Supreme Court Says Courts Must Not Take Pedantic Approach On Delay Condonation, Restores Second Appeal Chance

3 min read

Does the length of a delay alone decide a plea for delay condonation? The Supreme Court has held that it does not where the first appellate court set aside a decree in the litigant’s favour ex parte, restoring a Himachal Pradesh man’s chance to file a second appeal.

Supreme Court of India building, where a Bench restored a litigant's plea for condonation of delay in filing a second appeal.

New Delhi: The Supreme Court has set aside a Himachal Pradesh High Court order that refused to condone delay in a second appeal, holding that where a trial court decree in a party’s favour has been reversed in appeal without hearing him, the mere duration of delay cannot be a ground to shut him out [Janardhan Dass v. Kirnesh Jung].

Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Prasanna B. Varale allowed the civil appeal, arising out of SLP (C) No. 23859 of 2025, by an order dated September 29, 2026.

A sale deed, a suit and a reversed decree

The appellant, Janardhan Dass, had filed Civil Suit No. 21/1 of 2011/13/15 seeking cancellation of a sale deed dated May 26, 2010 executed between him and the respondent, Kirnesh Jung. He also sought cancellation of subsequent mutation entries and an injunction restraining the respondent from entering the suit properties.

The trial court partly decreed the suit. It cancelled the sale deed subject to the appellant repaying Rs 6,40,000 out of the total consideration of Rs 16,50,000, and granted the injunction. The first appellate court then allowed the respondent’s appeal and dismissed the suit. When the appellant sought condonation of delay in filing a regular second appeal, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla rejected the plea on April 10, 2025 in C.M.P.(M) No. 312 of 2023.

What each side told the Court

Counsel for the appellant argued that the first appellate judgment, though reasoned, was passed ex parte, and that the delay was compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, factors the High Court did not consider. Senior counsel for the respondent contended that the delay fell beyond the COVID-19 set-off period and that the judgment could not be termed ex parte.

No room for a “pedantic approach”

After examining the first appellate court’s judgment, the Bench recorded that the decree in the appellant’s favour had been set aside ex parte, and held:

“Considering the facts, we are inclined to hold that the appellant is certainly entitled to the relief of condonation of delay, as merely the duration of delay per se, cannot be a ground to reject the substantive right of the appellant, especially, when it involves reversing the decision of the Trial Court. The Courts are not expected to adopt such a pedantic approach, while adjudicating an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.”

Merits untouched, liberty to implead

In setting aside the High Court’s order, the Bench made clear that it had expressed nothing on the merits of the case. The respondent is stated to have alienated the property during the proceedings, so the appellant was given liberty to file an application to implead the proposed purchaser.

What the order signals

Limitation rules exist to bring finality, not to defeat a hearing on merits. The order reinforces that when a litigant who won at trial has lost his decree in an appeal he was not heard in, courts weighing a Section 5 application must look at the cause and the stakes, not simply count the days. It also signals that High Courts should engage with explanations such as an ex parte reversal or pandemic disruption instead of dismissing delay applications mechanically.

Case Title: Janardhan Dass v. Kirnesh Jung
Case No.: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 23859 of 2025
Bench: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Prasanna B. Varale, Supreme Court of India
Date of Order: September 29, 2026
Impugned Order: High Court of Himachal Pradesh, C.M.P.(M) No. 312 of 2023, dated April 10, 2025

Similar Posts