Vulgar words alone do not make out Section 354A IPC; the complaint must specifically allege a sexually coloured remark, the Kerala High Court has held.
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Kochi: The Kerala High Court has quashed the sexual harassment charge under Section 354A(1)(iv) of the Indian Penal Code against a man accused of abusing a woman in obscene language, but has let trial go ahead on the charges of obscene words, criminal intimidation and insulting the modesty of a woman, since the complaint did not specifically allege a sexually coloured remark [Prasad Mahendragiri v. State of Kerala and Another].
Justice Jobin Sebastian partly allowed the accused’s petition seeking to quash the final report and all further proceedings in C.C. No. 274 of 2024 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kalpetta. The allegations are untested, the Court has expressed no view on the guilt of the accused, and the presumption of innocence applies.
Where the Court drew the line
A general abuse directed at a woman does not, by itself, constitute an offence under Section 354A(1)(iv) of the IPC.
For that provision to apply, the Court said, there “must be a specific allegation that the accused had made sexually coloured remarks against the de facto complainant.” Finding no such allegation, it quashed the proceedings under Section 354A(1)(iv).
What the complaint alleges
The petitioner is the sole accused. According to the prosecution, which relies on the complaint, he abused a woman in filthy language in front of others at Maniyankode in Wayanad on 9 March 2024, owing to previous enmity. It is further alleged that when she and her daughter confronted him, he abused them again on a public road outside his house, made sexually coloured remarks, and threatened to kill them while showing a machete. The words alleged are not reproduced here.
The final report invoked Sections 354A(1)(iv), 294(b), 506(ii) and 509 of the IPC, and the petitioner asked for the entire proceedings to be quashed.
The charges that stay
Turning to Section 509, the Court noted that intention is central.
The intention to insult the modesty of a woman is an indispensable ingredient of the offence.
Whether that intention existed on these facts, the Court held, is for the evidence at trial. The same goes for Section 294(b): whether the words were obscene, and whether they could generate impure thoughts in those who heard them, can be decided only after trial. Section 506(ii), criminal intimidation, was held prima facie made out on the allegation of a threat to kill with a machete.
In short, the petition succeeded in part. The Section 354A(1)(iv) proceedings were quashed, and the petitioner will face trial under Sections 294(b), 506(ii) and 509.
Why the order matters
Section 354A(1)(iv) treats the making of sexually coloured remarks as a distinct form of sexual harassment. The order keeps that offence apart from abuse that is merely vulgar or hostile, and indicates that obscene language by itself cannot carry a complaint under it. The complaint has to allege a sexually coloured remark in terms.
The other provisions were left open. Obscenity and intention to insult modesty go to trial, so the ruling is about how the charge must be made out at the threshold. It is not a finding on what was said, or on the guilt of the accused.
Case Title: Prasad Mahendragiri v. State of Kerala and Another [Crl.M.C. No. 1240 of 2026]
Bench: Justice Jobin Sebastian, Kerala High Court
Date of Order: September 16, 2026
Appearances: S. Sabarinadh, A. Jayasankar and Indulekha Joseph (for the petitioner); V.R. Ramlal, Public Prosecutor (for the State)