A car driven at a person can be “an instrument of death”, the Karnataka High Court has said in refusing to quash the attempt to murder case against a motorist accused of driving at a traffic policeman during a drunken-driving check.
Bengaluru: A motorist accused of driving his car at a Head Constable on a drunken-driving check will have to face trial, with the Karnataka High Court dismissing his petition to quash the criminal proceedings for attempt to murder. The Court held that the survival of the injured policeman does not efface the alleged offence and that the question of intention must be decided at trial [Ramanjalu v. State of Karnataka and Another].
The petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed by Ramanjalu, who sought to quash the chargesheet and the case pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mayo Hall, Bengaluru. Justice M. Nagaprasanna rejected it. The matter was reserved on August 11, 2026 and pronounced on October 16, 2026. The allegations are untested, the petitioner is presumed innocent, and the Court has expressed no view on his guilt.
Survival is not the test
The petitioner said the complainant had not suffered grievous injury. The Court pointed to the wound certificate, which recorded ten abrasions on the face, arms, forearms, hand, left knee and left foot, and a displaced, multi-fragmented fracture of the head of the fibula, medically classified as grievous. It then held:
“A motor vehicle, when driven in such a manner towards a human being, is capable of becoming an instrument of death. The distinction between an injury and a fatality, in circumstances of this nature, may rest upon nothing more than the slender thread of providence. The fact that the complainant survived the incident cannot, by itself, dilute the gravity of the act alleged or efface the intention or knowledge that may be gathered from the manner in which it was committed.”
The Court found that the alleged deliberate driving towards the complainant, the attempt to evade the check, the eyewitness statements and the injuries together gave material from which the required intention or knowledge could prima facie be inferred. It reached the same prima facie view on the other offences: rash and negligent driving under Section 279, use of force to deter a public servant from duty under Section 353 (applying the Supreme Court’s decision in B.N. John v. State of Uttar Pradesh), mischief under Section 427 for the damaged equipment and vehicle glass, and criminal intimidation under Sections 503 and 506, where the words allegedly uttered had to be read with the conduct that followed.
The night of October 23, 2021
The case arises from Crime No. 245 of 2021 of the HAL Police Station, registered for offences under Sections 279, 307, 353, 427 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. In a complaint dated October 24, 2021, Head Constable Mubharak Ali of the HAL Airport Traffic Police Station alleged that on the night of October 23, 2021, while he was on special duty to detect drunken driving, the petitioner, who was driving a Hyundai Creta, tried to evade the check by speeding away and, instead of stopping, drove in a manner that ran over the complainant, injuring his thighs and feet and damaging the department’s drunken-driving detection machine.
The prosecution says the petitioner appeared to be under the influence of alcohol and, immediately before the incident, asked the complainant, “Who told you to stop me? Do you know who I am?” The petitioner is a 48-year-old general manager of an insurance company.
A spot mahazar was drawn on October 25, 2021, a chargesheet followed, and the magistrate took cognizance on February 1, 2022 in C.C. No. 50442 of 2022.
What each side argued
For the petitioner, it was argued that the ingredients of Section 307 were absent because there was no intention or knowledge, that Section 353 required intentional criminal force, and that the prosecution rested on a distorted account. The State Public Prosecutor said the allegations disclosed the offences and that the gravity of an act cannot be judged only by the extent of injury.
Section 307 and the limits of a quashing petition
The Court relied on recent Supreme Court rulings, including Surender Kumar v. State of Haryana and Abhishek v. State of Rajasthan, for the settled position that the offence of attempt to murder turns on the intention or knowledge behind the act and the circumstances in which it was done. Neither a fatal injury nor grievous hurt is an indispensable ingredient, and the fact that an injury was on a non-vital part does not by itself rule out Section 307. At the stage of a quashing petition, the Court added, it is not to hold a mini-trial or weigh evidence.
Trial to decide
The Court said the inherent power under Section 482 cannot be used to terminate prematurely a prosecution that discloses the foundational ingredients of the offences, and that the truth must emerge from trial, where witnesses are cross-examined. It also stated: “Equally, the solemn presumption of innocence that accompanies every accused remains undisturbed until the prosecution establishes guilt in accordance with law.” The petition was rejected. The Court made clear that its observations are confined to the quashing petition and are not findings on guilt, and that the trial court must proceed independently on the evidence before it.
What the order shows
The recent Supreme Court line on Section 307 is applied here to a vehicle case: the legal question is what the driver intended or knew, judged from the surrounding circumstances, and the fact that the victim survived or that the injury was not fatal does not settle it. A court will not weigh a defence of lack of intention at the quashing stage when the chargesheet and medical record disclose a triable case.
Case Title: Ramanjalu v. State of Karnataka and Another
Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 3658 of 2022
Bench: Justice M. Nagaprasanna, Karnataka High Court
Date of Order: October 16, 2026
Appearances: Mr. Sunil Kumar S., Advocate, for the petitioner; Mr. B.N. Jagadeesha, State Public Prosecutor-I, for the State; respondent No. 2 served and unrepresented