh, which has opted not to contest the High Court’s ruling, maintained that it was incorrect to invalidate the entire Act; only the provisions that violate the Constitution should be nullified.
In her rebuttal, Senior Advocate Menaka Guruswamy, representing the petitioners, referenced the Constitution Bench ruling in Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust vs. Union Of India & Ors, which clarifies that minority religious educational institutions are exempt from the Right to Education (RTE) Act.
Responding to Senior Advocate Guru Krishnakumar, who represented an intervenor against the Act, CJI Chandrachud questioned the objection to the legislature recognizing an institution that provides religious instruction and requiring adherence to specific basic standards.
He expressed concern that striking down the entire Act would leave Madrasas unregulated, stating,
“Isn’t it in our national interest to regulate Madrasas? You can’t disregard 700 years of history like this… If we uphold the High Court’s order, parents will continue sending their children to Madrasas, creating isolated institutions without legislative oversight… It is a policy decision to regulate the Madrasas.”
CJI emphasized that the Act empowers the State to set standards. In response to Krishnakumar’s argument that the Act does not guarantee secular education and focuses primarily on theological studies, CJI highlighted that Section 20 of the statute permits State intervention.
CJI reiterated that “religious instruction is not unique to Muslims,” responding to Krishnakumar by stating,
“If an institute trains Buddhist monks and the State mandates some secular education, that reflects our national ethos. Remember, what you’re arguing in the context of Islam applies to all religions in India, from Vedic pathshalas to institutions training Buddhist monks and Jain priests.”
While acknowledging Krishnakumar’s concerns about the quality of education for Madrasa students, CJI added,
“However, discarding the Act is akin to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”
CJI further stated that
“religious instruction is not inherently contrary to our country’s values.”
When Kumar claimed that Madrasa education would not prepare students for the mainstream, Justice Pardiwala countered,
“Why should you expect them to be on par? You cannot force that!”
Senior Advocate Madhavi Divan, representing an intervenor opposing the Act, argued that Madrasa education undermines the right to quality education guaranteed under Article 21A of the Constitution. While acknowledging the freedom to pursue religious instruction, she contended that it cannot replace mainstream education.
Divan pointed out that the Madarsa Act favors religious scholars in the Board’s composition, potentially exposing children to a singular worldview. Education should empower children to transcend their “birthmarks,” she argued. Due to the predominantly religious nature of these institutions, students might develop a limited perspective.
When CJI noted that there are other similar religious institutions where children join at a young age, Divan argued that these cases involve individuals taking monastic vows to renounce worldly life, unlike Madrasas, where students aim to participate in society.
She expressed concern that students from Madrasas might miss opportunities in professions such as the Navy, piloting, or engineering due to a lack of relevant subjects.
Senior Advocate Swarupama Chaturvedi, representing the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), echoed Divan’s points, asserting that Madrasas cannot serve as substitutes for mainstream education. While the NCPCR supports Madrasa education as a supplement, it cannot replace formal education.
Chaturvedi informed the Court that the NCPCR had prepared a report on the shortcomings of the Madrasa system and contacted States for inspections. The Court inquired whether the NCPCR had taken a similar stance regarding institutions of other religions.
“But the NCPCR is aware that religious instruction is provided to young children by institutions across India. Has the NCPCR adopted the same position that it contradicts fundamental Constitutional values?” CJI asked.
“Has the NCPCR issued any directives, cutting across communities, stating that children should not be enrolled in religious institutions unless they are taught secular subjects?” CJI continued.
Chaturvedi acknowledged that the NCPCR believes religious instruction should not substitute mainstream education.
“So, tell us, has the NCPCR issued a directive that across communities, children should not be sent to any monasteries or pathshalas unless they learn science, math, etc.? Why is there only concern for Madrasas? We want to know if you have addressed other institutions. Has the NCPCR treated all communities equitably?”
CJI asked.
Chaturvedi requested time to obtain instructions on that matter and promised to submit an additional statement.
Justice Pardiwala asked if the NCPCR had analyzed the entire Madrasa syllabus.
When the senior counsel confirmed this, Justice Pardiwala observed,
“What conclusions have they reached? What constitutes religious instruction? It appears you are all fixated on the term ‘religious instruction,’ hindering your understanding. The arguments’ foundation is flawed. There is a significant difference between the religious instruction referenced in Article 28 and the medium of education provided.”
The bench also heard brief rebuttals from Senior Advocates A.M. Singhvi, P. Chidambaram, Salman Khurshid, and M.R. Shamshad on behalf of the petitioners.
Singhvi contended that striking down the Act effectively bans Madrasas; if deficiencies exist, the State should utilize its powers under the Act to rectify them rather than dismantling the entire structure. He added that modern subjects are indeed taught in Madrasas. Chidambaram proposed aligning the service conditions of Madarsa teachers with those of other educators.
Shamshad expressed concern over some remarks in the NCPCR’s report, labeling them as “Islamophobic.” He argued that if the State establishes more general schools in Muslim-majority areas, Madrasas will naturally close down.
The petitioners contended that the High Court had misinterpreted the UP Madarsa Act, viewing it as primarily focused on religious instruction rather than its actual purpose: establishing a regulatory framework for educating Muslim children.
In declaring the law ultra vires, the High Court Division, comprising Justices Vivek Chaudhary and Subhash Vidyarthi, also instructed the Uttar Pradesh Government to create a scheme to integrate students currently studying in Madrasas into the formal education system.
The High Court’s ruling stemmed from a writ petition filed by Anshuman Singh Rathore, challenging the constitutionality of the UP Madarsa Board and objecting to the management of Madrasas by the Minority Welfare Department, among other related issues.
Petitions contesting the High Court’s judgment were filed by Anjum Kadari, the Managers Association of Madaris Arabiya (UP), the All India Teachers Association of Madaris Arabiya (New Delhi), the Managers Association of Arbi Madarsa Nai Bazar, and the Teachers Association of Madaris Arabiya Kanpur.
Representatives for the petitioners included Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. P.S. Patwalia, Mr. P. Chidambaram, Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Mr. Salman Khurshid, and Mr. M.R. Shamshad, Senior Advocates, assisted by Rohit Amit Sthalekar, AOR Sankalp Narain, Adv. M.A. Ausaf, Adv. H.P. Sahi, Adv. Yash Johari, and Adv. Utkarsh Pratap in these matters.
The Allahabad High Court, in its March 22 judgment, declared the Act “unconstitutional” and directed the state government to integrate madrasa students into the formal education system. However, on April 5, the CJI-led bench granted interim relief to approximately 17 lakh madrasa students by following the High Court’s decision to annul the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004.
The Supreme Court considered around eight petitions, with the lead petition filed by Anjum Kadari, challenging the High Court’s ruling.
Case Title : Anjum Kadari and another v. Union of India and others
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