The Allahabad High Court accepted the principle that a change of religion does not automatically extinguish Scheduled Tribe status, which remains a question of fact in each case. It nonetheless upheld orders voiding three land purchases, holding that the petitioner had not placed material showing she continued to follow the customs of her tribe or was accepted by it on the dates of the transactions.
Prayagraj: The Allahabad High Court has dismissed three connected writ petitions challenging revenue orders which declared void a woman’s purchase of agricultural land in Sonbhadra district, holding that although a change of religion does not by itself terminate Scheduled Tribe status, the petitioner had failed to establish that she continued to possess that status on the dates the sale deeds were executed [Nanhki @ Naimunnisha v. State of U.P. and 3 Others].
Justice Arun Kumar affirmed the orders of the Deputy Collector, Duddhi, and vacated any interim protection, while expressly recording that the conclusion did not rest on the fact of her marriage, on the allegation of conversion, or on any single document describing her religion.
The background
The petitioner, a resident of Sonbhadra district, claimed to belong to the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe by birth as the daughter of a man of that community, and relied on a Scheduled Tribe certificate issued by the Tehsildar, Duddhi. Between November 2011 and November 2018 she purchased agricultural land at village Bagharu through three registered sale deeds, the parcels being small and together amounting to well under half a hectare. Her case was that her vendors belonged to the Gour Scheduled Tribe, that the caste status of both sides was recited in the deeds themselves, and that she had remained in possession throughout.
The sale deeds went unchallenged for about nine years and revenue entries were made in her favour. In December 2025 the revenue authority issued notice, and by separate orders of January 22, 2026 the Deputy Collector held the transfers void for contravening the bar on transferring tribal land to a non-tribal, and directed that the land vest in the State.
The competing cases
Counsel for the petitioner disputed the allegation of conversion outright, submitting that she continued to belong to the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe and had not abandoned her tribal identity. The argument was that marrying according to Islamic rites, or the description of her as Muslim in certain documents, could not conclusively establish that she had ceased to be a member of the tribe. It was further pressed that the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 contains no provision analogous to paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which excludes a person from Scheduled Caste status on change of religion. Reliance was placed on Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika v. State of Gujarat.
For the State, the Additional Advocate General submitted that the case did not rest on the marriage alone but on a course of circumstances extending over several decades, relying on inquiry reports, statements recorded during the inquiry, identity documents and the family register. It was argued that the petitioner had produced no substantive material showing that she continued to follow the customs of the Bhuiyan tribe, participate in its community life, or be recognised by it. Reliance was placed on State of Kerala v. Chandramohanan and on the more recent decision in Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh.
The principle the Court accepted
On the law, the Court agreed with the petitioner. It held that the submission that mere conversion does not automatically extinguish Scheduled Tribe status was well founded, recording that in Chandramohanan the Supreme Court had held there can be no broad proposition that a person ceases to be a member of a Scheduled Tribe merely by reason of change of religion. Whether a person continues to be a member notwithstanding conversion is a question of fact, to be determined with reference to tribal traits, customs, traditions and continuing connection with the community.
The Court noted that the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 prescribes no religion-based exclusion, and that status must turn on whether the claimant continues to possess and is recognised for the essential attributes of tribal identity, including customary practices, social organisation, community life and acceptance by the community concerned.
The Court also rejected the State’s preliminary objection that the petitioner should have taken the statutory revision route, holding that the rule of alternative remedy is one of discretion rather than an absolute bar, and that the questions arising, including which statutory regime governed pre-Code transactions, justified examination on merits.
Why the petitioner nonetheless failed
Having accepted the principle, the Court turned to the evidence and found the petitioner’s case wanting. It held that she had not satisfactorily established continuity of her connection with the Bhuiyan community, having principally denied conversion and asserted continued membership without supporting that assertion with material showing the actual continuance of tribal customs, social relations or community recognition.
The Court was careful about what it was not saying:
“The Court is conscious that a person cannot be required to prove tribal status by demonstrating observance of every custom of the community throughout her life, nor can a single document describing her religion as Muslim be treated as determinative. The conclusion reached herein is not based upon any such rigid test.”
