Today, On 13th March, The Supreme Court of India reaffirmed the mandatory three-year practice rule, with the CJI stressing that the condition must remain while its implementation needs refinement. He also questioned passive practice and suggested free legal aid work as experience.
The Supreme Court of India while examining the petitions challenging the three-year practice requirement, instructed all High Courts across the country to extend the deadline for submitting applications for Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts up to April 30, 2026.
A Bench led by CJI Surya Kant, along with Augustine George Masih and K Vinod Chandran jeard the matter.
During the hearing today, Chief Justice Surya Kant remarked that the requirement of three years’ practice was laid down by a previous Supreme Court judgment and must be followed.
He clarified that the only question now is how to frame the procedure for enforcing this rule.
The CJI said,
“Ultimately, let’s be very clear. The practice condition will have to be there. There is the view taken by a bench and we should respect that bench. The only issue is the modalities of giving effect to that.”
He added that the three-year requirement is necessary, but raised an important concern by stating,
“3 years [condition] should be there. But does that mean an advocate sitting idle in one court or the other and watching? Is that going to make them eligible? Or make them free legal aid counsel. That is a very good idea.”
Explaining the purpose behind the rule, the CJI noted,
“The point of the practice requirement is that you learn something.”
He further observed that creating special relaxations for women or persons with disabilities may not be workable in practice.
The CJI also stressed that the judiciary needs candidates with sufficient maturity and exposure, saying they want mature persons to come to the judiciary.
Senior Advocate Siddharth Bhatnagar presented four structured proposals to the Court. He informed that among the 12 High Courts that submitted affidavits, 7 supported the uniform retention of the current rule. His first suggestion was to retain the rule without any changes.
His second and most comprehensive suggestion stated that women and persons with disabilities (PwD) should be allowed to take the civil judge examination without having first completed three years of practice.
However, they would be required to fulfill the remaining practice period after passing the exam before undergoing training at the judicial academy. Seniority would be counted from the date of appointment. As an alternative, he proposed reducing the practice requirement for these two groups from three years to two.
The third suggestion involved a staggered implementation: requiring no years in 2026, one year in 2027, two years in 2028, and returning to the full three years by 2029.
The fourth suggestion specifically targeted PwD candidates, advocating for lower qualifying standards, age relaxation, and directives to High Court Accessibility Committees to implement Sections 19 and 23 of the RPwD Act.
Various High Court committees including those from Delhi, Gauhati, Odisha, Punjab and Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Manipur, and J&K and Ladakh supported maintaining uniformity in the rule. The Delhi High Court committee warned that easing the requirements for one category could lead to similar requests from others.
The J&K High Court committee emphasized a clear separation between eligibility and suitability, asserting that the three-year requirement was a matter of eligibility and should not be compromised for any group.
Meanwhile, the Karnataka and Meghalaya High Court committees favored adjustments for specially-abled candidates within the current framework. Only the Tripura High Court committee suggested completely eliminating the rule for such candidates.
Senior Advocate Pinky Anand expressed concerns that students and recent graduates had not been sufficiently consulted, noting that the practice requirement did not correlate with adjudicatory skills, and observed that the average age of a judicial aspirant was around twenty-nine.
Justice Chandran countered this point.
He stated,
“I have been a Chief Justice. I have been a senior judge. The entire thing is about coaching centres. We have interviewed the judges,”
When Senior Advocate Colin Gonsalves pointed out that NLSIU Bangalore was losing its top graduates due to the rule, Justice Chandran remarked,
“A lot of people who passed out took the hard road, practiced and then….”
CJI Surya Kant approached the discussion from a different angle, affirming that the Court would honor the May 2025 ruling but was concentrating solely on implementation. He questioned what tangible courtroom experience over three years effectively represented in terms of actual practice.
He cautioned,
“Today, if you don’t pick up meritorious people, then God knows what people will you have for another 20-40 years,”
The CJI then suggested a potential direction,
“After one year practice, one year can also be a training year and then probation starts. That can also be the view.”
The Court instructed all High Courts to extend application deadlines for posted positions to April 30, 2026. New advertisements from states or High Courts must also reflect this same deadline. The issue will be revisited next week.
Notably, Justice Chandran and Justice Masih were part of the bench responsible for the judgment currently under review. The May 20, 2025 ruling in All India Judges Association and Ors v. Union of India and Ors was delivered by then CJI BR Gavai, alongside the two judges, and reinstated the three-year bar practice requirement that had been removed in 2002 based on Shetty Commission recommendations.
The review petitions stem from the Supreme Court’s ruling on May 20, 2025, which reinstated the requirement that candidates have a minimum of three years’ practice as advocates to qualify for entry-level judicial service positions, such as Civil Judge (Junior Division).
The Court determined that prior courtroom experience is essential for ensuring the competence, maturity, and practical understanding of trial court operations among judicial officers.
This ruling revived a previous practice condition that had been relaxed in 2002 to permit fresh law graduates to directly participate in judicial service examinations.
Subsequently, review petitions were filed contesting the decision. One of the petitioners, advocate Chandra Sen Yadav, argued that the directive to impose a uniform practice requirement was issued without sufficient empirical evidence and failed to consider the Shetty Commission’s recommendations, which advocated for the removal of this condition due to the internships and court exposure that law students receive during their education.
Additionally, the petitioners contended that candidates undergo institutional training before taking up judicial office, suggesting that a mandatory pre-entry practice period may be unnecessary.
The review petitions further claim that this requirement disproportionately impacts candidates from economically disadvantaged and socially marginalized backgrounds, including those from SC, ST, and OBC communities, as well as excluding law graduates with relevant experience in non-litigation roles, such as those in law firms, public sector enterprises, and corporate legal departments.
The petitioners also argued that the judgment effectively imposed a blanket disqualification on fresh law graduates without any legislative support and placed an unreasonable restriction on the right to practice a profession under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
One of the pleas specifically requested an exemption for persons with disabilities from the three-year practice requirement, citing structural barriers that impede access to litigation work.
Earlier, On February 10, 2026, the Supreme Court permitted the review petitions to be heard in open court, deviating from the standard practice of resolving review cases in chambers without oral arguments. Notices were issued to the States and High Courts.
During the hearing last month, the Chief Justice of India (CJI) remarked that the three-year rule was “disproportionately affecting women candidates.”
In response to the Court’s request for input, several High Courts expressed their support for maintaining this condition, while others advocated for a relaxation of the requirement for candidates with disabilities.
Law colleges have proposed expanding the definition of “practice at the Bar” to encompass various types of legal experience.
Case Title: Bhumika Trust v. Union of India & Ors. and connected matters