X Corp tells Karnataka HC that the Sahyog portal enables secret censorship without due process. SG Mehta defends it as vital for India’s massive digital safety.
Bengaluru: Today, on July 17, In an important case before the Karnataka High Court, X Corp (formerly Twitter) has filed a writ petition against the Union of India, challenging the use of the Central Government’s ‘Sahyog’ portal for issuing content blocking directions.
The case is being heard by Justice M. Nagaprasanna, and it raises significant constitutional and technological concerns related to online censorship, freedom of speech, and digital regulation.
X Corp argues that the Sahyog portal enables the government to block content by using Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. According to the company, this process bypasses the specific procedure laid out under Section 69A of the IT Act and the safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court in the landmark Shreya Singhal v. Union of India case.
X Corp calls this mechanism a “parallel and opaque framework for censorship” that lacks essential procedural protections like advance notice, a chance to be heard, and a reasoned order.
Backing X Corp in this matter is DIGIPUB, an association of 92 digital media organisations. DIGIPUB has intervened in court and stated that the Sahyog portal’s non-transparent takedown orders violate the freedom of the press and have a chilling effect on journalism in India.
Representing the Union of India, Solicitor General (SG) Tushar Mehta began his arguments by emphasizing the vastness of India’s digital ecosystem, pointing out that there are over 90 crore internet users in the country, with a new user joining every three seconds.
He stated that the issues raised in this case go far beyond X Corp and have implications for all intermediaries on the internet.
While discussing the legal basis of X Corp’s petition, SG Mehta said,
“The petitioners invoke freedom of speech under Article 19, but a large number of intermediaries engage in activities that fall outside constitutional protection. Not all online speech is defensible under Article 19(1)(a).”
Highlighting the scale of India’s digital economy, SG Mehta added,
“India’s digital payments ecosystem exceeds that of the US and Europe combined (7x), and is 3 times larger than China’s—showing the scale and seriousness of digital governance challenges.”
He also argued that online platforms are not innocent players but run commercial models that depend on manipulating user behaviour:
“Online platforms have constructed business models that commodify human attention. ‘Engagement’ is often a euphemism for exploiting psychological tendencies to generate ad revenue. Regulatory oversight is essential.”
Defending the legal rules in question, SG Mehta stated that these regulations, including Rule 3 of the IT Rules, are necessary due to the manipulative nature of algorithm-driven platforms:
“The rules under challenge are a necessary response to the manipulative design of algorithm-driven platforms that profit from behavioural targeting and data monetisation.”
At one point during the hearing, Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed,
“It’s a package.”
To this, SG Mehta responded in agreement—indicating that with digital privileges come regulatory responsibilities:
“With the privileges of digital expression come corresponding responsibilities, including regulatory compliance.”
Further, SG Mehta said:
“While users perceive themselves as consumers, in reality, they are the product. Platforms generate revenue by profiling and monetising user data and behavioural patterns.”
He urged the court to consider the larger picture and not just focus on social media:
“The constitutional validity of Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules must not be examined through the microscopic lens of platforms like X (formerly Twitter). These social media intermediaries form only a tiny fraction of the broader internet ecosystem.”
On the relevance of Indian constitutional interpretation, SG Mehta remarked:
“I agree with the senior counsel for the petitioners—social media does not alter the contours of Article 19(1)(a). But constitutional interpretation is dynamic. The Constitution is a living document.”
Taking a critical view of relying too much on foreign jurisprudence, SG Mehta added:
“Our courts have become over-reliant on American jurisprudence. While we must welcome light from any quarter, not all foreign precedent is illuminating. Sometimes even darkness is imported just because it comes from a ‘reputed’ jurisdiction.”
He made a strong pitch for a more India-centric approach in interpreting constitutional and digital rights: “The time has come for a Re-Indianisation of the Indian judiciary.”
