Having turned approver, the applicant found himself in a procedural trap: no longer an accused, and so unable to seek regular bail, but caught by a statutory provision requiring an approver to be detained until the trial ends. The Delhi High Court treated his application as one under its inherent jurisdiction and released him.
New Delhi: The Delhi High Court has held that the statutory bar on releasing an approver on bail under Section 343(4)(b) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 operates exclusively against the Trial Court, and does not restrict the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS [Ravi @ Sunny v. The State of NCT of Delhi].
Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav allowed the application and directed that the applicant be released on regular bail, subject to conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court.
The background
The applicant had sought regular bail under Section 483 of the BNSS in connection with an FIR registered in 2025 at Police Station Sultanpuri, Delhi, for offences under Sections 21, 22, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, Section 238 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 18(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, which extends to Delhi.
His counsel told the Court that he had been in jail and had been granted interim bail from time to time, which continued under an order of July 2026. Critically, he had been granted pardon by the competent court in April 2026, and had therefore ceased to be an accused and assumed the status of an approver.
The procedural objection
The State did not oppose the substance of the plea. Its objection was one of form. Counsel for the State submitted that once the applicant was no longer an accused, an application for regular bail under Section 483 of the BNSS, corresponding to Section 439 of the CrPC, would not be maintainable, and that the petition ought to have been filed as a criminal miscellaneous case.
Counsel for the applicant then made an oral request that the application be treated as a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC, corresponding to Section 528 of the BNSS, submitting that the Court was fully empowered to exercise that jurisdiction.
The Court accepted that request and treated the petition as having been filed under Section 439 read with Section 482 of the CrPC, corresponding to Sections 483 read with 528 of the BNSS. That single step disposed of the maintainability point without requiring a fresh filing.
The bar and who it binds
On the substantive question, the Court restated what it described as a settled position, that the bar under Section 343(4)(b) of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section 306(4)(b) of the CrPC, operates only against the Trial Court. It relied on the decision of a Coordinate Bench in Amit Chakraborty v. State (NCT of Delhi):
“…there are catena of judgments authored by Coordinate Benches of this Court as well as other High Courts which unanimously hold that the bar under Section 306(4)(b) of Cr.P.C. to release or grant bail to an approver who has been granted pardon is limited to the Trial Courts, and the High Court, exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., can order the release of an approver from detention in appropriate cases.”
Applying that, the Court held that the bar does not restrict its wide inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, and set out the consequence in plain terms:
“In a case where the applicant has already been granted pardon and has assumed the status of an approver, continued detention solely on account of a procedural statutory bar before the Trial Court would cause grave hardship and result in unnecessary incarceration.”
The application was allowed and the applicant directed to be released, with the framing of conditions left to the Trial Court.
Why it matters
The provision at the centre of this order is easy to overlook and harsh in operation. When a Magistrate or Sessions Judge tenders pardon to an accomplice, the accomplice must be examined as a witness, and the statute then directs that he be detained in custody until the termination of the trial unless already on bail. The rationale is protective and evidentiary at once: it keeps the approver available to depose and insulates him from pressure or inducement from those he is to testify against.
The difficulty is that a trial under the NDPS Act read with MCOCA may run for years, and the provision contains no outer limit. A person who has ceased to be an accused, who is now a prosecution witness, and against whom nothing further is alleged, can end up spending longer inside than many of those still facing charges. The High Court’s answer is that the bar constrains the Trial Court’s power and nothing more, leaving the inherent jurisdiction untouched.
The procedural aspect is of equal practical use. The State’s position produced a neat catch. As a former accused the applicant could not maintain a bail application; as an approver he was barred by statute from being released by the court trying the case. Rather than dismissing on that footing and inviting a fresh petition, the Court simply converted the application. Practitioners will note that the conversion was permitted on an oral request made during hearing.
Two limits are worth recording. The Court did not hold that every approver is entitled to release. The authority it relied on speaks of ordering release in appropriate cases, and the factors here were particular: the applicant had already been enjoying interim bail for some time, the State did not oppose his release on the merits, and the only obstacle was the bar before the Trial Court. Second, this is an order on liberty, not on the case. The prosecution against the remaining accused continues, and nothing in the order touches the merits of the allegations or the eventual weight to be given to the approver’s evidence, which will be assessed at trial in the usual way.
Case Title: Ravi @ Sunny v. The State of NCT of Delhi [BAIL APPLN. 1655/2026]
Bench: Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav, High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Date of Order: September 14, 2026
Appearances: Advocate Rishi Pal Singh for the applicant. Additional Standing Counsel Akhand Pratap Singh with Advocates Hritvik Maurya and Lisa Pegwal for the State.