Justice KS Puttaswamy best known for being the first individual to challenge the Aadhaar scheme, filing a writ petition with the Supreme Court in 2012 to contest its constitutional validity. While the Court ultimately upheld the scheme, it recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right.
Karnataka: Former Karnataka High Court Justice KS Puttaswamy passed away on Monday(28th Oct) at his home in Bengaluru at the age of 98.
He began his legal career as an advocate in 1952 and was appointed as a judge of the Karnataka High Court in November 1977, serving until 1986. After retiring, he took on the role of vice chairperson at the Central Administrative Tribunal’s Bengaluru Bench.
He is best known for being the first individual to challenge the Aadhaar scheme, filing a writ petition with the Supreme Court in 2012 to contest its constitutional validity. While the Court ultimately upheld the scheme, it recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right.
CASE SUMMARY
- In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (Aadhaar Act), asserting that its passage as a Money Bill was legal and valid, although Justice D.Y. Chandrachud dissented.
- The Court reviewed 27 petitions, each challenging various aspects of the Aadhaar system.
- A key issue was whether it was lawful to mandate Aadhaar for receiving government subsidies, given the risk of excluding beneficiaries. The infringement of the fundamental right to privacy by the Aadhaar Act was contested, with Petitioners arguing that Aadhaar’s use for tracking and profiling individuals violated the Constitution and led to a surveillance state.
- The Court determined that using Aadhaar for welfare schemes was constitutional and upheld the requirement to link Aadhaar with PAN cards. However, it ruled that the mandatory linking of Aadhaar with bank accounts was unconstitutional as it did not meet the test of proportionality, violating the right to privacy.
- Additionally, the Court struck down Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act, which allowed private companies to require citizens to provide their Aadhaar numbers for services.
- The Court emphasized that the decision to link Aadhaar numbers with mobile SIM cards was not valid or constitutional, as merely having a legitimate state aim does not justify the means adopted. The means must be carefully tailored to achieve a legitimate goal without disproportionately encroaching on individual liberties.
Case Analysis of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
BRIEF FACTS
Facts: In 2009, the Indian Government initiated the Aadhaar project as a universal identification system aimed at improving the tracking of services it provided. This involved the collection of biometric data for identification and authentication purposes, beginning with an executive order in 2009.
The Aadhaar Act was enacted in 2016, granting statutory approval to the project. However, both the administrative action and the Act faced public scrutiny and were challenged in the Supreme Court for constitutional violations, including the right to privacy.
The first writ petition was filed in 2012, which raised questions about the fundamental nature of the right to privacy, prompting the formation of a nine-judge bench in K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. vs. Union of India ((2017) 10 SCC 1), affirming privacy as a fundamental right. The Court subsequently scheduled the final hearing for 2018 before a five-judge Constitution Bench.
KEY ISSUES
- Did the Aadhaar Project create or have the potential to create a surveillance state, rendering it unconstitutional?
- Did the Aadhaar Act and Section 139AA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) violate the right to privacy?
- Could children be included under Sections 7 and 8 of the Aadhaar Act?
- Was the Aadhaar Act validly passed as a ‘Money Bill’ under Article 110 of the Constitution?
- Were any other sections of the Aadhaar Act unconstitutional?
KEY ARGUMENTS BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
- The Petitioners focused on issues related to privacy, surveillance, data protection, consent, and the legislative process. They argued that the collection of information for Aadhaar was mishandled due to the involvement of multiple third parties, suggesting that it set the stage for a surveillance state. Regarding consent, they contended that making Aadhaar compulsory for essential services like banking and phone connections made genuine consent impractical.
- They also claimed that biometric authentication requirements led to increased exclusion from welfare benefits and argued that the aim of creating a pervasive identification system was illegal, violating Article 14. Furthermore, the Petitioners questioned the legislative process of passing the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill, claiming that bypassing the Rajya Sabha was unlawful, rendering the Act invalid.
