The Allahabad High Court noted that judges, burdened with overwhelming caseloads, cannot be treated as robots or superhumans expected to deliver instant decisions. It warned officials that workload pressures never justify defying binding judicial orders issued by courts.
The Allahabad High Court has delivered a strongly worded decision holding the Prakash Singh, District Inspector of Schools, Ghazipur, guilty of contempt for failing to comply with a four-year-old interim order directing payment of an employee’s salary.
Rejecting the State’s request to postpone contempt proceedings on account of a pending application for vacation of the interim order, Justice Kshitij Shailendra highlighted the fundamental importance of the rule of law and the dignity of the judiciary.
The Court observed that courts dealing with enormous backlogs cannot be expected to function as flawless, tireless machines, while litigants treat active judicial directives as optional.
The court remarked,
“At the core of the Court’s reasoning was a candid recognition of the strain on constitutional courts, especially the Allahabad High Court. “
Justice Shailendra noted the practical reality that judges are often required to process hundreds of matters daily, which inevitably slows disposal, sometimes extending to years or even decades. Yet, he cautioned that parties cannot be allowed to openly disobey operative orders merely because the system is burdened.
The Court warned that such disobedience would turn adjudication into disorder, stating,
“In heavily burdened constitutional courts, like our Allahabad High Court, where around 400, 500, 600 and sometimes more than 800 cases are listed every day before every Judge, judicial proceedings may consume considerable time for disposal; sometimes years and sometime decades also. Still people all around may expect such overburdened judges to become ever-working super robots or super computers or super-human beings? If during such pendency, parties are permitted to openly defy operative directions, the administration of justice would descend into chaos and anarchy. The law does not countenance such audacity.”
The Court further emphasised that public trust in the judiciary depends not on rhetoric but on strict enforcement of its orders. It cautioned that allowing judicial commands to be ignored would directly weaken constitutional governance.
In this context, it observed,
“An order of a Constitutional Court is neither a mere advisory opinion nor a decorative piece of paper to be admired and ignored at convenience. It carries with it the full authority of the Constitution and the solemn mandate of the rule of law. The moment litigants are permitted to treat judicial directions as optional, the very foundation of constitutional governance begins to erode.”
The contempt application was filed based on a writ petition initiated in 2017 by Radhey Shyam Yadav.
Earlier, On April 18, 2022, the writ court passed an interim order directing that the applicant be paid his current salary during the pendency of the case, while taking note of interim orders granted in other identical writ petitions.
Although a Special Appeal (No. 385 of 2022) challenging the interim order was dismissed as withdrawn on July 6, 2022, the DIOS did not release the salary. This led the applicant to move the contempt application in 2022, which remained pending for about four years.
During the recent proceedings, the current DIOS of Ghazipur, Mr. Prakash Singh, was brought on record as opposite party No. 4 through Civil Misc. Impleadment Application No. 7 of 2025.
Mr. Prakash Singh appeared personally and filed an affidavit explaining that the State of Uttar Pradesh had filed an application seeking vacation of the interim order on May 12, 2022, and followed it with a listing application on May 13, 2026. On this basis, the State asked the High Court to defer contempt proceedings until the stay vacation application is heard, pointing out that May 25, 2026 was the next date fixed in the writ matter.
Counsel for the applicant, Mr. Awadhesh Kumar Malviya, countered that the employee had not received salary for four years. He argued that simply moving an application to vacate an order does not entitle the opposite party to disregard a binding judicial directive.
The Court then laid down a strict and clear position on the effect of pending recall/vacation applications.
It stated,
“A person against whom an interim order operates, cannot be permitted to arrogate unto himself the authority to decide whether he shall obey the order or not merely because he has filed an application for recall, modification, clarification, or vacation of that order. Filing of such an application does not eclipse, suspend, neutralize or render dormant the subsisting order of the Court. Unless the competent Court modifies, stays, recalls, or vacates its earlier order, the order continues to operate with full binding force.”
The Court added that if filing applications automatically suspended judicial directions, it would encourage repeat filing as a tactical method to escape compliance. It warned against such misuse.
The Court invoked a moral and institutional argument, referencing Mahatma Gandhi’s principle that courts weaken the law by tolerating non-compliance.
It stated,
“The majesty of the law stands diminished only when the Court permits its own command to be rendered ineffectual with impunity. In that sense, the continued non-enforcement of a subsisting judicial order amounts to a tacit permission for its violation, thereby attracting the very principle enunciated by Mahatma Gandhi that insult survives not merely by the act of wrongdoer, but by the acquiescence of the authority which tolerates it.”
It also rejected administrative concerns related to possible financial loss if the interim order was later overturned. The Court relied on the doctrine of restitution, noting that parties are restored to their original positions if an interim order is eventually vacated.
The High Court observed that the mere pendency of a stay-vacation application could not justify withholding an employee’s salary for an extraordinary period of four years. It, therefore, held DIOS Prakash Singh guilty of contempt for failing to comply with the interim order dated April 18, 2022.
The Court noted that the contempt matter, registered as Contempt Application (Civil) No. 6489 of 2022, has been listed on July 8, 2026 among the top ten cases, and directed that the DIOS must appear personally on that date for framing of charges. At the same time, the Court kept open the possibility of purging the contempt, making it clear that he may still comply with the interim order and “purge the contempt, if so advised” before the next hearing.