To make out the offence of intentional insult to provoke a breach of the peace, the insult must be aimed at the person complaining, not at someone who is not before the court. On that basis, the Karnataka High Court has quashed an FIR against a shopkeeper accused of making remarks against the Prime Minister when questioned about barricades outside his shop, finding no allegation that he insulted the complainant, and continuing the case would be an abuse of process.
Dharwad: The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal proceedings against a shopkeeper booked under Sections 285 and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, holding that the essential ingredients of the offences were not disclosed by the complaint, and that continuing the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law [Imtiyaz Nuruddin Chinchali v. State of Karnataka and Another].
Justice Venkatesh Naik T, allowing a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS), quashed the FIR registered by the Athani Police, Belagavi district.
The case
According to the complaint, the petitioner had placed certain barricades on the road in front of his shop, and when the complainant questioned him about them, he allegedly made statements against the Prime Minister of India. A complaint was lodged some days later, and an FIR followed under Section 285 of the BNS (danger or obstruction in a public way) and Section 352 of the BNS (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace). The petitioner approached the High Court to quash the proceedings, contending that there was no allegation that he had insulted or abused the complainant, and that an alleged political statement could not be converted into a personal criminal prosecution without the basic ingredients of the offence being made out.
The State and the complainant opposed the plea, submitting that the material prima facie disclosed an offence, that the barricades had caused public inconvenience, and that the petitioner had allegedly used insulting words with an intention to provoke a breach of peace; they argued that the allegations required investigation and that disputed questions of fact could not be examined in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.
The insult must be to the complainant
Examining the ingredients of Section 352 of the BNS, the Court held that the offence requires an intentional insult that gives provocation to “any person”, intending or knowing it likely that such provocation will cause that person to break the public peace. On the complaint’s own showing, the Court found, the petitioner had neither abused nor insulted the complainant so as to provoke a breach of peace; the only allegation was that he had made some statement against the Prime Minister. Such general and omnibus allegations, without any specific insult directed at the complainant, did not attract Section 352.
The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P., which, in the context of the corresponding provision of the Indian Penal Code, held that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not amount to intentional insult unless the requisite intention or knowledge to provoke the person insulted into breaching the peace is established, and that where the allegations do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence, continuing the criminal proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law. The Court also found that Section 285 was not attracted, and that there was an unexplained delay of four days in lodging the complaint, the incident being of one date and the complaint of another.
Applying the settled principle that inherent jurisdiction may be exercised where the allegations, even taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute any offence, the Court held that no offence was made out, and that continuation of the proceedings would be an abuse of process. It accordingly quashed the FIR and the proceedings.
Why it matters
The order turns on the precise ingredients of a frequently invoked provision. Section 352 of the BNS, like Section 504 of the old IPC, penalises an intentional insult that is calculated, or known to be likely, to provoke the person insulted into breaching the peace. Two elements are central: the insult must be intentional and aimed at provoking a breach of peace, and, crucially, it must be directed at a particular person, ordinarily the complainant, whose provoked reaction the law is concerned with. An insult aimed at a third party who is not before the court does not, without more, satisfy the section, because the provision protects against the provocation of the person insulted, not against offence taken by a bystander on someone else’s behalf.
The decision reflects the courts’ consistent reluctance to let the criminal process be set in motion where the complaint, read as it stands, discloses no offence. The Bhajan Lal line of authority, echoed in Mohammad Wajid, permits quashing where the allegations, even if wholly accepted, do not make out the ingredients of the offence charged; to allow such a case to proceed would subject the accused to the ordeal of a trial with no lawful foundation. The unexplained delay in lodging the complaint reinforced the Court’s conclusion that the prosecution could not be sustained.
The judgment is confined to the legal question of whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of Sections 285 and 352, and does not concern the content or propriety of any statement attributed to the petitioner; the Court’s analysis is about the frame of the offence, not the politics of what was allegedly said. For the petitioner, the outcome is the end of the criminal case; more broadly, the order is a reminder that Section 352 is not a general remedy for offence caused by a remark about a third party, but a specific offence requiring an intentional insult to the complainant with the object of provoking a breach of the peace.
Case Title: Imtiyaz Nuruddin Chinchali v. State of Karnataka and Another [Criminal Petition No. 101720 of 2026]
Bench: Justice Venkatesh Naik T, High Court of Karnataka at Dharwad | Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC-D:15574
Date of Order: September 18, 2026
Status: Criminal petition allowed. FIR and proceedings under Sections 285 and 352 of the BNS quashed as not disclosing the essential ingredients of the offences; continuation held to be an abuse of process.