Married Woman’s Affair Not Rape on Promise of Marriage, Rules Punjab & Haryana High Court

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The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that a married woman cannot claim rape on the basis of a false promise of marriage, calling such acts “promiscuity, immorality and reckless disregard of marriage.” The Court acquitted a man sentenced to 9 years in a 2016 case.

Married Woman’s Affair Not Rape on Promise of Marriage, Rules Punjab & Haryana High Court
Married Woman’s Affair Not Rape on Promise of Marriage, Rules Punjab & Haryana High Court

Chandigarh: In a recent landmark judgment, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that a married woman who enters into a sexual relationship outside of her marriage cannot claim rape on the ground of a false promise of marriage.

The court made this ruling while acquitting a man who had been convicted and sentenced to nine years imprisonment in a rape case dating back to 2016.

Justice Shalini Singh Nagpal emphasized that

“a fully matured married woman consenting to a sexual relationship outside marriage on a promise of marriage is merely an act of promiscuity, immorality and reckless disregard of the institution of marriage and cannot lead to a rape case.”

The complainant, a married woman, had alleged that she was induced into the relationship by a promise of marriage. However, the High Court disagreed, noting that she was “not a naive, innocent bashful young lady” and was capable of understanding the consequences of her impulsive actions.

The court highlighted that she was a grown woman, a mother of two children, and ten years older than the accused, which strengthened the argument that she fully understood her decisions.

The judgment further explained,

“When a fully matured married woman, consents to sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues indulging in such activity, it is merely an act of promiscuity, immorality and reckless disregard of the institution of marriage, not an act of inducement by misconception of fact. Section 90 of IPC cannot be applied in any such case to pardon the act of a woman and the criminal liability on another.”

During the appeal, the accused argued that the trial was flawed because Section 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) had been violated. He stated that even in cases initiated by private complaint, a sessions trial must be conducted by a public prosecutor.

On the merits of the case, the accused contended that a married woman could not have been induced into sexual relations on the pretext of marriage.

The complainant did not oppose the appeal, as there had been a compromise with the accused, and she did not object to allowing his appeal. The Court recognized the technical issue regarding the public prosecutor but noted,

“It is not a case where there has been a denial of full and fair opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. Hence, non-prosecution of the case by a Public Prosecutor should not, in the opinion of this Court, be regarded as an illegality grave enough to vitiate the trial.”

On the merits, the Court sided with the accused, observing that inducement for marriage is understandable for an unmarried woman, but in this case, the complainant was already married, even though she claimed to be unhappy and allegedly seeking a divorce from her husband, who was in the military.

The court found her claim untrue, noting that she had admitted to residing with her in-laws and had not filed any divorce petition.

The court also highlighted inconsistencies in her testimony, stating,

“Her statement regarding sexual intercourse by the appellant 55-60 times during the year 2012-13 is conspicuous by absence of dates and other material particulars. She admitted that the physical intimacy 55-60 times in the year 2012-13 was in her in-laws’ house. Clearly, the prosecutrix was in a consensual relationship with the appellant for a period of more than two years during which period, she remained married to her husband. In the fact situation, her claim that appellant had physical relations with her and committed rape upon her on the assurance that he would marry her is per se false and unacceptable.”

The Court further elaborated on the prolonged nature of the relationship, stating,

“It appears that for two long years, day after day, week after week and month after month, the immoral arrangement of prosecutrix with appellant continued until the day of reckoning when she suffered an emotional set back on coming to know that appellant had solemnized marriage with another woman.”

The court noted the impossibility of inducement under the circumstances, adding,

“The accused was clearly not in a position to induce her to intimacy on the assurance of marriage, that too in her own matrimonial house where her in-laws and children would also be present.”

It concluded,

“The assertion that she was induced into sexual relationship and raped by the appellant on the basis of a promise to marry stands irrefutably falsified. Even if the allegations levelled by her are accepted at their face value, it is unconceivable that a legally married woman could be induced into sexual relations on a promise of marriage. Accepting, such a promise was indeed made, it would be unenforceable in law being contrary to law and morality of the society. It appears that for two long years, day after day, week after week and month after month, the immoral arrangement of prosecutrix with appellant continued until the day of reckoning when she suffered an emotional set back on coming to know that appellant had solemnized marriage with another woman.”

The Court made it clear that this was a case of a consensual relationship that later turned sour and should not form the basis of a criminal case.

“Though the appellant cannot be regarded as completely innocent in the fact situation, yet such a relationship based on consent cannot be made the foundation of a charge, as serious as one under Section 376 IPC. In such a case, presumption stipulated under Section 114-A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot come into play nor can it be held that consent was given under a misconception of fact. The findings of learned trial Court based on Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 90 of IPC are unsustainable in the fact situation of the case and are liable to be set aside.”

The appellant was represented by Senior Advocate RS Cheema with advocate Sumanjeet Kaur, while Advocate Vikas Gupta represented the complainant.

Senior Deputy Advocate General Jatinder Pal Singh appeared on behalf of the State of Punjab.

Click Here to Read Our Reports on Extramarital Affair

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Hardik Khandelwal

I’m Hardik Khandelwal, a B.Com LL.B. candidate with diverse internship experience in corporate law, legal research, and compliance. I’ve worked with EY, RuleZero, and High Court advocates. Passionate about legal writing, research, and making law accessible to all.

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