‘Article 326 Is the Governing Provision’: Supreme Court Examines Bihar Electoral Roll Revision as ECI Defends Voter Verification Drive

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The Supreme Court resumed hearing on ADR’s plea challenging Bihar’s Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls, amid concerns over voter exclusion and fairness. The Election Commission defended the exercise, arguing that Article 326 and election laws fully empower it to revise rolls to protect electoral integrity.

‘Article 326 Is the Governing Provision’: Supreme Court Examines Bihar Electoral Roll Revision as ECI Defends Voter Verification Drive
‘Article 326 Is the Governing Provision’: Supreme Court Examines Bihar Electoral Roll Revision as ECI Defends Voter Verification Drive

The Supreme Court of India heard petitions led by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) that challenge the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls being carried out in Bihar. The petitions raise serious concerns about procedural fairness, transparency, and the possible impact of the revision exercise on voters’ rights.

The Bench hearing the matter consists of the Chief Justice of India and Justice Joymalya Bagchi.

Senior Advocate Maninder Singh, appearing for the Election Commission of India, began his submissions by placing the core issue before the Court.

He stated that the real question is whether such an electoral roll revision is strictly controlled by parliamentary legislation, or whether it operates as a foundational mechanism through which the Election Commission re-asserts its constitutional jurisdiction, subject to the principles of non-arbitrariness and reasonableness. He submitted that electoral processes across the world function within defined policy frameworks.

He further emphasized that the conditions mentioned under Article 326 of the Constitution for inclusion in electoral rolls are mandatory and operate on a continuous basis. According to him, while Article 325 is framed in a negative manner by stating that no person shall be rendered ineligible, Article 326 is the true governing provision that determines voter eligibility.

Continuing his arguments, Senior Advocate Maninder Singh submitted:

“that the principle established by this Court—applied in cases where repeated actions undermine the integrity of a process and are prima facie found to lack bona fides—applies fully in the present matter. Respectfully, the same circumstances have recurred here.”

He also referred to the Court’s earlier observations in a related context and stated:

“The Court, as he understands, had previously expressed satisfaction when the FIR in Bihar was filed, despite similar concerns having been raised solely on the basis of news reports, without any other material strong enough to withstand judicial scrutiny.”

Towards the end of his submissions, Senior Advocate Maninder Singh made a strong statement regarding the intentions of the petitioners and said:

“I have no hesitation in accepting the submission made on behalf of the Election Commission that the suggestion to revert to the paper ballot system of a bygone era reveals the real intention of the petitioning associations, which is to discredit the system of voting through EVMs and thereby derail the electoral process.”

With this, he concluded his submissions.

Another counsel addressing the Court stated that he would confine his arguments only to Article 326 of the Constitution. He explained that Article 326 restricts voter eligibility to citizens who are not otherwise disqualified, and that this principle was clearly intended from the very beginning of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

He further explained that the principles governing the preparation of electoral rolls for Parliamentary constituencies and State Legislative Assembly constituencies are identical, and therefore it was sufficient to explain the legal position with reference to Parliamentary constituencies alone.

He then outlined the statutory framework in detail. First, he referred to Clause 50 of the Bill, which mandates that every constituency must have an electoral roll, making the preparation of such a roll mandatory and a condition precedent for conducting elections.

Second, he explained that a registered voter must not suffer from any disqualification listed under Clause 16, which primarily relates to citizenship and other statutory disqualifications. Third, he stated that a voter can be registered in only one constituency and not more than one.

He added that these principles are reiterated in the official notice at page 24 of the record. Finally, he raised the question of how the law deals with persons who are disqualified but whose names nevertheless appear on the electoral roll.

Senior Advocate D.S. then highlighted what he described as a flawed approach adopted by the petitioners. He stated that the petitioners were attempting to import the requirements of Section 16(1)(b) into Section 16(1)(a) of the Act. He read out the statutory provision and stated:

“Electoral Roll—Disqualifications for registration: A person shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll if he is not a citizen of India, or is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court.”

Senior Advocate D.S. further submitted that every person who is not less than 18 years of age on the qualifying date and is ordinarily resident in a constituency is entitled to be registered in the electoral roll of that constituency.

He addressed the argument raised by the petitioners that Section 19 does not expressly mention citizenship as a condition for registration. According to him, this argument overlooks the opening words of Section 19, which state that the provision is “subject to the foregoing provisions.”

These words, he explained, automatically bring in Section 16, which clearly lays down the primary eligibility conditions. He emphasized that citizenship and the minimum age of 18 years are fundamental constitutional requirements, while other statutory conditions are secondary and can be satisfied through prescribed procedures.

He further informed the Court that the Election Commission has provided forms, conducted door-to-door verification, and collected information to ensure compliance with the law. He submitted that adequate opportunities were given to raise grievances, and that even the petitioners themselves had availed these remedies.

Turning to Section 62 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which deals with the right to vote, Senior Advocate D.S. explained that the provision clearly states that every person whose name is entered in the electoral roll is entitled to vote. In simple terms, he said, inclusion in the electoral roll determines the right to vote.

Concluding his submissions, Senior Advocate D.S. stated that the revision process has already been carried out. He submitted that with the technological resources and manpower available to the Election Commission, the exercise could be completed swiftly, demonstrating that there was nothing irregular about it.

He further stated that even at this stage, no concrete lapse has been pointed out in relation to Bihar, and that in other states, the process is still ongoing.
With this, he ended his submissions.

Advocate Eklavya Dwivedi then addressed the Court and focused his arguments on the principle of proportionality. He submitted that Article 326 is a self-limiting constitutional provision which guarantees adult suffrage and mandates that every person who is entitled to registration on the electoral rolls must be registered.

His second submission related to Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, which he noted has been discussed at length during the hearings. He emphasized that the phrase “in such manner as it may think fit” must be interpreted broadly.

Drawing from the submissions of Senior Advocate Maninder Singh, he argued that Section 21(3) effectively frees the Election Commission from the rigid framework of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, and allows it to design and implement a revision process in the manner it considers appropriate.

Advocate Eklavya concluded his arguments with a pointed remark, stating:

“the mere presence of the word ‘democratic’ in an organization’s name does not imply that it is contributing to the strengthening of the country’s democratic framework.”

The matter will now be taken up by the Supreme Court for further hearing tomorrow.

Case Title:
ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND ORS. Versus ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA [W.P.(C) No. 640/2025 PIL-W].

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Hardik Khandelwal

I’m Hardik Khandelwal, a B.Com LL.B. candidate with diverse internship experience in corporate law, legal research, and compliance. I’ve worked with EY, RuleZero, and High Court advocates. Passionate about legal writing, research, and making law accessible to all.

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