The Supreme Court has put a stay to further investigation into an FIR filed against a man who called Congress President Mallikarjun Kharge “ayogya” (incompetent). The court’s order stays legal proceedings related to the complaint. The man had been charged under sections for insulting a public figure.

New Delhi: The Supreme Court today stayed further investigation into an FIR lodged in Karnataka against a man accused of referring to the All India Congress Committee (AICC) President, Mallikarjun Kharge, as “Ayogya” (which translates to “worthless” or “rascal”).
The Court hearing a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the Karnataka High Court’s ruling, which had quashed charges under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, but upheld charges under Sections 153-A, 153-B, and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). These sections pertain to promoting enmity and inciting violence.
The Bench, comprising Justice MM Sundresh and Justice Pankaj Mithal, issued the interim order during the hearing of the SLP, with Senior Advocate Aruna Shyam representing the petitioner, Mithun Shet.
On September 27, the Karnataka High Court dismissed charges under the SC/ST Act but permitted further investigation under the IPC sections mentioned above. The case stems from a public speech delivered by the petitioner in Siravara, Raichur, Karnataka, where the contentious remark was allegedly made. A complaint filed by the President of the District Congress Committee, claiming that the term “Ayogya” was used against Kharge with the intent to stir up caste-based hatred and depict him as a deceiver. Initially, the FIR registered in Kalaburgi and later transferred to Raichur for further investigation.
The SLP reads,
“The Petitioner, during a speech, in one of the Programme at Siravara, Raichur, Karnataka, had used the word “Ayogya” for the President of the All India Congress Committee (AICC). The Respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint with the Police alleging that the said word was used to incite hatred and violence towards the caste of the victim so as to create intimidation by falsely portraying him as a cheater and requested to take action against the Petitioner. Subsequently, an FIR in Crime No. 12/2024 was registered at P.S Brahmpur, Kalaburgi District which was eventually transferred at P.S Sirawar, Raichur District as Crime No. 08/2024 upon an order dated 22.01.2024 passed by the Learned District and Sessions Court, Kalaburgi. The FIR was registered under sections 153-A, 153-B, 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(2)(v-a) of the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,”
The petitioner approached the Karnataka High Court seeking to quash an FIR, arguing that the term “Ayogya” does not meet the criteria for an offence under the relevant IPC sections. While the High Court dismissed the charges under the SC/ST Act, it retained those under the IPC, interpreting “Ayogya” as meaning “rascal,” a view the petitioner contested. In the Special Leave Petition (SLP), the petitioner argued that the High Court had incorrectly interpreted the word “Ayogya,” asserting that it should be understood as worthless rather than “rascal.”
Additionally, the petitioner contended that the elements required to invoke Sections 153-A, 153-B, and 505 of the IPC were not met, as the term did not promote disharmony or enmity between different groups.
The SLP emphasizes that “Ayogya” has multiple synonyms, with “worthless” being one of the closest meanings, and the High Court erred in selecting only “rascal.” It also argues that the context of the term’s use in this case was not adequately considered by the court.
Moreover, the petitioner raised the issue of whether simply using the word “Ayogya” could incite violence or lead to public disorder, referencing Supreme Court precedents like Ramesh S/o Chota Dalal vs. Union of India (1988) and Balwant Singh vs. State of Punjab (1995), which highlight that words must be capable of inciting violence or public disorder to attract such charges.
Furthermore, the petitioner questioned whether supporters or followers of the Congress Party could be considered a “group or community” under Section 153-A of the IPC, and whether the High Court’s interpretation conflicted with established legal principles from cases such as Manzar Sayeed Khan vs. State of Maharashtra (2007).