While discussing how US jurisprudence has changed, SG Mehta pointed out that the Supreme Court’s earlier reliance on Reno v. ACLU—which was key in the Shreya Singhal ruling—might now be outdated:
“In the United States itself, judicial thought has evolved. The celebrated Reno v. ACLU ruling—on which Shreya Singhal heavily relies—has been gradually diluted. Judges in the US are now questioning Reno in light of emerging threats.”
He continued:
“While the petitioners argue that Shreya Singhal protects their position, a correct reading of that judgment actually undermines their case. The legal framework it upheld, including oversight and accountability, is consistent with Sahyog.”
Explaining the limited nature of protection under Section 79, he said:
“Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act is an exception to the general rule—namely, that you are responsible for what happens on your platform. You lose safe harbour when you fail to act upon unlawful content.”
Justice Nagaprasanna then asked,
“So, you cannot take refuge under the safe harbour?”
To this, SG Mehta responded:
“Correct, My Lord. In the era of print and early electronic media, there was no statutory safe harbour for hosting or publishing unlawful content. The law treated platforms as responsible publishers.”
Further, SG Mehta explained the nature of protection under Section 79:
“Yes, the exception under Section 79(1) exists, but it comes with conditions. Intermediaries are not liable for third-party content unless they fail to act after being notified by the Government.”
He clarified that compliance is not compulsory but conditional:
“When the Government notifies an intermediary about unlawful content, it is for the platform to take a call—to take it down or not. There is no compulsion. They can always refuse.”
“This is not a penal provision. It is an exception to an exception. The primary rule is that you are responsible for the content on your platform. The safe harbour under Section 79 is granted conditionally—subject to compliance with due diligence obligations.”
He emphasized:
“Section 79 does not confer a right. It is merely a statutory protection—unavailable to printers, publishers, or broadcasters, who remain liable for what they publish or air.”
He supported his argument by pointing to recent cyber incidents:
“The recent Punjab incident demonstrates how dangerous the internet can be in the absence of effective regulation. Criminals lodged in jail were using VPNs to communicate with the outside world.”
He noted how law enforcement notices were ignored:
“Despite being served law enforcement notices, several VPN service providers refused to comply. That’s precisely why there is a need to notify Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in India and ensure their accountability under the law.”
On the role of intermediaries, SG Mehta clarified:
“The Government merely notifies ISPs or intermediaries about unlawful content or activity. It is entirely up to them—they may choose to comply or contest. They retain the right to defend their decision through appropriate legal channels.”
He also said that the State has a constitutional responsibility to protect its citizens:
“It is, however, the State’s constitutional duty to safeguard the common man against online frauds—be it phishing websites, deceptive financial schemes, or misuse of personal data. We cannot turn a blind eye.”
He provided an example of prompt corporate cooperation:
“We recently came across a serious fraud facilitated through a search engine. Upon notification, Google took it down immediately. In fact, Google has generally responded positively to concerns flagged by the Government.”
In another example, SG Mehta highlighted:
“There have been instances where fake websites were created for booking rooms and services related to Somnath Temple, Kumbh Mela, and other such religious or public events. These were clear cases of fraud.”
He further stated:
“Upon notifying Google, appropriate action was taken. Moreover, the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Ministry (HMA) has established a dedicated cell to monitor and report such fraudulent activities.”
In conclusion, SG Mehta made a pointed observation:
“In such scenarios, freedom of speech is not even engaged. These intermediaries are purely commercial entities facilitating financial frauds, not engaging in expressive activity.”
“Even Smart TVs Are a Threat”: SG Mehta Defends India’s Content Blocking Rules as X Corp Challenges Sahyog Portal in Karnataka High Court
SG Mehta explained that when the government finds harmful or fraudulent content online, it notifies the platforms.
“Upon notifying Google, appropriate action was taken. Moreover, the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Ministry (HMA) has established a dedicated cell to monitor and report such fraudulent activities.”
He added,
“In such scenarios, freedom of speech is not even engaged. These intermediaries are purely commercial entities facilitating financial frauds, not engaging in expressive activity.”
He extended this argument to platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and others:
“Even social media platforms, while involving an element of free speech, are ultimately business enterprises. Their commercial operations and data-driven revenue models must be subjected to regulatory oversight.”
