The year 2024 was notable for its significant Constitution Bench decisions, as the Supreme Court delivered 12 judgments spanning from five-, seven-, and nine-judge benches. These 12 decisions included a wide array of issues, including free and fair elections, state powers to legislate and levy taxes, affirmative action, and more. All were presided over by former Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, highlighting the apex court’s pivotal role in constitutional jurisprudence.
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1 Constitutionality of the Electoral Bonds Scheme
In the case of Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court delivered a 4:1 majority judgment. The bench comprised Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud and Justices Sanjiv Khanna, BR Gavai, JB Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra.
The Court held that the anonymity provided under the electoral bond scheme violates citizens’ fundamental right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It emphasized that transparency is vital for the effective functioning of democracy.
The judgment highlighted the intricate connection between voters’ right to know about political funding and their ability to make informed electoral choices. The Court concluded that the scheme’s anonymity provisions failed to adequately balance the privacy of political donors with the public’s right to access information about the sources of electoral funding, thereby upholding the constitutional challenge.
Citation : 2024 INSC 113
Case Title: Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.
Coram: DY Chandrachud and Justices Sanjiv Khanna, BR Gavai, JB Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra
2.Validity of automatic vacation of stay orders
The Constitution Bench unanimously ruled that the automatic expiration of interim orders after six months is impermissible. Additionally, the Court held that issuing blanket directives requiring High Courts to hear all cases with interim stays on a daily basis and resolve them within a specified timeframe exceeded the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice. Justice Oka authored the judgment, with Justice Mithal providing a separate concurring opinion.
The Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice require that an order rescinding or modifying interim relief should only be passed after hearing the affected parties.
The Supreme Court outlined the following guidelines for exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution:
(i) These powers cannot be used to nullify benefits obtained by a large number of litigants through valid judicial orders.
(ii) The Court must respect the substantive rights of litigants.
(iii) While the Court may issue directions to streamline procedural matters, it cannot impact the substantive rights of litigants who are not parties to the case. The right to be heard before an adverse order is issued constitutes a substantive right.
(iv) The exercise of these powers must uphold the principles of natural justice.
Citation: 2024 INSC 150
Case Title: High Court Bar Association Allahabad v The State of Uttar Pradesh
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Manoj Misra
3. Constitutional immunity from accusations of accepting bribes in connection with their vote in Parliament or a state legislature.
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that legislators are not entitled to immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution for acts of bribery. A Seven-Judge Bench overturned the earlier decision in P.V. Narasimha Rao.
The Court laid down a two-fold test for granting immunity under Articles 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution: first, the activity must relate to a collective function of the legislature, and second, the action must be intrinsically connected to the legislator’s duty. Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud authored the judgment.
The Supreme Court found that bribery undermines the core principles of democracy and is not immune under Article 105(2); members involved can face prosecution for bribery. The Supreme Court clarified that bribery is not within the scope of parliamentary immunity
Citation: 2024 INSC 161
Case Title: Sita Soren v. Union Of India
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Ajjikuttira S. Bopanna, Justice M. M. Sundresh, Justice Pamidighantam S. Narasimha, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Sanjay Kumar, Justice Manoj Misra
4. Power of states to tax mines and minerals and whether royalty on mining leases is a tax.
The Nine Judge Bench, by a 8:1 majority, held that royalty on mining leases can not be considered as a tax. The majority also ruled that states’ have the power to tax mining rights and mineral bearing lands under Entry 50 of List II and this power is not limited by the MMDR Act.
However, Parliament has the power under Entry 54 of the Union List to limit the taxing power of the states. Chief Justice Chandrachud authored the majority judgment.
Justice Nagrathna wrote a dissenting judgment which found that royalty is a form of tax, and the MMDR Act limits the taxing power of the states. She referred to the test for what constitutes a tax in Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, (1985 INSC 107).
The case identifies four essential components of a tax:
(i) the nature of the imposition,
(ii) a clear specification of the person subject to the levy,
(iii) the rate at which the tax is imposed, and
(iv) the value to which the rate is applied to determine the tax liability.
