“It was not for the Plaintiff to substantiate or prove the reasons given by the testatrix,” the Bombay High Court has said while granting probate of a mother’s will favouring her daughter. The Bench held that expensive gifts, a pilgrimage and help with a passport did not establish Undue Influence, and that excluding the son and his family did not, by itself, invalidate the will.
Mumbai: Probate of a mother’s will dated May 24, 1989 has been granted by the Bombay High Court, which allowed a probate appeal pending since 2011 and held that a daughter’s gifts and help with travel arrangements could not, on the evidence in this case, justify rejecting the will [Meena Vasant Patel v. Prithviraj Ambalal Patel, since deceased through legal representatives].
A Division Bench of Justices Sarang V. Kotwal and Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale delivered the judgment on November 4, 2026. It set aside the September 21, 2010 decision dismissing Meena Vasant Patel’s testamentary suit and granted probate of Shantaben Ambalal Patel’s will.
Gifts, a pilgrimage and a passport
The Single Judge had treated the daughter’s expensive gifts, pilgrimage with her mother and assistance in obtaining a passport for a possible visit to the United Kingdom as circumstances undermining the will. The appellate Bench rejected that reasoning.
In paragraphs 51 and 54, the Court found nothing unnatural in a financially comfortable daughter bringing gifts when visiting her mother from abroad. Applying illustrations (vii) and (viii) to Section 61 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, it explained that affection, flattery or persuasion did not invalidate a will where the maker retained free judgment and volition. There was no direct evidence here that Meena had persuaded her mother to execute the will.
The Bench also relied on the Supreme Court’s explanation that not every influence is legally undue: persuasion cannot invalidate a will where testamentary capacity remains intact and fraud or coercion is absent. Its conclusion depended on the evidence of voluntary execution in this case.
The solicitor who attested the will
Evidence from solicitor and attesting witness Mrunal Shah was accepted by the Court. He described receiving Shantaben’s instructions, preparing the document and having its contents explained to her in Gujarati before she signed. His testimony established the execution and attestation of the will, the Bench held in paragraphs 46 and 47.
There was no basis, the Court found, to conclude that Shah had colluded with Meena or had a personal interest in giving false evidence. It also rejected the suggestion that the daughter’s presence at the solicitor’s office was inherently suspicious, since the record did not show that she interfered with the drafting or exerted pressure there.
Two competing wills
Meena sought probate as the sole executrix under the 1989 will, which bequeathed her mother’s estate to her. Her brother, Prithviraj, disputed its execution and alleged fabrication, coercion and undue influence. He also relied on a purported later will dated March 9, 1990.
Both siblings’ suits had been dismissed by the Single Judge. The rejection of the brother’s claim was not appealed and had attained finality, so the Division Bench examined the validity of the earlier will propounded by the daughter rather than reopening the rejected claim under the later document.
Excluding an heir is not enough by itself
The brother’s side argued that excluding him and his children made the will suspicious, particularly because they had lived with Shantaben. The Bench applied Supreme Court precedent that exclusion of a natural heir alone does not invalidate a will; the relevant inquiry remains whether genuine suspicious circumstances affect its authenticity or due execution.
The will recorded Shantaben’s reasons for excluding her son, including her view that he had received sufficient property from his father and her complaints about the family business. These were the testatrix’s stated reasons, not a separate adjudication by the Court that business misconduct had occurred.
Having found the will to be freely and validly executed by a person of sound mind, the Bench said it could not replace the testatrix’s reasons with its own assessment. In paragraph 59, it stated:
“It was not for the Plaintiff to substantiate or prove the reasons given by the testatrix.”
Probate granted after considering the evidence as a whole
Scrutiny of suspicious circumstances was not dispensed with. Referring to the cumulative assessment required in will disputes, the Court considered all the relevant factors together and found no suspicious circumstances surrounding Shantaben’s 1989 will.
The operative directions in paragraph 64 allow the appeal, set aside the decree in Testamentary Suit No. 48 of 1990, grant probate of the May 24, 1989 will and direct that a decree be drawn accordingly. This is a final judgment in the appeal, not interim relief.
Why it matters
The decision distinguishes ordinary acts of family affection from pressure that takes away a person’s freedom to make a will. It also reinforces that a court’s view of how an estate should fairly be distributed cannot replace a testatrix’s proved, voluntary choice. The beneficiary must still establish lawful execution and answer genuine suspicious circumstances.
Case Title: Meena Vasant Patel v. Prithviraj Ambalal Patel, since deceased through L.Rs. Suhasini Prithviraj Patel and others
Case Number: Appeal No. 112 of 2011 in Testamentary Suit No. 48 of 1990 in Testamentary Petition No. 424 of 1990
Court: Bombay High Court, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction
Bench: Justices Sarang V. Kotwal and Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale
Decision Date: November 4, 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:23837-DB
Outcome: Appeal allowed; refusal of probate set aside; probate of the May 24, 1989 will granted.