Valid cause to live apart does not settle the question of capable wife maintenance on its own: the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that a wife with sufficient cause to live separately is not, for that reason alone, entitled to maintenance if she is found capable of maintaining herself, while upholding Rs 30,000 a month for the couple’s minor son.
Indore: The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Indore has dismissed a criminal revision filed by a wife and her minor son against a Family Court order that granted maintenance to the child but refused it to the mother, a qualified dentist. The Court found no perversity in the finding that she was not “unable to maintain herself” within the meaning of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, now Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [Rupal Dhir & Anr. v. Gaurav Dhir].
The order of October 12, 2026 was passed by Justice Alok Awasthi, who heard the revision under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 on the question of admission.
The order under challenge
By its order of September 27, 2025 in MJC (Cri) No. 969 of 2024, the First Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Indore partly allowed the application. It directed the husband to pay Rs 30,000 a month to the son from July 4, 2024, the date of the application, and awarded nothing to the wife.
The Family Court found that the husband is a qualified dental surgeon running his own clinic, has completed post-graduation, holds a PPF account with substantial deposits, has received insurance proceeds and invests in mutual funds. It assessed his monthly income at no less than Rs 1,50,000 and held that he had neglected to maintain his wife and son after separation.
The marriage and the claim
Petitioner Rupal Dhir and respondent Gaurav Dhir were married on November 19, 2019 according to Hindu customs. Their son lives with the mother. The wife and son applied for maintenance of Rs 2,00,000 a month, alleging cruelty, dowry demands, physical and mental harassment, being forced out of the matrimonial home, and neglect by a husband of sufficient means.
The husband denied the allegations of cruelty. He contended that his wife is a qualified dentist capable of earning and maintaining herself, and described himself as a postgraduate student with limited independent income.
Why the dentist’s own claim failed
On the wife’s claim, the Family Court noted that she is a BDS dentist and did not accept her plea that she could not work only because the child was young. It held that capacity to earn and actual earnings are distinct, but on the facts rejected her claim.
Justice Alok Awasthi said the revisional jurisdiction under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act is limited, and the Court does not re-appreciate evidence unless the findings are perverse, based on no evidence or patently illegal. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shailja & Anr. v. Khobbanna, (2018) 12 SCC 199, on the difference between capacity to earn and actual earnings, the Court observed:
“The wife is a professionally qualified dentist. The Family Court recorded that she herself admitted the qualification and that the only reason advanced for not earning was the young age of the child. That reason was found unconvincing in the facts of the case. No perversity is demonstrated in the conclusion that the wife is not ‘unable to maintain herself’ within the meaning of Section 125 of Cr.P.C./Section 144 of BNSS.”
Sufficient cause, but not enough
The Family Court had accepted that the wife had sufficient cause to live separately, noting the registration of an FIR for offences relating to dowry harassment. The High Court did not disturb that finding, but held that it does not settle the maintenance question on its own:
“The concurrent finding that she has sufficient cause to live separately does not, by itself, entitle her to maintenance when she is found capable of maintaining herself. The challenge on this score, therefore, fails.”
The allegations in that FIR remain untested, and nothing in the revision order records any finding on them.
The son’s Rs 30,000 left undisturbed
On the son’s maintenance, the Court noted that the Family Court assessed the husband’s income from his own admissions in cross-examination, the running of his dental clinic, PPF deposits, insurance proceeds and mutual-fund investments. It held:
“The amount of Rs.30,000/- per month for a minor child of about three years, residing in Indore, is neither inadequate nor excessive when tested against the status of the parties, the child’s right to be maintained at a standard reasonably consistent with that of the father, and the overall means of the respondent.”
The petitioners had relied on Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury Nee Nandy and Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena. The Court said those rulings lay down the object of Section 125 and the duty of a husband of means, but they “do not compel a different conclusion on the specific findings recorded against the wife’s claim.”
Finding “no perversity, illegality or material irregularity”, the Court dismissed the revision and affirmed the Family Court’s order, directing that a copy be sent to the Family Court, Indore.
What the order means for Section 125 claims
Maintenance claims under Section 125 CrPC, now Section 144 BNSS, often turn on two separate questions: whether the wife has a valid reason to live apart, and whether she is unable to maintain herself. This order makes clear that winning on the first does not decide the second. Where the record shows a professional qualification and no convincing reason for not using it, a Family Court may refuse maintenance to the wife without that finding being treated as perverse in revision.
At the same time, the order keeps the child’s claim separate. The father’s obligation to the son was measured against his own means and status, and the Court refused to disturb an award it found reasonable for a young child living in Indore.
Case Title: Rupal Dhir & Anr. v. Gaurav Dhir [Criminal Revision No. 135 of 2026]
Neutral Citation: 2026:MPHC-IND:29880
Bench: Justice Alok Awasthi, High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore
Date of Order: October 12, 2026
For Petitioners: Advocate Arpit Singh
For Respondent: Advocate Sudhanshu Vyas