The Allahabad High Court has held that Rule 4(3)(b) of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 places a mandatory obligation on the competent authority to take an express decision on a representation against deemed suspension made after release from custody, and that continuing the suspension beyond release must rest on a conscious order.
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Lucknow: The Allahabad High Court has set aside an order of the State government that revoked the deemed suspension of a government doctor but deferred the question of his salary for the suspension period until the outcome of the criminal cases against him, and has directed the authority to take a fresh, reasoned decision within two months [Dr. Ravindra Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.].
A single-judge Bench of Justice Indrajeet Shukla decided the writ petition (Writ-A No. 6327 of 2024). The criminal cases against the petitioner are pending, the allegations in them are untested, the High Court has expressed no view on their merits, and the presumption of innocence applies.
Background
The petitioner, an allopathic doctor appointed in 2007 as Medical Officer at a Primary Health Centre in Mauranipur, District Jhansi, faced two criminal cases registered in 2021 and 2022, in which he was in custody from June 29, 2022 to October 20, 2022. By an order dated October 10, 2022, he was placed under deemed suspension with retrospective effect from June 29, 2022, under Rule 4(3)(a) of the 1999 Rules.
He applied for revocation of the suspension on October 21, 2022, the day after his release. The representation was forwarded to the Director of Medical Health, but no decision was taken for nearly two years. After the writ petition was first disposed of on May 17, 2024 with a direction to reconsider, the Under Secretary revoked the suspension by an order dated July 12, 2024 and allowed him to resume duties. The order, however, said that treating the period of suspension as service and paying salary for it would be considered after the outcome of the criminal cases.
Contentions
The petitioner, represented by Dharmendra Kumar, argued that withholding salary and service benefits until the end of the criminal trial has no statutory basis, that deemed suspension should end once he sought revocation after release, and that the presumption of innocence operates in service law until conviction.
The State, represented by the Chief Standing Counsel, opposed treating the suspension period as service. It submitted that the gravity of the charges, which could attract life imprisonment, justified deferring the consideration until the trials conclude, and that the pending proceedings justified the continued treatment of the period as suspension.
Rule 4(3)(b) is mandatory
The Court examined Rule 4(3)(b), under which a government servant released from custody may represent against the deemed suspension, and the competent authority “shall after considering the representation in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the provision contained in this rule, pass appropriate order”. It held that the provision is not merely an opportunity to be heard.
The requirement of an express decision for continuance of deemed suspension is mandatory.
The Court reasoned that if the requirement were only directory, the latter part of the rule would be rendered nugatory. It added that deemed suspension does not lapse automatically on release, but that its continuance beyond that point must rest on an express, conscious decision.
Delay and malice in law
On the delay of nearly two years, from October 21, 2022 to July 12, 2024, the Court held that the inaction attracted what it called malice in law, meaning not personal ill-will but the exercise of power without lawful justification.
The initial inaction, with the flux of time, transforms into illegal action which can hardly be countenanced in law.
The Court observed that the authorities woke up only after the earlier order of the High Court, and that delay is a facet of unreasonableness giving rise to arbitrariness.
Precedents distinguished
The Court distinguished Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar, which arose under different rules that did not carry a representation provision equivalent to Rule 4(3)(b). It also distinguished Amrit Lal Verma v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Allahabad Bank, where the authorities had consciously decided to keep the employee under suspension pending criminal proceedings, whereas here no reasoned decision was taken for two years.
Directions of the Allahabad High Court on the deemed suspension representation
The High Court set aside the impugned order of July 12, 2024 and directed the Under Secretary to reconsider the payment of salary for the period of deemed suspension, excluding the period of detention, and to pass a reasoned, speaking order within two months. The fresh decision is also to determine the petitioner’s entitlement for the period between his release and the revocation of the suspension.
Why The Allahabad High Court Judgment Matters
The ruling gives government servants in Uttar Pradesh a clear point of reference when a deemed suspension continues after release from custody: the competent authority must decide the representation expressly, and promptly, and cannot let it lapse into silence. Where it does not, the resulting delay can itself be treated as arbitrary.
The judgment does not decide whether the petitioner is entitled to full salary for the period, which is left to the fresh decision, and it does not touch the criminal cases. It also reads Rule 4(3)(b) as separate machinery from Rule 4(2), so that the pendency of a criminal trial is not by itself a ground for open-ended deferment.
Case Title: Dr. Ravindra Singh v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Medical Health and Family Welfare & 5 Ors. [Writ-A No. 6327 of 2024]
Bench: Justice Indrajeet Shukla, Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench
Appearances: Dharmendra Kumar for the petitioner; Chief Standing Counsel for the State