When a Judge exercises administrative power over roster allocation, listing and committees, who reviews those decisions, the Allahabad High Court has asked, calling for a more participative, rule-bound and accountable model of High Court administration in a judgment that began with delays and bail non-compliance in the subordinate judiciary.
Prayagraj: The Allahabad High Court has called for a recalibration of the Chief Justice-centric model of High Court administration, stressing the need for a more deliberative, institutionally balanced and participative approach and stronger institutional accountability.
Justice Vinod Diwakar made the observations in a judgment arising from four cases in which the Court flagged delays in the subordinate judiciary and non-compliance with bail directions, and raised wider questions of judicial discipline. The Court said it discussed the High Court’s own functioning while examining these issues.
Background of the case
One significant issue was continued non-compliance with bail-related directions. The judgment records 1,65,930 bail orders in which two sureties were directed, despite the High Court’s directions in Smt. Bacchi Devi v. State of U.P., and finds deficiencies in the compliance reports submitted by District Judges. The Court held that such problems cannot be treated as the isolated conduct of individual judicial officers, since they reflect the behavioural pattern of the institution.
It said judicial character needs institutional support, including sustained training and learning, mechanisms for fixing accountability for administrative-side decisions, corrective measures for breaches of discipline, and a curriculum that builds fraternity. It added that every promotion or elevation should be followed by a compulsory training programme, so that judicial officers understand the consequences of decisions taken at each level.
Chief Justice-centric administration needs recalibration
The Court noted that the Chief Justice-centric model envisaged by the Supreme Court combines strong leadership with a collaborative, participative and consultative approach, embedded in a spirit of fraternity. It observed that there was little room for conscious and participative dialogue among Judges on the allocation of judicial business, that allocation of work was not linked to performance, and that no defined, codified and notified parameters govern consideration for elevation and promotion. It added that administrative-side decisions attract no accountability and are not audited by any independent agency, so that accountability cannot be fixed even where favouritism, partisanship or other extraneous considerations are proved, and that the cumulative effect erodes the conditions in which judicial character forms. It concluded:
“…requires recalibration in favour of a more deliberative and institutionally balanced approach.”
The Court also said the marginal role of puisne Judges in administrative matters runs against theories of participative decision-making, and stressed that a High Court is not merely a hierarchical administrative body, since its Judges are equals in judicial functions while administrative decisions can directly affect the functioning of individual Judges.
84 committees and concentration of responsibility
The Court noted that the High Court’s administrative business is transacted through 84 committees, and that over the preceding three and a half years a majority of them had been chaired by only two or three senior Judges, who were also handling demanding judicial rosters. Its concern, it said, was not the number of committees but the concentration of administrative responsibility, which raises questions about the effective participation of other Judges.
It also noted that the minutes of committees constituted by the Chief Justice had never been communicated to the Full Court, giving the impression that they function independently of the High Court, and that there was consequently no institutional forum within the High Court to raise such issues except through judicial orders. It said such a situation could leave Judges with a frustrating professional life in an environment not conducive to judicial work.
‘Who judges the judge?’
A significant part of the judgment asks who reviews a Judge’s exercise of administrative power, such as roster allocation, case listing and the conduct of the High Court’s business through committees, which may stay insulated from review in the name of judicial independence. The Court observed that while judicial decisions are ordinarily open to appeal and review, administrative decisions may not get similarly structured scrutiny despite their consequences for fairness, equality and institutional integrity.
In the absence of formal review, it said, the task of judging the judge shifts informally to the institution itself, through full-court deliberations, internal checks and, increasingly, public scrutiny. It cautioned that such diffuse accountability is often insufficient, and called for clearly articulated administrative standards, reason-giving obligations and limited but meaningful review mechanisms based on rule-bound procedure. Because the judiciary is self-regulated, it said, it must maintain effective checks and balances on its administrative side so that discretion is never misused and is exercised strictly under the procedure established by law and duly notified rules.
Not an aspersion on the Chief Justice’s office
The Court clarified that its observations were not meant to test the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Justice or to cast aspersions on the functioning of the office of the Chief Justice. Its sole concern, it said, is the manner in which the High Court discharges its administrative functions in defiance of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, and the need to streamline them through a rule-bound procedure with greater transparency and objectivity.
Bench: Justice Vinod Diwakar, Allahabad High Court