- The Respondents countered that the information collected for Aadhaar was non-invasive and did not lead to data profiling or state surveillance. They argued that the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR), which housed identity information, was not under the control of the government or police. The Respondents maintained that adequate safeguards were in place to prevent data breaches and claimed that the tests established in Puttaswamy I were met, making the Aadhaar Act constitutional.
WHAT IS HELD IN KS PUTTASWAMY CASE
- The Supreme Court upheld the Aadhaar Act’s constitutional validity, its designation as a Money Bill, and the mandatory use of Aadhaar-based identification for welfare schemes funded by the Consolidated Fund of India.
- On the question of whether the project contributed to a surveillance state, the Court concluded that the Aadhaar structure and provisions did not foster such a state.
- The UIDAI’s arguments emphasized that only minimal biometric data was collected; it did not gather additional information regarding the purpose or location of transactions; the data was siloed, and merging was prohibited; authentication was shielded from the internet, and only registered devices could make authentication requests.
- Consequently, the Court found it challenging to profile individuals based on biometric and demographic data stored in the CIDR. The Court also strengthened certain data protection provisions, ruling that authentication records could not be stored for longer than six months, rather than the five years allowed by the Act.
Regarding the right to privacy, the Court referenced its 2017 Puttaswamy I decision, which established privacy as a fundamental right. Any infringement must meet three criteria:
(i) legality, meaning there must be an existing law;
(ii) necessity, defined by a legitimate state interest; and
(iii) proportionality, ensuring a rational connection between the objective and means used.
The Court determined that the Aadhaar Act’s existence, along with its goal of delivering welfare benefits, satisfied the first two criteria. It found that the third requirement of proportionality was also fulfilled, as the Aadhaar Act effectively identified beneficiaries while balancing privacy rights with rights to food, shelter, and employment.
The mandatory linking of Aadhaar with PAN was upheld, but the mandatory linking with bank accounts was struck down for failing the proportionality test. Similarly, the mandatory linkage with mobile numbers was not upheld.
On whether children could be included under Sections 7 and 8 of the Aadhaar Act, the Court ruled that parental consent was essential for a child’s enrollment, and such enrollees had the right to opt-out upon reaching adulthood.
Regarding the passage of the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill, the Court stated that since the Act aimed to create a unique identification system to enable deserving beneficiaries to access subsidies funded by the Consolidated Fund of India, its classification as a Money Bill was valid.
Certain sections of the Aadhaar Act were struck down as unconstitutional, including Section 57, which permitted private companies to use Aadhaar for authentication. The Court noted that the provision’s broad language could lead to misuse, allowing any entity to exploit private data, thereby violating privacy rights. Section 47, which restricted complaints about violations to the UIDAI, was also invalidated, with the Court ruling that any affected individual should have the right to file a complaint.
Regulation 27, which allowed data storage for five years, was struck down, with the Court holding that retention beyond six months was impermissible.
DISSENTING JUDGEMENT JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
- In his dissent, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud raised significant concerns regarding privacy violations associated with the Aadhaar project and Act. He deemed the legislative passage of the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill unconstitutional and stressed the need for clear norms governing the collection and retention of biometric data, including informed consent, data access, correction, deletion rights, and opt-out options. Justice Chandrachud argued that the Aadhaar Act lacked essential privacy safeguards and questioned the independence and accountability of the UIDAI.
- While acknowledging that the legitimate state aim was met, he contended that the Aadhaar Act did not fulfill the necessity and proportionality criteria. He maintained that the state’s objectives could be achieved through less intrusive measures rather than imposing mandatory Aadhaar as the sole identification method.
- Justice Chandrachud asserted that the Aadhaar Act undermined the principles of informational privacy, self-determination, and data protection.
- He reiterated concerns about the potential for a surveillance state, commercial profiling, and electoral manipulation. He concluded that, without an independent regulatory framework with robust data protection safeguards, the Aadhaar Act violated Article 14. Finally, he criticized the Act for being overly broad and insufficiently limited.