He added that whenever unlawful activities are found on digital platforms, the government’s responsibility is clear.
“If unlawful activity is detected on payment sites or online auction platforms, the Government’s duty is to notify them. Thereafter, it is for the intermediary to decide whether to act and thereby retain safe harbour protection under Section 79.”
He explained that the scope of the IT Act is much wider than just social media.
“It is important to note that the term intermediary under the IT Act is broad. It includes not just social media platforms, but also cloud service providers, online gaming platforms, and even domain name registrars.”
Mehta warned about growing digital threats:
“It is through constant vigilance that the Government can protect the common man from harmful malware propagated through intermediaries. Today, even mobile phones qualify as computer resources capable of forwarding malware to every contact stored within.”
He also added,
“Not just phones—even our smart TVs can be vectors for malware and cyber threats. The scale and range of digital vulnerability is far greater than before.”
Justice M. Nagaprasanna agreed, observing,
“In fact, we may now say—whatever is ‘smart’, is a computer resource.”
SG Mehta elaborated further on the extent of data surveillance:
“Our mobile phones have effectively become automatic tape recorders, often recording or analysing data without our knowledge. Today, even smart TVs function as fully capable computer resources.”
Using a personal example to highlight algorithmic profiling, Mehta said,
“I enjoy Urdu ghazals. Now, YouTube has learned whether I prefer Ghalib or Faiz—and curates my feed accordingly. This is how far algorithmic personalisation has gone.”
Justice Nagaprasanna reflected on this with a sharp observation:
“These algorithms are designed in such a way that whatever we desire appears on our phones. The only private desire left is that which remains unspoken—once we utter it, our devices seem to know.”
SG Mehta warned about AI dangers:
“Today, every individual is profiled. With the advent of Artificial Intelligence, the risks are exponentially higher. AI can be hazardous in ways we’re only beginning to understand.”
He also cautioned against narrow interpretations of free speech restrictions:
“If we interpret Article 19(2) too narrowly, some of the most harmful and dangerous content may never fall within any restricted category—despite being unfit for any platform.”
Raising a practical concern, Mehta said,
“Today, an AI-generated video can show a judge making unlawful remarks. If such a video comes to the notice of the Government, how should it act? Unless the phrase ‘in the interest of public order’ is invoked, where does it fit under Article 19(2)?”
He added,
“That is why, across the world, the restrictions under free speech provisions are being interpreted not narrowly but elastically. The law must evolve to address contemporary technological realities.”
Citing an international example, Mehta said,
“There was a fake video of the Ukrainian President asking his troops to retreat. Believing it to be real, soldiers started returning. This is the power—and danger—of emerging tech like AI.”
He argued that the Shreya Singhal ruling is being misread by X Corp.
“When the Shreya Singhal verdict was pronounced, the context was entirely different. Nonetheless, the ruling remains applicable to this matter, albeit not in support of the petitioners but contrary to their case.”
He further added,
“At that time, intermediaries had not raised any objections to being informed by the government regarding unlawful content. The Supreme Court had upheld Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, confirming that content removal upon receiving either a court directive or government notice was legally valid.”
On the subject of U.S. precedents, Mehta said:
“U.S. judgments can’t be relied upon in the Indian context. The approach to freedom of expression there differs significantly from ours. In the U.S., acts like burning the national flag are seen as valid expressions of dissent. But in India, such acts amount to sacrilege. The Reno judgment is nearly three decades old.”
Justice Nagaprasanna agreed:
“Indeed. There’s been a complete paradigm shift—not just in the medium, but in everything.”
SG Mehta continued,
“To challenge IT Rules, one must prove direct violation of free speech. But X (Twitter) can’t claim rights under Article 19(1)(a)—it’s just a notice board. Only users posting on it can claim such rights.”
He clarified the government’s position:
“If content is patently unlawful, the State can regulate it. And regulation is the least restrictive way to stop such content while still respecting constitutional limits.”