It similarly clarified that nothing in the judgment suggested a married woman must use her husband’s name, or that continuing to use her father’s name after marriage was in any way improper.
Summing up the basis of its finding, the Court recorded:
“This conclusion is not founded upon the mere fact of her marriage with Sirajuddin, nor upon the mere allegation of conversion, nor upon the isolated entry recording her religion as Muslim. It rests upon the prolonged circumstances brought on record by the respondents concerning her subsequent family, religious and social identity, coupled with the absence of convincing material establishing continued adherence to the customs and social practices of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe…”
On the Scheduled Tribe certificate, the Court held it was relevant evidence but not conclusive, and did not preclude examination of the underlying question where subsequent material bearing on status was brought on record, particularly given the State’s specific allegation of non-disclosure when the certificate was obtained.
Registration, mutation and delay
The Court held that registration of an instrument establishes its registration and nothing more, and cannot validate a transaction prohibited by a mandatory provision. A recital in a sale deed that the purchaser belongs to a Scheduled Tribe is evidence of the representation made, but cannot confer a statutory status on a person who did not hold it. Subsequent mutation or revenue entries likewise cannot create a right contrary to a statutory prohibition.
On delay, the Court held that once a transfer is void for contravening a protective prohibition, lapse of time, mutation or continued possession cannot by themselves confer validity, relying on Additional Commissioner, Revenue v. Akhlaq Hussain.
A point of some technical importance also arose. The impugned orders were passed under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, but all three transactions predated the commencement of the relevant provisions of the Code in February 2016. The Court held that validity had to be tested against the regime in force on the respective dates, namely Section 157-B read with Sections 166 and 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and that the provisions of the Code could not be applied retrospectively. Since the impugned orders gave effect to the same prohibition and the same consequences, no interference was warranted.
Why it matters
The judgment is likely to be reported as a ruling about conversion, and that would be a misreading. The Court decided the legal question in the petitioner’s favour and the factual question against her. Those are different things, and the distinction is the whole of the judgment.
The underlying doctrinal position is settled and worth restating, because it is frequently confused. Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 excludes from Scheduled Caste status a person professing a religion other than Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism. No equivalent exclusion exists in the Scheduled Tribes Order, because tribal status is understood as an anthropological and social classification rather than a religious one. That is why a converted member of a Scheduled Tribe can, in principle, retain the status while a converted member of a Scheduled Caste ordinarily cannot, and it is why litigation in this area turns on evidence of continuing tribal life rather than on a declaration of faith.
That evidentiary framework carries a practical difficulty which this case illustrates. Proving continuing adherence to customs, participation in community life and acceptance by the community is an unusual burden, resting on material that ordinary litigants seldom document: affidavits from community elders, evidence of participation in tribal ceremonies, records of social relations. Where the State places on record a long course of contrary circumstances, a denial in the pleadings will not answer it. Practitioners advising clients in this territory will read the judgment as a caution about what has to be assembled, and assembled early.
There is a further consequence that reaches beyond this petitioner. The transfers here were nine to fifteen years old, registered, acted upon and mutated in the revenue records. The holding that none of that cures a prohibited transfer means that title to tribal land carries an open-ended vulnerability, since the status of a purchaser can be reopened long after the transaction on material that surfaces later. That is a deliberate feature of protective legislation, whose object the Court described as the preservation of tribal land and the protection of the social and economic interests of Scheduled Tribes, but it sits uneasily with the ordinary expectations of finality that attach to a registered instrument.
Case Title: Nanhki @ Naimunnisha v. State of U.P. and 3 Others [Writ – C No. 17043 of 2026, with Writ – C Nos. 17171 of 2026 and 17214 of 2026]
Bench: Justice Arun Kumar, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Date of Judgment: September 14, 2026 | Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 705
Appearances: Advocates Panchu Ram Maurya and Shashank Maurya for the petitioner. Senior Advocate and Additional Advocate General Anoop Trivedi, assisted by Additional Chief Standing Counsel Abhishek Shukla and Standing Counsel Anubhav Chandra, for the State respondents. Advocate Pradeep Singh for the Gaon Sabha.