Rejecting anticipatory bail to a Railway Protection Force officer accused in a custodial death, the Allahabad High Court observed that “the plague of custodial death does not show any sign of abating,” and held that in such cases the burden of proof should ordinarily lie on the police personnel to rebut the allegations against them.
Prayagraj: The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, has declined anticipatory bail to a Railway Protection Force (RPF) officer accused of causing a custodial death, observing that the “venomous snake of custodial death” had reared its head once again, and holding that where a person dies in custody, the burden of proof can and should ordinarily rest on the police personnel to explain and rebut the allegations against them [Appellant v. State of U.P. and Another].
Justice Manish Mathur dismissed the criminal appeal, filed under Section 14-A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, against a Special Judge’s order rejecting the officer’s anticipatory bail. The allegations are untested and the matter remains at the pre-charge-sheet, investigation stage; the observations were made for the limited purpose of deciding bail, and nothing has been established at trial.
The allegations
According to the First Information Report, on November 4, 2025, the appellant and co-accused, all RPF personnel, arrested and took away one Sanjay Sonkar, the informant’s brother, for questioning in connection with a criminal case. He was allegedly brought back to the village later the same day and then taken away again. On the morning of November 5, 2025, the informant was told that his brother’s body was in the mortuary. The FIR alleges that the deceased was subjected to a brutal assault by the appellant and co-accused during custody, which led to his death. The case was registered under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
Counsel for the appellant argued that he had been falsely implicated, that the post-mortem report recorded only two injuries, a contusion on the upper thigh and abrasions on both knees, which could not have caused death, and that as a police officer cooperating in an ongoing investigation, there was no occasion to take him into custody. The State and the informant opposed the plea, contending that the allegations plainly disclosed a custodial death, a serious offence, and pointed to a general diary entry indicating that it was the appellant and co-accused who had taken the injured man to the hospital, where he was declared brought dead. The Additional Government Advocate submitted, on instructions, that the appellant was in fact not cooperating with the investigation.
The SC/ST Act bar did not defeat the plea
A preliminary objection was raised that the anticipatory bail application was itself barred by Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which ordinarily excludes anticipatory bail in cases under that Act. The respondent relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain to press that bar.
The Court rejected the objection on two grounds. First, it held that the decision relied upon had not overruled the earlier Supreme Court ruling in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, and had not laid down that an anticipatory bail application is absolutely barred merely because an SC/ST allegation is levelled in the FIR. Second, and more fundamentally, the Court found on a perusal of the FIR that no allegation attracting the SC/ST Act per se had been made out; Section 3(2)(v) appeared to have been invoked only in view of the seriousness of the allegations and the severity of the potential punishment, rather than as a substantive caste-atrocity charge. The preliminary objection was accordingly rejected, and the plea decided on its merits.
‘The plague of custodial death does not show any sign of abating’
Turning to the merits, the Court held that, without entering into the merits and subject to the evidence at trial, the primary gist of the allegations pertained to a custodial death, and that whether the post-mortem report corroborated the allegations was a matter to be examined during the investigation and any subsequent trial. It then made observations of wider significance on the persistence of deaths in custody:
“The allegations levelled pertain to the aspect of venomous snake of custodial death rearing its head once again in the present proceedings. It appears that although COVID-19 pandemic had run its course but the plague of custodial death does not show any sign of abating.”
Most significantly, the Court articulated where the burden of proof should lie in such cases, given that the events occur within the exclusive knowledge and control of the custodial authorities:
“In cases of custodial death, the burden of proof can and should ordinarily be on the police personnel to rebut the allegations levelled against them pertaining to trivializing human life in their depravity.”
That burden, the Court held, would be on the appellant to explain, and at this stage no such explanation appeared to be made out. Finding no good ground to grant indulgence, the Court rejected the criminal appeal, leaving the officer without pre-arrest protection.
Why the order matters
The order is a strong judicial statement on the enduring problem of custodial deaths, and on how courts approach bail where a death in custody is alleged against those who held the deceased. The Court’s refusal of anticipatory bail reflects the seriousness with which such allegations are treated, and its reasoning, that a person who dies in the custody of the police or a uniformed force does so beyond public view and within the control of those officers, underpins the observation that the burden should ordinarily shift to the custodial personnel to explain the death. That approach echoes the Supreme Court’s long-settled jurisprudence, from D.K. Basu onwards, that custodial violence strikes at the rule of law and that the State bears a heightened responsibility to account for the safety of those in its custody.
The decision is also a useful clarification on the interplay between the SC/ST Act’s Section 18 bar and anticipatory bail: the mere invocation of a provision of the Act in an FIR does not mechanically shut out anticipatory bail, and courts will look at whether a genuine caste-atrocity allegation is made out or whether the provision has been added only to reflect the gravity of the offence. At the same time, the order decides nothing on guilt. The post-mortem findings, the cause of death, and the officers’ role are all matters for the investigation and any eventual trial, and the appellant, though refused bail, remains presumed innocent until the allegations are tested and proved in accordance with law.
Case Title: Appellant v. State of U.P. and Another [Criminal Appeal No. 2499 of 2026]
Bench: Justice Manish Mathur, Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)
Date of Order: September 15, 2026