It was held that royalties paid under Section 9 of the MMDR Act satisfy these criteria, thereby classifying Section 9 as a taxation provision. Consequently, it was ruled that the royalty on mining leases under Section 9 constitutes a tax.
Citation: 2024 INSC 554
Case Title: Mineral Area Development Authority v Steel Authority of India
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice B. V. Nagarathna, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Justice Satish C. Sharma, Justice Augustine G. Masih
5. States’ power to sub-classify Scheduled Castes for providing reservation
In a 6:1 majority decision, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of states to create sub-classifications within the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) categories. The Court reasoned that the various castes and tribes included in the SC/ST List are not homogenous, as they experience differing levels of discrimination. It further clarified that sub-classification does not alter the Presidential List, as no castes or tribes are added or removed.
Justice Trivedi dissented, arguing that sub-classification violates Article 14 by unfairly favoring certain castes or tribes over others within the Presidential List. She also held that states lack the legislative competence to create such sub-classifications.
Citation: 2024 INSC 562
Case Title: State of Punjab v Davinder Singh
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Bhushan R. Gavai, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Bela M. Trivedi, Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Satish C. Sharma
6. Constitutional challenge against Section 6A of Citizenship Act, 1955
A Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court by a majority of 4:1 upheld the constitutional validity of Section 6A. Justice Kant on behalf of himself and Justices Sundresh and Mishra authored the majority opinion and Chief Justice Chandrachud authored a separate concurring opinion. Justice Pardiwala authored a dissenting judgment declaring Section 6A invalid.
In response to the contention that Section 6A was not being adequately enforced, the majority issued the following directions:
- The directions issued in Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India (2005 INSC 287) should be followed to deport the illegal migrants who entered after 1971.
- The provisions of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 should be integrated with Section 6A for identifying illegal immigrants.
- The current statutory framework and tribunals for identifying illegal immigrants in Assam are inadequate and must be enhanced to enforce the legislative intent of Section 6A in a time-bound manner.
Citation: 2024 INSC 789
Case Title: In re: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955
Coram: Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Surya Kant, Justice M.M. Sundresh, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Mishra
7. State’s Power to Regulate Industrial Alcohol
The Nine-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, by an 8:1 majority, upheld the power of State Legislatures to regulate industrial alcohol, overruling the judgment in Synthetics. Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud authored the majority opinion on behalf of Justices Roy, Oka, Pardiwala, Misra, Bhuyan, Sharma, and Masih, while Justice Nagarathna delivered a dissenting opinion.
The majority held that the term “intoxicating liquors” under Entry 8 of the State List encompasses all forms of alcohol detrimental to health, including denatured spirits used as raw materials for producing potable alcohol. Consequently, the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act (IDRA) must be interpreted as excluding “intoxicating liquors” as defined in this judgment. Since industrial alcohol falls under Entry 8 of the State List, the majority found it unnecessary to address whether Section 18G of the IDRA excluded states’ regulatory powers over products under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List.
In her dissent, Justice Nagarathna contended that “industrial alcohol” is distinct from “intoxicating liquors.” She asserted that while states can regulate intoxicating liquor intended for human consumption, they lack the legislative competence to regulate industrial alcohol due to Entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule (industries controlled by the Union in the public interest) and the statutory framework of the IDRA.
Citation: 2024 INSC 812
Case Title: State of Uttar Pradesh v Lalta Prasad Vaish
Coram: Chief Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Bengaluru V. Nagarathna, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Justice Satish C. Sharma, Justice Augustine G. Masih.
8. Scope of the words “material resources of the community” under Article 39(b) of the Constitution
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 majority, held that not all private property qualifies as “material resources of the community” under Articles 39(b) and (c), which the State can acquire and redistribute. The Court overruled the decision in Sanjeev Coke, which had included private resources within the ambit of “material resources of the community.” Chief Justice Chandrachud authored the majority opinion.
