The Supreme Court held that the Section 20 presumption under the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be drawn unless the initial demand is proved, acquitting two public servants in a 1996 bribe case.
New Delhi: The Supreme Court has acquitted a former village Talati-cum-Mantri and a peon in a 1996 bribery case, holding that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be drawn where the initial demand for a bribe has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the mere recovery of the money cannot, by itself, resurrect the prosecution’s case [Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat].
A Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar allowed the appeals, setting aside concurrent convictions recorded by the trial court in 1999 and affirmed by the Gujarat High Court in 2015.
The central principle: no proven demand, no presumption
The decisive legal question was the interplay between proof of demand and the statutory presumption available to the prosecution in corruption cases.
Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act allows a court, once it is proved that a public servant accepted gratification, to presume that the gratification was accepted as a bribe. But the Court reiterated that this presumption is not a substitute for proof of demand it is triggered only after the demand has been independently established. Drawing on the three-judge Bench decision in N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court held that where the initial demand itself is not proved, the mere recovery of the tainted money cannot revive the case:
The Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 20 would come into play only after the initial demand is proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, and that if the initial demand itself is not proved, the mere recovery of the amount would not resurrect the prosecution’s case to enable a finding that the charge was proved. The High Court, it found, had erred in drawing the presumption merely because the accused were public servants and because the peon was found in possession of a currency note smeared with anthracene powder.
The proposition is a settled but frequently-misapplied one, and its practical force is considerable: in corruption prosecutions, demand is the foundational fact, and a successful trap or recovery cannot fill the gap left by an unproven demand.
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Why the demand was held doubtful
The complainant had alleged that the accused Talati-cum-Mantri (A1) demanded ₹120 for issuing an income certificate ₹100 for himself and ₹20 for the peon (A2). The Court found the proof of that demand riddled with doubt.
First, the complainant’s account of the amount had shifted. In a separate case he had filed against the accused within a month of the incident, he had deposed that the initial demand was ₹200, settled finally at ₹120 a version he did not repeat in the present trial, creating a material variance on the very amount alleged. Second, and more tellingly, although the complainant had been instructed by the Anti-Corruption Bureau to hand over the entire ₹120 whenever the demand was made, he gave only ₹20 to the peon — and the peon, standing a foot or two away, did not question why only ₹20 was being paid when he had supposedly been told ₹120. That conduct, the Court held, raised serious suspicion about whether the ₹120 demand was made at all. There was also a discrepancy between the complainant and the panch witness over the manner in which the note was taken out and handed over.
The peon’s acquittal, and a plausible innocent explanation
The position of the peon was even weaker for the prosecution. Both the trial court and the High Court had found that no demand was proved against him — the case being only that the complainant thrust the ₹20 note into his pocket. The Court noted that the peon’s defence, that the festival of Eid fell the next day and the complainant had simply given him ₹20 after receiving his certificate, was probable.
Significantly, the money was handed over after the income certificate had been prepared and given to the complainant. Relying on the principle in State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, the Court observed that it cannot be assumed, merely from a payment, that the payment was pursuant to a demand particularly where the very work for which the bribe was allegedly sought had already been completed.
The invalid sanction — but the acquittal rests elsewhere
The Court also addressed a challenge to the validity of the sanction to prosecute the Talati-cum-Mantri. Under Section 19(1)(c) of the Act, cognizance of an offence under Sections 7 and 13 requires the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove the public servant from office. Here, the sanction had been granted by the Deputy District Development Officer, whereas — the accused holding the substantive post of Talati-cum-Mantri — it was the District Development Officer alone who was competent to remove him under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961. On that footing, the Court found the sanction invalid.
Notably, however, the Court declined to rest the acquittal on the sanction defect alone, holding that even leaving that aside, the prosecution’s evidence “falls woefully short” of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The acquittal thus stands on the merits the failure to prove demand rather than on the technical infirmity in the sanction.
The result
Holding that the charge of demand was not proved against A1, that both courts had found no demand by A2, and that mere possession of the ₹20 note could not sustain the convictions, the Court set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, acquitted both appellants of the offences under Sections 7, 12 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, and cancelled their bail bonds.
Case Title: Rafikmiya Ahmedmiya Malek v. State of Gujarat, with Sirajbhai Rasulbhai Vora v. State of Gujarat [Criminal Appeal Nos. 1177 and 1183 of 2015]
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Citation: 2026 INSC 890
Date of Judgment: August 19, 2026
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