Holding that the rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative remedy is one of discretion and self-restraint rather than a bar on jurisdiction, the Karnataka High Court quashed an official memorandum by which the State Board of Auqaf had constituted an eleven-member ad-hoc committee for eleven months instead of following the procedure laid down in the Rules.
Dharwad: The Karnataka High Court has held that the availability of a remedy before the Waqf Tribunal under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction where the challenge is directed against the legality of the Waqf Board’s own action, while quashing an official memorandum constituting an ad-hoc committee to manage a Wakf institution for eleven months [Bazme Tohid Tanzeem Committee, Mudalagi v. The Chief Executive Officer, Karnataka State Board of Auqaf and Others].
Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum allowed the writ petition and directed the District Waqf Officer, Chikodi, to take charge of the institution under Rule 54(5) of the Karnataka Wakf Rules, 2017 and to complete the process of constituting a succeeding managing committee within four months.
The background
The petitioners, who claim to be the president and secretary of a Wakf institution at Mudalagi in Belagavi district, challenged an Official Memorandum dated February 12, 2026 issued by the Karnataka State Board of Auqaf constituting an eleven-member ad-hoc committee for a period of eleven months.
The managing committee of the institution had been constituted in June 2019 for a term of three years, which expired on June 12, 2023. The dispute over what should follow has been before the High Court twice already. In the first round, the Board’s appointment of an Administrator was stayed, and those proceedings were disposed of in March 2024 with a direction to maintain status quo. When the Board again appointed an Administrator, the petitioners returned to Court, and by an order of October 29, 2025 that appointment was quashed with a direction to the Board to redo the exercise in accordance with law.
The Official Memorandum now under challenge followed. The Board’s counsel raised a preliminary objection that the petitioners had an efficacious remedy before the Waqf Tribunal under Section 83, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Wakf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum and on a coordinate bench ruling affirmed in appeal. On the merits, it was argued that Section 32(2)(o) of the Wakf Act confers a sufficiently wide power on the Board to do all acts necessary for the control, maintenance and administration of auqaf.
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is subject-specific
Framing three points for consideration, the Court began with maintainability. Reading Sections 6, 7 and 83 together, it held that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is attracted in respect of those disputes which the Act specifically requires to be determined by it. Section 6, the Court noted, concerns a defined class of questions, namely whether a particular property specified in the list of auqaf is Wakf property and whether a Wakf so specified is Shia or Sunni. Neither question arose here.
“The aforesaid provisions, therefore, cannot be construed to mean that every administrative action of the Wakf Board, merely because it relates to the management of a Wakf institution, is necessarily immune from scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
On Anis Fatma Begum, the Court held that the decision cannot be read as laying down an absolute proposition. It relied on the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in State of Andhra Pradesh v. A.P. State Waqf Board, which distinguished the earlier case on the footing that it had not arisen out of a writ petition before a High Court, and which examined the legality of the Board’s action in exercise of judicial review jurisdiction rather than relegating the parties to the Tribunal.
The principle the Court drew from that line of authority is that a court must first examine the nature and substance of the challenge. The mere fact that the subject matter relates to a Wakf is not by itself sufficient to oust the High Court’s jurisdiction.
Rejecting the respondents’ contention in its absolute form, the Court pointed to the consequence it would produce. Even where the Board acted in patent disregard of the statutory Rules or in breach of a binding direction of the High Court, an aggrieved person would be driven to the Tribunal merely because the order concerned the management of a Wakf institution. Such an interpretation, the Court held, would effectively immunise statutory authorities from judicial review.
“The rule requiring exhaustion of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and self-restraint. It does not extinguish the constitutional power of the High Court under Article 226. The existence of an alternative remedy is undoubtedly a relevant consideration, however, where the action complained of is alleged to be without jurisdiction, in violation of a mandatory statutory provision, in breach of principles of natural justice or in disregard of binding judicial directions, the High Court is entitled to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction.”
A general power cannot displace a specific rule
Turning to the merits, the Court set out Rule 54 of the Karnataka Wakf Rules, 2017, which prescribes a structured mechanism for constituting a succeeding managing committee. Sub-rule (5) supplies the consequence where no succeeding committee is constituted: management and supervision automatically vest in the District Waqf Officer, who must then secure constitution of the succeeding committee within three months.
