A man’s later marriage to the girl he is accused of having sexual intercourse with while she was a minor, and the birth of their child, cannot end a POCSO case, the Delhi High Court has held, refusing to quash the FIR and holding that an enduring relationship cannot retrospectively supply legal consent.
New Delhi: The Delhi High Court has dismissed a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking to quash FIR No. 106/2024 of Police Station Roop Nagar and all proceedings arising from it, in a prosecution that includes an allegation of aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) [Ankit Kumar Singh v. State & Anr.].
Justice Sanjeev Narula, in an order dated October 1, 2026, found that the case for quashing was not made out, even though the victim, now an adult, her mother who lodged the complaint, and the petitioner all asked that the proceedings be brought to an end.
Background of the case
The FIR was registered on April 6, 2024 under Section 363 IPC on the complaint of the victim’s mother, who reported that her daughter had left home that morning and could not be found. The victim was then a little short of 16 years and 7 months old, and the petitioner was 20. She was traced in October 2024, and a medical examination recorded a pregnancy. In her statement under Section 164 CrPC, she said she had left voluntarily, travelled with the petitioner to Hyderabad, Darbhanga and Nepal, and had not been coerced, and she referred to a marriage ceremony at Darbhanga.
She later left her mother’s home again and was living with the petitioner and their son, born in December 2024, when he was arrested at Darbhanga in August 2025. Two days after she turned 18 in September 2025, she told the Special Court that she wished to remain with him and did not oppose his release, and he was granted bail. The two married on September 29, 2025, a compromise deed was executed in May 2026, and the chargesheet has been filed, with the matter awaiting consideration of charge.
Submissions
The victim was present in Court and confirmed that she had accompanied the petitioner willingly, had no grievance against him and was living with him and their child as a family. Her mother said she had approached the police only because her daughter was missing, and that she now accepted the marriage and did not wish to pursue the case.
Appearing for the petitioner, Advocates Aman Goyal, Yogesh Kalra and Gaurav Kashyap argued that the relationship was voluntary throughout, that the victim had consistently denied coercion and said she had not disclosed her correct age to him, and that continuing the prosecution would expose the family to hardship without any useful purpose. They relied on State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, Ramgopal v. State of M.P. and K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu. Additional Public Prosecutor Tarang Srivastav opposed the plea, relying on the victim’s undisputed minority, the medical evidence of pregnancy and the material collected in the investigation.
Willingness is not consent
The Court accepted, for the purposes of the petition, the victim’s account of a voluntary relationship, noting that her denial of coercion dated to the investigation and that nothing suggested the marriage was a device to secure quashing. It held that her present choice as an adult deserved respect, but that the real question was whether proceedings concerning sexual intercourse with her as a child should end because of what the relationship later became.
Pointing to Section 2(1)(d) of POCSO, which defines a child as anyone below 18, to the absence of consent as an ingredient under Section 3, and to clause sixthly of Section 375 IPC, the Court held that willingness “may explain the relationship” but does not take the alleged act outside the statute. Parliament chose a uniform age threshold, it said, and a court cannot substitute its own assessment of a child’s maturity for that choice. It made clear that no finding of grooming, deception or force was being made against the petitioner, but held that the absence of those circumstances does not by itself answer the allegation.
Marriage, child marriage law and the precedents
The Court held that the September 2025 marriage, solemnised when both parties had reached the prescribed marriageable age, cannot determine the legality of intercourse during her minority, and that the earlier ceremony at Darbhanga, when neither had reached that age, did not need to be adjudicated. Referring to the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, and to Independent Thought v. Union of India, it said that even a subsisting marriage would not displace POCSO. It also noted that the Supreme Court’s suggestion of a “Romeo-Juliet” clause in State of U.P. v. Anurudh recognised a problem but did not introduce an exception, which would need legislative consideration.
The Court distinguished the decisions relied on. It noted that Ayyub Malik v. State of Uttarakhand rested on the parties’ circumstances taken together and that Mahesh Mukund Patel v. State of U.P. turned on a finding that the woman was already a major, whereas here minority is undisputed and a pregnancy was medically recorded during it. It held that a coordinate Bench’s decision in Harmeet Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), which quashed a POCSO case, calls for careful consideration of the facts and does not prescribe quashing whenever marriage and a child are present.
There the victim was about 17 years and 2 months old and the State had no objection, while here the victim was younger and the State seeks to prosecute. It referred to Prince Kumar Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Mohd. Dilsad v. State, where quashing was also declined despite later marriage and children.
The Article 142 route
Acknowledging the hardship refusal would cause the family, the Court said the difficulty went beyond the sincerity of the marriage:
“To end the prosecution on the grounds advanced would allow subsequent marriage, parenthood and family acceptance to outweigh the protection afforded to her when she was a child. That protection cannot depend simply on whether a relationship survives or eventually receives approval.”
The Court observed that in K. Kirubakaran the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings under Article 142 and expressly barred the order from being treated as a precedent, so that no rule of relief could be derived from it by a High Court exercising Section 528 BNSS jurisdiction. The petitioner was left free to approach the Supreme Court and to place the exceptional circumstances of the family before it, including for relief under Article 142.
Directions
The petition was dismissed. The Court confined its observations to the prayer for quashing and directed the Special Court to consider the charges, evidence and every defence available in law independently, uninfluenced by any prima facie assessment made in the order. It noted that the forensic report was awaited when the chargesheet was filed and assumed nothing about its result, and that the petitioner’s bail is not disturbed.
Why The POCSO Case Order Matters
The order addresses a recurring situation in which a prosecution under POCSO continues after the victim has grown up, married the accused and had a child. It holds that such developments are relevant to a plea for exceptional relief but cannot alter the statutory ingredients of the offence or amount, by themselves, to an abuse of process, and it points the family towards the Supreme Court’s Article 142 jurisdiction rather than quashing under Section 528 BNSS. The petitioner is yet to face charge, and the Special Court will decide the case on the evidence.
Case Title: Ankit Kumar Singh v. State & Anr. [CRL.M.C. 4917/2026]
Bench: Justice Sanjeev Narula, Delhi High Court
Date of Order: October 1, 2026
For the Petitioner: Aman Goyal, Yogesh Kalra and Gaurav Kashyap, Advocates
For the State: Tarang Srivastav, Additional Public Prosecutor
If a child is in need of help or protection, call CHILDLINE on 1098.