Supreme Court: Extension of Deadline for Preliminary Assessment of Juvenile in Heinous Offences

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The Supreme Court issued guidance on extending juvenile assessment deadlines for heinous offenses. This ruling provides clarity on how to handle assessments for juveniles involved in serious crimes. The decision aims to balance accountability with considerations for juvenile offenders’ developmental stages. It reflects ongoing legal discussions surrounding juvenile justice and fair sentencing practices.

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New Delhi: The Supreme Court interpreted that the three-month timeline specified in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, or JJ Act, for the initial assessment of juveniles aged 16 years and older involved in serious crimes is not obligatory but advisory. According to Section 15 of the JJ Act, the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) required to perform this preliminary evaluation for juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18 who are accused of heinous offenses. Furthermore, Section 14 (3) states that this assessment should be completed within three months.

However, Justices CT Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal clarified that this timeframe can be extended with a reasoned order from the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

The Court ruled that,

“The provision in Section 14(3) of the Act, which mandates a three-month period for completing a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act, is not obligatory but rather directory in nature. The same is held to be directory.”

This decision clarifies the interpretation of timelines for conducting preliminary assessments under the specified Act.

The Court made a decision on an appeal regarding a rape case involving a child in conflict with the law, which challenged a previous decision made by the Karnataka High Court. The Court observed that the Juvenile Justice (JJ) Act does not provide any provision for extending the time limit or specify the consequences for not completing the inquiry within the given time frame in such cases.

The Court compared this to the provision under the JJ Act for cases of minor offenses, where the inquiry must be completed within four months. In these cases, the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) has the authority to grant a two-month extension, and if the inquiry remains inconclusive even after the extended period, it can be terminated. However, the Court noted that if the JJB requires further extension of time to complete the inquiry into serious and heinous offenses, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate can grant such an extension, provided that they record the reasons for it.

Additionally, the Court highlighted that a preliminary assessment of the child involved in a heinous offense allows the JJB to seek assistance from experienced psychologists, psycho-social workers, or other experts. This preliminary assessment holds significant importance as it determines whether the inquiry against the child will be conducted by the JJB or if the child will have to face trial before the Children’s Court.

The Court emphasized that the JJB has the authority to impose a lenient punishment, while the Children’s Court can treat the child as an adult and impose stricter penalties, depending on the outcome of the preliminary assessment.

The Court observed,

“The legislature’s intention regarding serious or heinous offenses can be discerned from Section 14 of the Act. This section allows for additional time extensions for completing inquiries by the Board, which can be granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate upon written reasons. It is in addition to two months’ extension which the Board itself can grant.”

This interpretation highlights the legislative provisions for extending inquiry timelines in such cases.

The court concluded,

“If a statute does not specify the consequences for failing to meet a prescribed time limit, that time limit cannot be considered mandatory. “

This ruling consistent with similar decisions made by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Delhi High Court, which also determined that a three-month period not obligatory.

The appellants represented by Senior Advocates S Nagamuthu and Sidharth Luthra, along with Advocates Sakshi Kakkar, Shakti Singh, R Karthik, and T Hari.

The respondents represented by Additional Advocate General Aman Panwar, as well as advocates Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta, Shivam Singh Baghel, and Harsh Gattani.

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