Today, On 13th March, The Supreme Court of India told the Lokpal of India it need not follow the Delhi High Court direction for a fresh sanction exercise in the cash-for-query case involving Mahua Moitra. The bench said the interpretation needs closer examination.
The Supreme Court told the Lokpal that it need not follow the Delhi High Court’s direction to conduct a fresh sanction exercise in the “cash‑for‑query” matter involving TMC leader Mahua Moitra.
The bench observed that the High Court’s reading which restricted the Lokpal’s role in prosecution and required a combined exercise under Section 20(7) and (8) warrants closer examination to ensure the Lokpal can carry out its statutory duty of safeguarding high‑level investigations.
Hearing a petition by the Lokpal challenging the Delhi High Court’s order that quashed the sanction for a CBI chargesheet against Ms. Moitra, the Court noted the case arises from the ongoing “cash‑for‑query” probe.
The Bench, comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi, directed,
“Issue notice. CBI accepts notice on behalf of AOR… Dasti notice to complainant. Meanwhile, the Learned Lokpal need not comply with directions in Para 89 of the impugned order dated 19.12.2025.”
Senior Advocate Ranjit Kumar represented the petitioner, while Solicitor General Tushar Mehta appeared for the CBI.
Mehta said,
“I support the impugned order insofar as it gives interpretation to the Act, though Respondents need to be investigated.”
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Senior Advocate Kumar submitted that the core issue involves interpreting Section 20 and its constituent parts rather than addressing any single individual,
“There is some issue regarding the interpretation of Section 20. We are not here for an individual but for the interplay between different parts of the section…There is a direction in the first case, to comply and issue the order composite under Section 20(7) and (8) together.”
Justice Bagchi observed the Court should scrutinize the High Court’s findings in paragraphs 76–78, where it held that the “Lokpal is on investigation and not on prosecution… It does not have a role in prosecution.”
He said those observations must be examined in light of Section 12 of the Act.
Justice Bagchi added that the Court was not permitting prosecution at this stage and that what the Lokpal seeks is a definitive interpretation of Section 20 after being directed to carry out a composite exercise. He indicated a preliminary view that the High Court’s interpretation may be an incorrect interpretation of section 20.
The Chief Justice reiterated that “Para 89 of the judgment need not be complied with by the Lokpal. We will say only this much.”
Justice Bagchi further explained the distinction between the accused’s conduct and the filing of a chargesheet, emphasizing the Lokpal’s purpose, to ensure and insulate and to create public confidence in inquiry, investigation,n and prosecution of public servants where public servants are highly placed, and thereforetherer is a real or a perceptible fear that he or she may disable these agencies, namely the investigating agency and prosecution agencies conducting their statutory duties..
He asked whether the Lokpal should assess the fairness and completeness of an investigation before granting sanction, noting that under Section 20(8) the Lokpal effectively takes a second look to determine whether an investigation has been conducted with a fair application of mind and not rendered nugatory by an indolent investigator.
He said the court had, for now, refrained from expressing a final view given the submissions by learned counsel, and called for a detailed examination of the interplay between the relevant sections alongside the BNSS judgment and the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The High Court’s Para 89 had directed,
“89. The learned Lokpal is requested to accord its consideration for the grant of sanction under Section 20 of the Lokpal Act, strictly in accordance with provisions thereof as construed hereinabove, within a period of one month from today.”
In a related matter, the Supreme Court issued notice limited to determining the Lokpal’s scope of powers, cautioning that the order should not be treated as permission to proceed against respondent No.1 and directing that status quo be maintained to preserve the record.
The Court also impleaded the Union of India as a party.
Kumar, for the Lokpal, pressed on whether the Lokpal must provide detailed reasons when it departs from a Preliminary Enquiry (PE). He contended the Lokpal had issued only a show‑cause notice to hear the other side, whereas the High Court viewed that action as “pre‑judging the matter.“
The Court also considered submissions relating to another respondent, Mujahat Ali Khan. Kumar argued Khan accused No.6 in the FIR and allegedly a beneficiary of tampered OMR sheets was properly excluded from a fresh preliminary enquiry.
Chief Justice Surya Kant questioned that stance, observing that,
“Initially, nothing was found against him. How do you want to proceed against him? You rightly did not hear, because his name was not there in the complaint. But once you passed the order, his name was added. Today, he is being implicated in purported compliance of order passed by you.”
Justice Bagchi remarked that once an FIR is registered and an investigation report is filed, the legal position changes, since the “FIR has merged into an investigation report,” and the Court must apply the law pragmatically.
Earlier, On December 19, 2025, the Delhi High Court set aside the Lokpal’s order, calling the procedure used “statutory ingenuity” for departing from the requirements of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.
The challenge came by way of a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, attacking the Sanction Order dated 12.11.2025 issued in Complaint No. 201/2023 by the Lokpal of India.
That order had authorized the filing of a charge-sheet under Section 20(7)(a) read with Section 23(1) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 against Moitra.
The matter arose from a “cash-for-query” allegation. It was alleged that the Member of Parliament had shared confidential login credentials for the Lok Sabha Member Portal with a Dubai-based businessman, who then used those credentials to post parliamentary questions that benefited his commercial interests.
The complaint also alleged that the MP received cash, valuable gifts, and assistance with home renovations in return for these favors.
The Lokpal first directed the CBI to carry out a Preliminary Inquiry. After considering the inquiry report and the MP’s objections which included assertions that the allegations were politically motivated and that sharing login details for clerical assistance was commonplace the Lokpal ordered a full-fledged investigation.
Following that investigation, the CBI submitted a comprehensive Investigation Report to the Lokpal on June 30, 2025, seeking permission to present a formal chargesheet in court. On November 12, 2025, the Lokpal granted sanction to the CBI to file the chargesheet.
In its reasoning, the Lokpal distinguished between two kinds of sanction under the Act. It described the present permission under Section 20(7)(a) as an administrative step authorizing the filing of a chargesheet, while observing that a subsequent, more formal sanction under Section 20(8) would be required later before a court could take cognizance and proceed with prosecution.
The Lokpal found sufficient initial material showing the sharing of credentials and the receipt of benefits to justify sanctioning the chargesheet.
Moitra challenged that order in the High Court, contending that the Lokpal’s exercise of power was mechanical. Her counsel argued the Lokpal disregarded her detailed written submissions and evidence that rebutted the CBI’s findings, and that the Lokpal was obliged to “apply its mind” to all available material including the option of closing the matter if the material was insufficient. They further submitted that, since the CBI had not substantiated the “cash” allegations, the Lokpal should not have authorized the chargesheet.
The CBI, through the Additional Solicitor General, countered that Moitra’s rights at this stage are limited. It maintained that authorizing the filing of a chargesheet is an administrative or supervisory action and does not amount to initiating trial.
The CBI added that the Lokpal had afforded Moitra more than the procedure required by law to be heard. The complainant supported these submissions, arguing that substantive legal determinations occur at the subsequent prosecution stage, not at the stage of permitting a chargesheet to be filed.
The High Court underlined that its power under Article 226 is supervisory rather than appellate. Consequently, the court’s role is to examine whether the decision-making process was fair and lawful, not to reappraise the evidence itself.
The court observed that interference is warranted only if the Lokpal’s decision was wholly irrational, illegal, or beyond its jurisdiction.
Case Title: Lokpal Of India v. Mahua Moitra and Others ,SLP(C) No. 8919/2026, SLP(C) No. 9576-9577/2026
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