Upholding the dismissal of a judicial officer after a departmental inquiry, the Gujarat High Court has held that a judge who accepts a mobile phone from a practising advocate and keeps in contact with her acts improperly, that non-reporting of vehicle purchases and a bank loan under the Conduct Rules was proved, and that, taken together, the proved charges show a lack of integrity for which dismissal was the only punishment, while also holding that a charge based on wrong judicial orders should not have been framed.
Ahmedabad: The Gujarat High Court has dismissed a writ petition by a former Judicial Magistrate First Class challenging the order dismissing him from service, holding that the High Court’s Full Court and the Government were justified in dismissing him for misconduct, in particular for accepting a mobile phone with a SIM card from a practising advocate [Amratlal Narendrabhai Vizoda v. State of Gujarat and Another].
A Division Bench of Justice N. S. Sanjay Gowda and Justice J. L. Odedra delivered the judgment on September 25, 2026 in Special Civil Application No. 5211 of 2017, after reserving it on July 28, 2026. The judgment was authored by Justice Sanjay Gowda.
Background of the case
The petitioner was suspended on May 15, 2008, while working as JMFC at Surat, after a vigilance inquiry was initiated into allegations of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer. A charge-sheet of 12 charges was issued on April 24, 2009. Four charges were relevant before the Court: Charge I (alleged corrupt practice and keeping mobile phones, three of them in third parties’ names), Charge II (not reporting vehicle transactions), Charge IV (not reporting a personal loan of Rs 35,000) and Charge VII (alleged favour to a complainant through the procedure adopted in two cheque-dishonour complaints).
In the inquiry, 14 witnesses were examined for the respondents and five for the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer held Charges I and VI partly proved and Charges II, IV and VII proved. After a second show-cause notice of July 2, 2014, a Committee of two Judges heard the petitioner in person and recommended dismissal, which the Standing Committee accepted. The Full Court resolved on March 15, 2016 to accept the recommendation, and the Government dismissed him with immediate effect by a notification of May 23, 2016.
Mobile phone from an advocate
Reciting the limited scope of review under Article 226 in disciplinary matters, the Bench said the High Court does not sit as an appellate court, does not normally interfere with findings of fact or the punishment unless it is disproportionate and shocks the conscience. On Charge I, it noted that the Committee had agreed with the Inquiry Officer that there was no evidence that the petitioner used the mobile phone to demand or receive bribes from litigants, but had found that receiving a phone with a SIM card from an advocate practising at the station where he was posted, and making 186 calls to her over about eight months, amounted to accepting an undue favour and was highly improper.
The Bench found that conclusion unassailable:
“A Judicial Officer should not associate himself with practicing advocates and has to maintain a distance from the advocates to prevent any impression of impropriety.”
It rejected the contentions that the petitioner used the SIM card only while posted at Surat and that the advocate had never appeared before him, holding that if the evidence indicated he had obtained the phone from a practising advocate and used it, that by itself amounted to misconduct.
Non-reporting of vehicles and loan
On Charge II, the Bench noted that the petitioner had bought and sold several cars and a motorcycle without informing the High Court, as Rule 19 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 requires for movable property above the prescribed value. His plea that the vehicles were on record because he claimed petrol allowance, and that he had reported belatedly and before the charge-sheet, was rejected: where the rules require reporting, a judicial officer must comply promptly and without demur, and he cannot say that the authority could infer the purchase from his petrol allowance claim. The petitioner did not really dispute that he had not made the intimation in time.
On Charge IV, the Bench noted that the petitioner admitted taking a personal loan of Rs 35,000 on December 21, 2005 and not intimating the High Court, offering his brother’s illness as the reason. It held that, even assuming an emergency, he could have informed the High Court afterwards and sought post-facto approval.
Charge over wrong orders ‘could not have been laid’
On Charge VII, which alleged that the petitioner treated two cheque-dishonour complaints as summons cases, acquitted the accused of the cheating offence and proceeded under the Negotiable Instruments Act to favour the complainant, the Bench noted that the Inquiry Officer had found undue haste and no hearing recorded in the roznama. It nonetheless held that this charge was itself improper:
“…the petitioner could not have been proceeded against for passing a wrong judicial order or for not following the prescribed procedure while discharging his judicial functions.”
The Bench added that, although the material showed that the procedure adopted by the petitioner was incorrect, the charge itself could not have been framed against him.
Dismissal the only appropriate punishment
Satisfied that there was clear and cogent evidence on the other three charges, the Bench held that the Two-Judge Committee and the Full Court were justified in holding them established, and that dismissal was the only appropriate punishment, given the conduct of possessing multiple mobile phones and communicating with a practising advocate. Read together, it said, the charges reflect a lack of integrity in a judicial officer.
It distinguished M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India, since the charges of keeping more than one phone, not reporting the car purchases and not reporting the loan were in fact admitted, and Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, which protects honest and strict judicial officers from trifling complaints, since these charges were not trifling. The petition was dismissed and the rule discharged.
Why The Judicial Officer Ruling Matters
The ruling draws a line for judicial officers’ conduct outside the courtroom, treating accepting a favour from a practising advocate and regular contact with her as misconduct even where no bribery is proved, and treating the duty to report property transactions and loans as one to be followed strictly. It also confirms that a disciplinary charge cannot rest on the mere wrongness of a judicial order, while allowing dismissal to stand on the other proved charges.
Case Title: Amratlal Narendrabhai Vizoda v. State of Gujarat and Another [Special Civil Application No. 5211 of 2017]
Bench: Justice N. S. Sanjay Gowda and Justice J. L. Odedra, Gujarat High Court
Date of Judgment: September 25, 2026
Appearances: Advocate Radhesh Y. Vyas for the petitioner; Assistant Government Pleader Dhruti Pandya for the State; Advocate I. G. Joshi and the Law Officer Branch for the High Court (respondent no. 2)