The Bombay High Court quashed an FIR against two men booked for drunkenly shouting at each other on a public street, holding that mere loudness, without obscenity or disturbance to a third party, does not attract the Prohibition Act, while using the occasion to lay down that criminal law cannot be a “bargaining chip” and that costs should follow consent quashing.
Mumbai: The Bombay High Court has quashed a First Information Report (FIR) against two men, one of them a law student, who had been booked under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act for shouting loudly at each other on a public street while under the influence of alcohol, holding that in the absence of any obscenity, depravity or disturbance directed at a third party, no cognizable offence was made out, and directing the applicants to pay Rs 10,000 in costs to a charity for having set the criminal machinery in motion [Lakhan Lalchand Dhamwani and Another v. State of Maharashtra and Another].
Justice Milind N. Jadhav, exercising the inherent power to quash under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the successor to Section 482 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, allowed the application on merits, subject to the costs condition.
Loud shouting is not, by itself, an offence
The FIR, registered at Pimpri Police Station in 2023 under Section 85(1) of the Prohibition Act, alleged that the two accused, under the influence of alcohol, were shouting loudly at each other on a public street, thereby breaching public peace and causing disturbance to the public at large. Examining the charge, the Court found the essential ingredients of the offence absent.
The Court noted that it was not even the prosecution’s case that the two had shouted at any third party or disturbed anyone else; the entire allegation rested on the two of them shouting at one another. Crucially, it held that consumption of alcohol is not itself an offence under Section 85, and that to invoke the provision, “improper and disorderly behaviour” must be culled out from the facts. Beyond the loud shouting, there was “no charge of the prosecution of any element of obscenity, depravity or moral offensiveness” as the provision requires.
Accepting the submission that “mere volume cannot be equated to be in violation of decency,” the Court drew on a Nagpur Bench decision which had defined “disorderly behaviour in society” as behaviour that is “completely out of order, in confusion, irregular, lawless, defying the restraints of decency.” Since nothing of that character was disclosed, and the case hinged only on loud shouting, the Court held that no cognizable offence was made out and that interference was necessary.
The scope of the quashing power
The Court set out the contours of the inherent quashing jurisdiction, now housed in Section 528 BNSS, which “substantially reproduces the language and intent” of Section 482 CrPC. That power, it explained, is invoked to step in where cases are instituted with mala fide motives or to harass the accused, and empowers a court to dismiss FIRs or criminal proceedings where there is no prima facie case or where orders violate natural justice, a discretionary power that varies from case to case.
Referring to the Supreme Court’s classic exposition in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which lays down the categories in which an FIR may be quashed, the Court reiterated that the power under Section 482 (and now Section 528) is an acknowledgment of powers “inherent” rather than a source of additional power, that even non-compoundable offences can be quashed where necessary, but that grievous offences such as murder, rape and dacoity ordinarily cannot be quashed even on settlement, because they carry societal implications.
‘Criminal law cannot be a bargaining chip’: the case for costs on consent quashing
The more far-reaching part of the order concerns the imposition of costs where parties settle a private dispute and jointly seek quashing, so-called “consent quashing.” Justice Jadhav held that where the underlying lis is purely civil, commercial or matrimonial and the offence is not heinous, the Court can accede to such a request, but that it should ordinarily impose costs, resting the principle on a pointed rationale:
“Criminal law cannot be used as a bargaining chip or a tool for private settlements after draining the State and judicial resources. In simple words, Courts cannot be used as a recovery mechanism to settle scores and/or bring the parties into subjugation.”
Costs in consent-quashing matters, the Court held, are warranted for three reasons: the wastage of public resources, the consumption of valuable judicial time, and deterrence against vexatious litigation. Once the criminal machinery is set in motion, it observed, the police must investigate, deploy personnel, collect evidence and file chargesheets using public funds, and trial and sessions courts expend substantial time on summons, scheduling, prosecutors and hearings, all of which is wasted if the matter is ultimately quashed by consent, clogging the system and swelling pendency.
The Court added that costs also curb “the growing trend of filing strategically exaggerated criminal complaints (especially matrimonial or commercial disputes) simply to force financial and legal settlements.” In an appropriate case, it noted, even the complainant may be made to bear costs, and in some strong circumstances even the State machinery, where a purely civil dispute has been dressed up as a criminal case. At the same time, the Court cautioned that costs must not be imposed “blindly or mechanically” where a party is not at fault.
The order: FIR quashed, Rs 10,000 to an NGO
Applying these principles, the Court held that since the applicants’ own conduct had led the complainant to invoke criminal proceedings, and both sides were now seeking quashing by consent, the applicants should pay costs. It directed them to pay Rs 10,000 within two weeks to a registered NGO working at the grassroots level for the shelter, care and upliftment of destitute senior citizens and persons with intellectual disabilities. The applicants, present in court, agreed to pay the amount to the charity. The FIR was accordingly quashed, with the matter listed on September 15 for compliance.
Why the order matters
The order carries value on two fronts. On the substantive law, it is a useful reminder that penal provisions like Section 85 of the Prohibition Act are not triggered by intoxication or noise alone: the statute targets disorderly, indecent or offensive conduct, and a private quarrel conducted loudly, without obscenity or impact on others, does not cross that threshold. By insisting that the specific ingredients of the offence be made out from the facts, the Court guarded against the routine criminalisation of trivial public conduct.
On the procedural side, the order is a notable articulation of an increasingly common judicial concern: that criminal complaints are being weaponised to force private settlements, and that quashing by consent, while permissible for non-heinous private disputes, should carry a cost to discourage the misuse of the criminal process and to compensate, at least symbolically, for the public and judicial resources consumed. Channelling those costs to a charity, rather than treating them as a penalty payable to the State, adds a restorative dimension. Together, the two strands make the decision a practical reference point both for challenges to petty prohibition cases and for the growing body of law on consent quashing and costs.
Case Title: Lakhan Lalchand Dhamwani and Another v. State of Maharashtra and Another [Criminal Application No. 1489 of 2026]
Bench: Justice Milind N. Jadhav, Bombay High Court
Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:35707
Date of Order: August 31, 2026