The Allahabad High Court converted a murder conviction into culpable homicide, ruling the incident arose from a sudden quarrel without premeditation. Justices Rajnish Kumar and Zafeer Ahmad held medical evidence showed assault, attracting Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) has partly allowed a jail appeal. It modified the conviction of the appellant, converting the charge of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) into culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC.
A Division Bench comprising Justices Rajnish Kumar and Zafeer Ahmad held that the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel and without premeditation, so Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applied.
Background of the Case
The case arose from an incident dated March 27, 2009, in District Pratapgarh. The complainant, Ram Bodh Yadav (PW-1), stated that his daughter Sunita was killed by her husband, Dev Bahadur alias Matru Yadav (the appellant), using an axe at around 6:00 AM. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, who was reportedly addicted to intoxicants, often fought with and assaulted his wife.
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The trial court (Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Pratapgarh) convicted the appellant on October 27, 2010, under Section 302 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The prosecution primarily relied on the testimony of the couple’s 12-year-old daughter, Shalu (PW-2), who claimed she witnessed the assault while warming herself near a bonfire.
Arguments of the Parties
On behalf of the appellant, counsel appeared as amicus curiae and argued that the prosecution case was unreliable due to major contradictions. He submitted that the FIR appeared to have been ante-timed. He also argued that PW-2, the only eyewitness, was not named in the FIR, and that her statement was recorded after a significant delay. The defence further emphasized that the act was committed in the “heat of passion” during a sudden husband–wife quarrel, without pre-planning, and therefore fell under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
The State’s learned AGA countered that the testimony of the child witness PW-2 was trustworthy and consistent. He argued that the nature of injuries on vital parts indicated an intention to cause death, supporting conviction under Section 302 IPC.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
The Court undertook a fresh re-evaluation of the evidence. Regarding the child witness (PW-2), the Bench noted that although child testimony requires “careful and cautious scrutiny,” it found her to be a natural witness. The Court observed that her central account was supported by medical evidence.
At the same time, the Bench identified weaknesses, including:
- inconsistency regarding the FIR timing, and
- the absence of PW-2’s name in the initial report.
On the nature of the offence, the Court observed:
“The occurrence took place inside the house and arose out of a quarrel. There is no material on record to suggest any premeditation or prior planning. The weapon used appears to have been picked up at the spot during the course of the incident.”
The Court discussed and applied principles from Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory (1989), Pundalik v. State of Maharashtra (2010), and Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019). It concluded that all four requirements for invoking Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC were satisfied: the occurrence was sudden, there was no premeditation, the act was done in the heat of passion, and the offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner.
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The Court further held:
“The medical evidence does not indicate such excessive or barbaric assault so as to conclusively infer that the accused acted in a cruel or unusual manner or took undue advantage. The act appears to have been committed in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.”
The Decision
Accordingly, the High Court altered the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.
Noting that the appellant had already spent 18 years, 7 months, and 11 days in incarceration (as of December 16, 2025), which is far beyond the maximum term of 10 years for Section 304 Part II, the Bench treated the time already undergone as sufficient and directed the appellant’s immediate release.
The Court ordered:
“The accused-appellant is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.”
Case Title: Dev Bahadur Yadav @ Matru Yadav vs. State of U.P.
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