The legal core of the afternoon was a dispute about what Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act requires. Counsel for the petitioner argued that abusive language alone is not enough, that the insult must be intentional and connected to caste, and that the anticipatory-bail bar in Section 18 falls away where those ingredients are not prima facie present, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shajan Skaria. The prosecution and the complainant argued the opposite. These are submissions; the Court has reserved its order.
New Delhi: Arguing the anticipatory bail plea of YouTuber Ajeet Bharti before the Delhi High Court, Advocate Jai Anant Dehadrai submitted that the mere use of abusive or offensive language does not, by itself, constitute an offence under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and that the insult must be intentional and specifically connected to the person’s caste identity [Ajeet Bharti v. State].
The plea, before Justice Saurabh Banerjee, arises from allegedly objectionable remarks made during a YouTube broadcast concerning Nagina Member of Parliament Chandrashekhar Azad.
The ingredients argument
Counsel framed the matter as raising an important question about the statutory scope and ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, which penalises intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place within public view. His submission was that for the offence to be attracted, the insult must be intentional and tied to the person’s caste identity, and that offensive language on its own does not meet that threshold.
Placing the background, counsel said the remarks were made in the context of an anti-reservation protest and after a provocation, submitting that an offensive post had been made about the petitioner’s sister to which he reacted. He was at pains to say that the petitioner’s position was not a blanket rejection of reservation, but an argument that it should continue on the basis of empirical data and objective criteria, with periodic assessment of who had benefited. He submitted that neither the person’s caste identity nor his being a Member of Parliament was the point of the criticism, and that the petitioner had not named the caste of the person concerned.
Counsel summarised the defence position with the submission that what mattered, on the petitioner’s own case, was whether a person was “yogya”, meaning suitable or worthy, and not his caste or his office.
Reliance on Shajan Skaria
Counsel relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, submitting that it too concerned anticipatory bail involving a YouTuber and was factually comparable. The principle he drew from it was that for an offence under the Act to be attracted, the insult must be intentional and specifically connected to caste identity, and that the bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 does not operate where the basic ingredients of the offence are not prima facie made out.
The Court engaged with the citation, noting that the decision relied on had arisen against a judgment whereas the present matter was an anticipatory bail plea, and observing that it was itself to deliver a judgment on the issue. Counsel maintained that the ratio on the ingredients of the offence and the Section 18 bar applied regardless. He also submitted that it was incorrect to suggest that Shajan Skaria had been overruled; counsel for the complainant said he had not suggested it was.
The prosecution and complainant’s response
The prosecution submitted that three elements prima facie attracted the Act: that the remarks were insulting towards a particular caste, that they were made publicly on social media, and that the accused does not belong to the same community, and that these were sufficient at this stage to bring the case within the Act and to attract the Section 18 bar.
Counsel for the complainant submitted that the programme was itself centred on caste, that specific caste names were expressly used, and that this went directly to the question of intention on which the defence relied. It was submitted that the petitioner was aware of the concerned person’s caste identity when the remarks were made, and that a prima facie offence was therefore made out. The Court cautioned against expanding the scope into the merits of reservation policy, observing that it was dealing only with an anticipatory bail application.
ALSO READ: Ajeet Bharti Moves Delhi Court For Anticipatory Bail In SC/ST Act Case Over Video
Why it matters
The argument goes to a question that recurs in prosecutions under the SC/ST Act: where is the line between offensive speech, which the ordinary law may or may not reach, and a caste atrocity, which the special Act punishes with a heightened threshold and a bar on anticipatory bail. The distinction the defence pressed, between abusive language in general and an insult intentionally directed at a person because of caste, is not a technicality; it is what the Supreme Court has identified as the core of the offence, and it is the difference between the special Act applying and not applying.
The reliance on Shajan Skaria is significant because that decision clarified two linked points: that the intentional-insult requirement must be genuinely satisfied, and that Section 18, which ordinarily bars anticipatory bail once a case under the Act is registered, does not operate where the ingredients of the offence are not even prima facie present. If the defence reading holds, the Section 18 bar does not automatically shut the door, and the Court can examine whether the remarks, on their face, are tied to caste. If the prosecution reading holds, the public use of caste references in a caste-centred programme is enough at this stage to trigger the bar. The Court’s own framing, whether the two identified portions by themselves attract the Act, sits precisely on that fault line.
It bears emphasis that this is one side’s legal argument in a reserved matter, met by a contrary argument from the prosecution and the complainant, and that the Court indicated it has its own view of the legal issue and will decide it in the reserved order. The context the defence advanced, provocation, an anti-reservation debate, the “yogya” framing, goes to intention, which the Act requires, but whether it is borne out is for the Court to assess on the material. Nothing has been decided, and the petitioner is entitled to the presumption of innocence.
Case Title: Ajeet Bharti v. State
Bench: Justice Saurabh Banerjee, High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Appearing: Advocate Jai Anant Dehadrai for the petitioner
Status: Order reserved. Submissions of all sides untested; no finding recorded. Presumption of innocence applies.