Supreme Court Clarifies: “SC Has No Power of Superintendence Over High Courts”

The Supreme Court clarified that it lacks the authority of superintendence over the High Courts. Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih, on a bench, made this remark when declining to instruct a High Court to promptly resolve a criminal appeal lodged by the petitioner.

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Supreme Court Clarifies: "SC Has No Power of Superintendence Over High Courts"

NEW DELHI: On 21st February, the Supreme Court of India has unequivocally stated its position regarding its authority—or the lack thereof—over the High Courts, shedding light on the constitutional boundaries that govern the judiciary’s hierarchy. This clarification came forth in a recent judgment where Justices Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih presided over a case that questioned the apex court’s supervisory capabilities.

The case in question revolved around a petitioner who sought the Supreme Court’s intervention to expedite a criminal appeal pending in a High Court. The appeal, which had been prolonged since 2016, prompted the petitioner to invoke Article 32 of the Constitution, hoping for a directive from the Supreme Court to hasten the High Court’s proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court’s response was both clear and firm. In its ruling, the Court emphasized-

“There is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts.”

This statement delineates the constitutional limitations placed on the Supreme Court, highlighting a structured division of powers within the judiciary.

The Court further referenced the case of Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 1, which underscores the distinct jurisdictions of the Supreme Court and High Courts, advocating for a mutual respect between these two judicial entities.

This stated-

“Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court elucidated that, while a petition under Article 32 might be theoretically maintainable, it could only extend a request to the High Court, rather than impose a directive. This stance reinforces the autonomy of the High Courts and respects the constitutional framework that delineates their operations.

Addressing the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 32 against the High Court’s decisions on case listings, the Court referenced the precedent set by Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra. This precedent firmly states that a judicial decision made by a competent judge does not infringe upon a Fundamental Right, thereby negating the basis for the petitioner’s appeal.

The Court’s observation-

Further cements the notion that the judicial process, including the prioritization of cases, falls within the purview of the High Court’s discretion and is not subject to direct interference from the Supreme Court.

author

Joyeeta Roy

LL.M. | B.B.A., LL.B. | LEGAL EDITOR at LAW CHAKRA

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