The Supreme Court dismissed a mother’s appeal against the Delhi High Court’s refusal of maintenance for her daughter, holding that scientific evidence prevails over legal presumptions. It ruled that “a man cannot be directed to pay maintenance if a DNA test disproves fatherhood.”
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the mother, who had challenged the Delhi High Court order denying maintenance for her daughter .
The Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh said that once a DNA report is on record and has reached finality, courts cannot ignore its conclusion.
Observing that scientific evidence should take precedence over conclusive proof under law, the Supreme Court has held that,
“A man cannot be directed to pay maintenance for a child if a paternity test does not establish his fatherhood.”
The parties married in 2016. Soon after, matrimonial discord developed. The mother then filed an application under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, requesting interim maintenance for herself and their child.
The mother had moved the Supreme Court against the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court on 17 October 2023, which had affirmed the findings of the Metropolitan Magistrate’s order dated 1 December 2017 and the Sessions Court’s order dated 20 March 2019.
These courts had held that her daughter was not entitled to maintenance from the respondent. The case began with the allegation that the appellant had worked for three years as a domestic help in the respondent’s house, during which time he had entered into sexual relations with her on the promise of marriage.
They eventually married on 2 March 2016, and a child was born on 1 April 2016. When the relationship broke down, she filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, seeking Rs,25,000 as interim maintenance, protection orders for herself and her minor daughter, and return of her stridhan.
The respondent opposed all allegations and asked for a DNA test to prove that he was not the biological father.
The Trial Court accepted that request and ordered the DNA test. The report dated 8 May 2017 stated that the respondent was not the biological father of the child. Based on this report and the observation that the appellant had not disclosed her income properly, the Trial Court rejected the request for interim maintenance.
The Sessions Court later noted that the claim for the child’s maintenance was “no longer pressed” and upheld the finding on concealment of income.
The High Court then discussed the law on presumption of paternity under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act and observed that this protection applies only when no DNA test has been conducted because the intention of Section 112 is to “grant the presumption of legitimacy to every child.”
Since the DNA report was already available and final, and even the validity of the marriage was under question, the High Court upheld the denial of maintenance for the child.
However, it found that the Trial Court had erred by denying the appellant her own interim maintenance and therefore sent that issue back to the Trial Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the main challenge was to the application of Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
The Court reproduced the section along with its new version under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, and noted that both provisions are identical.
The Court said that the purpose of this section is clear because the legislature retained it “to save any child from the stigma of illegitimacy” even after modern scientific advances. While analysing how courts have interpreted this presumption, the Bench referred to a series of earlier judgments.
In the case of Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohd. Farooq, the Court had said that Section 112 is a rule of law “based on the dictates of justice” and that courts must avoid lightly giving a verdict that would “have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and its mother an unchaste woman.”
Then, in Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal, the Supreme Court summarised the legal position and held that courts cannot order blood tests casually, that such requests cannot be allowed for a “roving inquiry,” that the husband must first prove non-access to dislodge the presumption, that courts must consider if a test would brand the child illegitimate, and that “no one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.”
The Court then referred to the landmark judgment in Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, where it was held that Section 112 was enacted long before DNA technology, and while the presumption is strong, “the same is rebuttable.”
The Court had explained that when there is evidence to the contrary, the presumption is rebuttable and must yield to proof, and where there is a conflict between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement…, the latter must prevail over the former.
The judgment also clarified the difference between a legal fiction and a presumption and observed that Section 112 creates a presumption, not a fiction.
Next, the Bench referred to Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy, where the Supreme Court held that a DNA test may be permitted depending on the facts because it can be the most authentic method for a husband to prove allegations of infidelity and also the most accurate method for a wife to prove her innocence.
Then, the Court mentioned the later judgment in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, where it was held that even a genuine DNA report does not automatically dislodge the presumption under Section 112 if the husband and wife were living together during the time of conception, and that what needs to be proved is non-access, not just a mismatch in DNA.
It was also observed that routinely ordering DNA tests could affect the child’s identity and even cause future psychological harm.
The Supreme Court also quoted from the decision in Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, where the Court said that judges must carefully “balance the interests” involved before ordering a DNA test. It warned that allegations of infidelity can deeply harm the dignity and reputation of women, and stated that “the conferment of such a right can lead to its potential misuse against vulnerable women.”
The Court noted the possibility of “significant mental distress” to women in such situations.
After reviewing all judgments, the Supreme Court explained that the present case stands on a different footing because here the DNA test has already been conducted with consent and has never been disputed.
Therefore, Section 112 cannot override a DNA report that has already attained finality. The Court said that this case is squarely covered by the principle in Badwaik, where the Court had held that in such a situation, the DNA report must prevail. For this reason, the Supreme Court held that the High Court was correct in denying maintenance to the child and concluded that the appeal was “bereft of merit.”
However, the Supreme Court expressed concern about the child, noting that even though the mother’s maintenance claim has been sent back to the Trial Court, the child may continue to face difficulties.
To ensure that the child’s welfare is not neglected, the Court directed the Secretary, Women and Child Development, Government of NCT of Delhi, to send a qualified officer to visit the appellant’s home and check the child’s condition.
The officer must assess the child’s “education, nutrition, health, as also the availability of basic material goods required to maintain a minimum standard of living,” and the Department must take corrective steps wherever support is needed.
The Supreme Court disposed of all pending applications with these directions.
Case Title: Nikhat Parveen @ Khusboo Khatoon v. Rafique @ Shillu