Anticipatory bail, once granted, ordinarily lasts till the trial ends, so what happens when a judge grants it for just 30 days? The Allahabad High Court has questioned an Azamgarh Sessions Judge who did exactly that, without giving reasons, even after the charge-sheet was filed. Finding his explanation unsatisfactory, the Court has asked him to account for the practice, and how often he has resorted to it.

Prayagraj: The Allahabad High Court has questioned the practice of a trial court granting anticipatory bail for a limited period of only 30 days, and directed the Additional Sessions Judge concerned to submit a proper explanation for having done so [Suresh Yadav and 2 Others v. State of U.P. and Another].
Justice Madan Pal Singh was hearing an application under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) seeking to quash, in part, an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Azamgarh, to the extent that it enlarged the applicants on anticipatory bail for only 30 days.
The case
The applicants had been granted anticipatory bail by the trial court in a case involving offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita for which the maximum punishment is below seven years, but the bail was limited to a period of only 30 days. Their counsel submitted that they had not been arrested during the investigation or up to the filing of the charge-sheet, that they had complied with the notice issued under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, and that, once anticipatory bail had been allowed after the police report was submitted and cognizance taken, there was no occasion to restrict it to 30 days. Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), counsel contended that anticipatory bail should ordinarily continue till the conclusion of the trial, subject to the usual conditions.
The Court’s concern
Granting interim protection earlier, on August 18, the Court had observed that the trial court, while allowing the anticipatory bail application, had granted bail for only 30 days without giving any specific finding as to why, even though the charge-sheet had already been submitted and cognizance taken; the accused would then be required to seek fresh interim relief after 30 days, resulting in unnecessary harassment. It had called for a report from the trial court explaining why, and under which provision of law, anticipatory bail had been granted for only 30 days.
The Court reiterated the settled position that a court may either allow an anticipatory bail application, granting bail till the conclusion of the trial subject to conditions, or reject it having regard to the gravity of the offence. In the explanation furnished, the Court noted, the trial judge had not set out the peculiar facts and circumstances on which he had confined the bail to 30 days, and the explanation was not found satisfactory.
The questions to the trial judge
The Court directed the Additional Sessions Judge to submit a proper explanation addressing three questions: first, in how many cases he, as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Azamgarh, had granted bail to accused persons for a limited period of a few days, such as 20, 30 or 40 days; second, what were the peculiar facts and circumstances on which he had granted bail to the applicants for only 30 days, given that the maximum punishment for the alleged offence is below seven years and that they had not been arrested till the filing of the charge-sheet; and third, what the applicants were expected to do once the 30-day period expired, whether they would have to surrender before the trial judge and move afresh for anticipatory bail.
The Court extended the applicants’ interim protection and listed the matter afresh, within the top ten cases, for September 30, directing that its order be communicated to the District Judge, Azamgarh, for compliance.
Why it matters
The order engages a question settled by the Supreme Court but recurring in practice: the duration of anticipatory bail. In Sushila Aggarwal, a Constitution Bench held that the protection of anticipatory bail is not ordinarily to be limited to a fixed period, and that it can, and normally should, continue till the end of the trial; while a court retains the discretion, in appropriate and peculiar circumstances, to limit its operation, it must do so for reasons, and not as a matter of routine. A time-bound anticipatory bail, granted without justification, exposes the accused to repeated rounds of litigation and the anxiety of re-arrest, precisely the harassment the remedy is meant to prevent.
The High Court’s disquiet is sharpened by the facts: the offence carries a maximum sentence below seven years, the accused were never arrested through the investigation, they cooperated with the Section 35(3) BNSS notice, and the charge-sheet had already been filed and cognizance taken. In such a setting, there was little apparent reason to cabin the bail to 30 days, and the trial court had recorded none. The Court’s pointed questions, especially how many times the judge had granted such short-duration bail, suggest a concern that the 30-day limitation may reflect a pattern rather than a considered, case-specific exercise of discretion.
Nothing has been finally decided on the applicants’ plea, and the underlying allegations remain to be tried, with the applicants entitled to the presumption of innocence; their interim protection continues in the meantime. What the order underscores is the principle that anticipatory bail, once granted, should not be arbitrarily time-limited, and that a trial court that departs from the norm must be able to justify it, failing which the High Court will call it to account.
Case Title: Suresh Yadav and 2 Others v. State of U.P. and Another [Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 5256 of 2026]
Bench: Justice Madan Pal Singh, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Date of Order: September 15, 2026
Status: Trial judge directed to furnish a proper explanation for granting anticipatory bail limited to 30 days; explanation so far found unsatisfactory. Applicants’ interim protection extended; listed September 30. Allegations untested; presumption of innocence applies.
