The Allahabad High Court raised concerns over policing and governance in Uttar Pradesh, observing that sections of the police machinery appear more loyal to the ruling establishment than the Constitution. The Court highlighted issues relating to the Gangsters Act, administrative accountability, encounter killings, selective crackdowns, and alleged misuse of police powers.
Examining the functioning of law enforcement agencies in Uttar Pradesh, the Allahabad High Court recently observed that a section of the State police machinery appears to exhibit greater loyalty to the ruling establishment than to the Constitution. The remarks were made by Justice Vinod Diwakar while hearing a case arising under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.
The Court’s observations came against the backdrop of concerns regarding the exercise of police powers under the Gangsters Act and the broader issue of administrative accountability in the State. While refraining from issuing a final ruling on several legal questions because related issues are currently under consideration before the Supreme Court, the High Court undertook an extensive examination of systemic problems affecting policing and governance in Uttar Pradesh.
Justice Diwakar observed that the State has historically been affected by what he described as a deeply entrenched culture of political influence over administrative institutions. According to the Court, the “feudal mindset of politicians and bureaucrats” has, over the years, transformed constitutional governance into a mechanism serving personal authority rather than public welfare. The judgment noted that successive governments have presided over an administrative structure vulnerable to political interference, particularly in matters concerning transfers, postings, and promotions of police officers.
The Court pointed out that appointments to influential districts, urban commissionerates, and other coveted positions are often perceived as rewards for political loyalty, while officers who display independence or resist external influence may face punitive transfers to less significant postings. Such practices, the Court observed, undermine merit-based administration and weaken institutional autonomy.
Making one of its most significant observations, the Court stated:
“The vertical loyalty of officers runs not toward the Constitution but toward the ruling dispensation. Field officers, acutely conscious of the transfer-posting economy, calibrate their conduct to satisfy political superiors. Encounter killings, selective crackdowns, and targeted use of the Gangsters Act against inconvenient individuals have periodically attracted judicial notice.”
According to the Court, this culture of political patronage creates an environment where officers prioritise the expectations of those in power rather than their constitutional obligations. Such a system, the judgment suggested, has serious consequences for the rule of law and public confidence in democratic institutions.
The High Court also expressed grave concern regarding what it described as recurring violations of procedural safeguards during criminal investigations and law-enforcement operations. Justice Diwakar remarked that a substantial segment of the police establishment often treats legal safeguards not as binding constitutional requirements but as obstacles to administrative convenience.
In a detailed critique of investigative practices, the Court observed:
“A considerable section of the officer cadre treats the rule of law not as a constitutional obligation but as an operational inconvenience. Arrests are effected without due process, many times FIRs are registered or suppressed with ulterior motives, and preventive detention provisions are invoked arbitrarily, at the whims of officers. The procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, are routinely bypassed. Judicial orders are complied with in form but defeated in substance.”
The Court noted that while statutory safeguards exist to protect citizens against arbitrary state action, these protections frequently remain ineffective due to selective implementation. Such practices, it observed, erode faith in the criminal justice system and create an atmosphere where legal processes become vulnerable to manipulation.
The judgment also examined the role of senior bureaucrats responsible for overseeing police administration and internal governance. Justice Diwakar stressed that constitutional governance cannot function effectively unless senior officials discharge their responsibilities with independence and integrity.
The Court specifically criticised the functioning of certain officers who have occupied the position of Home Secretary in the State, suggesting that administrative decisions relating to postings, disciplinary proceedings, and responses to judicial directions have, in some instances, been influenced by personal considerations rather than constitutional principles.
The Court observed:
“Certain officers who rose to the post of Home Secretary have, in practice, served as conduits for self-serving interests. Recommendations on postings, approvals of departmental proceedings, and responses to court proceedings have, in such instances, reflected considerations driven by personal or extrinsic calculations rather than dispassionate and constitutionally informed administrative judgment. This fundamentally compromises the institutional integrity that the position demands.”
According to the Bench, the State government must periodically evaluate the effectiveness, independence, and professional suitability of officers occupying key administrative positions to ensure that public institutions remain accountable to constitutional values.
To illustrate what it described as a culture of inadequate accountability within the police establishment, the High Court referred to the infamous Bikru village incident involving gangster Vikas Dubey.
In July 2020, a police team conducting a raid at Dubey’s residence in Kanpur’s Bikru village was ambushed, resulting in the deaths of eight police personnel, including a Deputy Superintendent of Police. The incident triggered national outrage and led to multiple inquiries into police intelligence failures and operational lapses.
Justice Diwakar noted that despite the magnitude of the tragedy and the apparent supervisory shortcomings associated with the operation, the officer responsible for overseeing the raid reportedly received only a formal caution. The Court questioned whether such limited consequences were proportionate to the seriousness of the failure.
Commenting on the matter, the Court observed:
“This Court finds it difficult to reconcile such a disproportionately lenient outcome with the gravity of the supervisory failure involved, and it is precisely this culture of institutional impunity that emboldens those in authority to remain unaccountable, perpetuating the feudal and politically patronised administrative ecosystem that this Court has adverted to hereinabove.”
The Court suggested that the absence of meaningful accountability mechanisms encourages a system where mistakes and misconduct often go unchecked, thereby weakening institutional discipline.
Throughout the judgment, Justice Diwakar repeatedly emphasised that public institutions derive their legitimacy from the Constitution and not from transient political authority. The Court underscored that governance structures must remain accountable to the law, irrespective of which political party is in power.
The Bench stressed that constitutional governance cannot be subordinated to individual convenience, political expediency, or administrative preferences. Public servants, particularly those entrusted with policing powers, are expected to function within the framework of constitutional values and legal safeguards.
While refraining from issuing a final verdict on the validity and application of certain provisions of the Gangsters Act because related issues are pending before the Supreme Court, the High Court’s observations amount to one of the most extensive judicial critiques of policing and administrative functioning in Uttar Pradesh in recent years.
The petitioners were represented by Advocate Ronak Chaturvedi, while the State was represented by Additional Advocate General Anoop Trivedi, Additional Advocate General Paritosh Kumar Malviya, and Additional Government Advocate Paritosh Malviya.
Case Titles: Rajendra Tyagi and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another
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