Supreme Court’s Verdict on the West Bengal Registration Act, 1961
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Calcutta High Court’s decision concerning the West Bengal Registration Act, 1961. The High Court had previously determined that the Registrar of Society can only annul a society’s registration by leveraging a procedural review power. This distinction between substantive and procedural review is crucial, with the former not being within the Registrar’s purview when evaluating a registration cancellation request.
This case emerged from a disagreement between two factions of Chinese tannery owners in Kolkata, contesting the management of a school. The Chinese Tannery Owners’ Association, registered in 1967 under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961, asserted that the ‘Pei May Chinese School’, established in 1929, was an affiliate of their association and was under their administration.
The contention began when the Registrar granted the ‘Pei May Chinese High School’ an independent society registration, following an application from the respondents. The appellant-Association contended that the respondents had no affiliation with the aforementioned school.
Subsequently, the Association approached the Registrar, seeking the cancellation of the ‘Pei May Chinese High School‘ registration. They alleged that the respondent’s registration application contained falsified signatures. However, the Registrar did not find evidence of forgery. This led to multiple legal battles between the two groups.
In 2016, the Calcutta High Court’s Division Bench noted that a criminal case regarding forgery allegations against the respondents was ongoing. Thus, the Registrar’s conclusion that the signatures weren’t forged seemed premature. The Division Bench clarified that while the 1961 Act doesn’t explicitly grant a substantive review power, a procedural review power is inherently present for the authority issuing orders under the Act. This perspective supported the Single Judge’s decision to send the matter back to the Registrar for reconsideration.
Later, the Registrar decided to cancel the ‘Pei May Chinese High School’ society’s registration. This decision was based on the Memorandum of Association (MoU) of the appellant-Association, which stated that the school would operate under its jurisdiction.
The Registrar believed that any new society registration concerning the school would necessitate an MoU amendment. Since the appellant-Association hadn’t sought such an amendment, the Registrar concluded that the registration was acquired by concealing facts and was, therefore, subject to cancellation.
While the Single bench of the Calcutta High Court upheld the Registrar’s decision, the Division Bench judges held differing opinions. This led to the involvement of a Referee Judge. The Referee Judge highlighted that the 1961 Act explicitly prohibits registering a society with a name identical or closely resembling a previously registered society’s name. In this case, the two societies had distinct names, even though the appellant-Association had disclosed that the school was its affiliate.
The Referee Judge emphasized that the Registrar’s cancellation order did not adhere to the Division Bench’s guidelines from January 14, 2016. The Registrar had overstepped by exercising a substantive review power, which was not granted to him, especially without referring to the respondent’s successful registration application.
The Referee Judge further elaborated that if the respondents had indeed concealed information, it should be proven that such concealment was tantamount to fraud, leading to a registration grant in violation of a statutory provision. This was not demonstrated, leading the court to determine that the Registrar lacked the authority to revoke the ‘Pei May Chinese High School‘ registration based on the suppression of material facts. The matter was once again sent back to the Registrar for a suitable decision, considering the Referee’s observations and the Division Bench’s January 14, 2016 order.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court against the Referee Judge’s decision, the apex court stated,
“We are of the view that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal shortcoming warranting our interference.”
Supporting the Referee Judge’s decision, the Supreme Court added that if the respondents couldn’t prove their right to operate the school on land owned by the Chinese Tannery Owners’ Association without their consent, the Registrar might consider this as a basis for registration cancellation. However, any such decision would be contingent upon the civil court’s final judgment if a related case is pending there.
Case Title: CHEN KHOI KUI vs LIANG MIAO SHENG & ORS