The Court found the language of that sub-rule significant, holding that it does not confer an unfettered discretion on the Board to devise any alternative arrangement of its choice, but identifies the authority who is to assume management in the interregnum and casts a duty on that authority.
The Official Memorandum itself came in for close scrutiny. It recorded that the proposal for an eleven-member ad-hoc committee had been placed before the Board with the recommendation of the Minister for Wakf, to be considered as a special case, and had been approved at the Board’s 365th meeting. The Court observed that the Board had not demonstrated why the statutory consequence under Rule 54(5) was not required to be followed, nor identified any provision authorising an ad-hoc committee for eleven months in substitution of the prescribed mechanism.
On the reliance placed on Section 32(2)(o), the Court held that the expression “necessary” in that clause cannot be read as conferring an independent and unrestricted power to disregard a specific statutory Rule, and that a general enabling provision cannot defeat an express procedure prescribed by Rules framed under the same enactment.
“If the contention of the Board were to be accepted, Rule 54(5) would become virtually redundant. Whenever the tenure of a managing committee expires and a succeeding committee is not constituted, the Board could simply invoke Section 32(2)(o), constitute an ad-hoc committee for any period and thereby circumvent the statutory consequence expressly prescribed under Rule 54(5).”
Noting that the issue had remained unresolved for several years, the Court added a caution about arrangements of this kind:
“An interim arrangement, if permissible in law, must remain genuinely interim and cannot be employed to defeat the prescribed mechanism for constitution of the regular managing committee.”
The directions
Allowing the petition, the Court quashed the Official Memorandum dated February 12, 2026 and directed the District Waqf Officer, Chikodi, to forthwith take charge of the management and supervision of the institution under Rule 54(5), to schedule a General Body Meeting after giving wide circulation to all persons interested, and to conduct that meeting under his supervision and in his presence.
The scheme is to be formulated strictly in accordance with Form-42 and Rule 48 of the Karnataka Wakf Rules, 2017 and forwarded to the Board for consideration, with the entire exercise to be completed within four months of receipt of the order. Until then, the District Waqf Officer alone is to control and supervise the institution without interference by the petitioners, the erstwhile committee, the ad-hoc committee or anyone else, and is to secure custody of the records, registers and accounts.
The Court expressly clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the eligibility or entitlement of any individual to be appointed to the succeeding managing committee, and that the exercise is to be undertaken by the competent authority strictly in accordance with the applicable scheme and the Rules.
Why it matters
The maintainability holding is the part of the order likely to travel furthest. Waqf Boards across States routinely meet writ petitions with the objection that Section 83 provides a specialised forum, and the objection often succeeds at the threshold. This order supplies a workable dividing line: where the petitioner asks the Court to decide something the Act entrusts to the Tribunal, such as the character of a property or a question under an approved scheme, the Tribunal is the forum; where the petitioner says the Board acted outside the power the statute gave it, the challenge is to the exercise of statutory power and Article 226 is available.
The second holding has a reach well beyond waqf law. The proposition that a broad residuary clause cannot be used to sidestep a specific procedure prescribed elsewhere in the same statutory scheme is a settled principle of interpretation, but it is one that tends to get tested where an authority finds the prescribed route inconvenient. The Court’s observation that accepting the Board’s reading would leave Rule 54(5) virtually redundant is the clearest statement of the point.
Also of note is what the Court made of the recital in the memorandum that the committee had been approved as a special case on a ministerial recommendation. The order does not treat that as improper in itself, but uses it to show that the Board had proceeded on a basis other than the one the Rules prescribe. For institutions whose managing committees have lapsed and remained in limbo, which the record here suggests is not an isolated situation, the practical consequence is that the District Waqf Officer route under Rule 54(5) is the default, and a longer ad-hoc arrangement requires justification the statute does not obviously supply.
Case Title: Bazme Tohid Tanzeem Committee, Mudalagi v. The Chief Executive Officer, Karnataka State Board of Auqaf and Others [Writ Petition No. 101523 of 2026 (GM-WAKF)]
Bench: Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum, High Court of Karnataka at Dharwad
Date of Order: August 19, 2026 | Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC-D:13086
Appearances: Advocate Shriharsh A. Neelopant for the petitioners. Advocate D.L. Ladkhan for respondents 1 and 2. Advocate Chetan T. Limbikai for respondent 3.