He added,
“What qualifies as ‘in the interest of public order’ must be interpreted from an Indian constitutional lens. Our Supreme Court has already held that the U.S. Schenck judgment (on wartime speech limits) does not apply in India.”
Mehta said the safe harbour concept is being wrongly portrayed as a right:
“Section 66A of the IT Act was struck down on grounds of vagueness, relying on Reno v. ACLU. But that context has changed. Today, safe harbour is not a right, it’s merely an exception to protect intermediaries from liability.”
He clarified,
“Section 79 of the IT Act, which provides safe harbour, has already been upheld by the Supreme Court. Also, since X (Twitter) is not a natural person, it cannot claim Article 19(1)(a) — the right to free speech.”
He reminded the court,
“In Shreya Singhal, the argument was that the IT Rules created a censorship regime. Now X (Twitter) is making a similar claim. But the context is important.”
He added,
“Back then, social media intermediaries themselves didn’t object to being notified by the government about unlawful content. That principle still holds — nothing new is being imposed.”
Highlighting the global challenges with social media, he said,
“Social media platforms are for exchanging ideas, which should never be interfered with. But their business model uses users as the product — and the whole world is now struggling to regulate this.”
He reiterated,
“The Reno judgment is outdated.”
Justice Nagaprasanna remarked:
“It came during 36 Kbps dial-up days.”
To this, Mehta responded, “Today, we carry computers in our pockets. India now has 190 crore phone subscribers — even a US court would rethink Reno today.”
He supported his arguments with data:
“Cyber crimes have exploded with rising mobile & internet use—
• 2002: 808 cases
• 2010: 1,322
• 2015: 11,000+
• 2020: 15,000
• 2022: 65,000+”
Mehta added,
“The MHA’s cyber crime portal (2019) got 5 lakh+ complaints by 2024. So this isn’t just about free speech—it’s about data-backed global cyber threats. That’s the real concern before the Court.”
Reinforcing his argument, he stated,
“Rule 3 of IT Rules applies to all intermediaries—social media included. X or Facebook don’t have freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a); only users posting there do.”
He said,
“Intermediaries say they have their own internal guidelines. We have no issue. But if we notify unlawful content, and they reply citing guidelines—we’re fine. The issue is only about lawful compliance.”
He pointed out,
“Social media intermediaries don’t just host content—they edit it. Their algorithms curate content based on users’ caste, religion, region, etc., shaping what each user sees.”
Referring to the Beer Biceps case involving influencer Ranveer Allahabadia, he said,
“In the Beer Biceps (Ranveer Allahabadia) case, the Supreme Court asked me to work with the govt to frame regulations for social media—ones that are effective but respect free speech.”
He concluded,
“Social media platforms can’t seek absolute exemption from regulations that govern all other media. Rules must apply uniformly, regardless of the medium.”
Justice Nagaprasanna commented,
“Social media platforms amplify content via their own algorithms. They can’t escape accountability by saying ‘we just host it’—they design the rules that decide what goes viral.”
Mehta referred to global developments:
“Refers to 2024 US SC judgment Moody v. NetChoice, upholding state laws on content moderation. Even in US, platforms face regulation.”
He added,
“TikTok ban was upheld in the US—shows even First Amendment protection isn’t absolute. The Reno judgment is now considered ‘vintage’.”
Justice Nagaprasanna ended on a cautionary note:
“The most dangerous is to use AI to write judgments. Don’t let artificial intelligence make your intelligence artificial.”
ALSO READ: Indian Govt’s ‘Sahyog’ Portal: Karnataka HC to Hear X Corp’s Plea on July 8
SG Mehta responded,
“There’s also the ‘right to be forgotten’—a new concern courts must address.”
SG Mehta requested the Court to take up the matter tomorrow at 10 AM.
Justice Nagaprasanna:
“Let’s finish it tomorrow, I’ll fix a date after that. Let’s not drag this matter.”
Case Title:
X Corp v Union of India & Ors W.P. No. 7405/2025
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