Justice Nagarathna, in a partly dissenting opinion, argued that all privately owned resources, except for “personal effects,” could constitute “material resources of the community.” She added that private property could be “transformed” into community resources through mechanisms such as nationalization or acquisition. Justice Dhulia, in his dissent, emphasized that the broad interpretation of “material resources of the community” adopted in Ranganatha Reddy and Sanjeev Coke was correct, citing significant income and wealth inequality.
All nine judges unanimously affirmed that Article 31-C continues to shield statutes from being invalidated for violating Articles 14 and 19 if they aim to implement Articles 39(b) and (c) as interpreted in this judgment. The constitutionality of the MHADA Act will now be determined by a regular bench based on the principles established in this case.
Citation: 2024 INSC 835
Case Title: Property Owners Association v State of Maharashtra
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Rajesh Bindal, Justice Satish C. Sharma, Justice Augustine G. Masih
9. Validity of ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ Licence to Drive ‘Transport Vehicle’
A five-judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled that a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) licence allows the holder to drive transport vehicles weighing up to 7500 kg without needing an additional licence under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
The Court clarified, however, that a separate licence is mandatory for operating vehicles such as e-rickshaws, e-cars, and those transporting hazardous goods. Additionally, a separate licence is required for transport vehicles classified as medium or heavy (weighing over 7500 kg).
The bench also directed the Union government to propose amendments to the Act to resolve inconsistencies causing confusion between transport vehicles and LMVs.
Citation: 2024 INSC 840
Case Title: Bajaj Allianz General Insurance v Rambha Devi
Coram: Chief Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Pamidighantam S. Narasimha, Justice Pankaj Mittal, Justice Manoj Misra.
10. Challenge to the change in the ‘rules of game’ in recruitment process
The Constitution Bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court unanimously held that the existing Rules governing eligibility criteria cannot be changed once recruitment begins unless the existing Rules permit it. However, recruitment bodies can devise appropriate procedures or methods of selection during the recruitment process as long as they are transparent, non-discriminatory, and rational. The Court upheld the decision in K. Manjusree. The judgment of the Court was authored by Justice Misra.
The Supreme Court held that ‘Rules of the Game’ should not be changed during the game, the process of recruitment begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the filling up of notified vacancies (¶13).
The Court held that the doctrine which stops the change of rules midway through the recruitment process is founded on the rule against arbitrariness in Articles 14 and 16, and the doctrine of legitimate expectations
Citation: 2024 INSC 847
Case Title: Tej Prakash Pathak v Rajasthan High Court
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Pamidighantam S. Narasimha, Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Manoj Misra
11. Criteria for the determination of a minority educational institution
The Supreme Court by a 4-3 majority overruled Azeez Basha. The majority held that merely because an institute is created by a statute does not strip it of minority status. The majority also held that Article 30(1) protects institutes established before the Constitution came into force in 1950.
The Court laid down criteria to determine when an institution is a minority institution benefitting from Article 30(1) protection. Notably, the Court for the first time in 75 years also laid down parameters to determine a minority institution. The majority, in the present case, held that an institution can be considered a minority institution if it is “established” by members of a minority community, with the “administration” of the institution being a consequence of its establishment.
The majority judgment was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Justices Kant, Datta and Sharma authored separate (partly dissenting) opinions.
Citation: 2024 INSC 856
Case Title: Aligarh Muslim University Through its Registrar Faizan Mustafa v Naresh Agarwal
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Satish C. Sharma
12. Validity of unilateral appointment of arbitrators in public-private contract
The Constitution bench (five judges) of the Supreme Court by a 3:2 majority held that clauses in arbitration agreements allowing one party to appoint sole arbitrators unilaterally are impermissible. While public sector undertakings (“PSU”)are not prohibited from empanelling potential arbitrators, requiring the other party to select from the curated panel violated the principle of equality of parties. The Court held that the equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration, including the appointment of arbitrators. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud on behalf of himself and Justices Misra and Pardiwala. Justice Roy and Justice Narasimha wrote separate partially dissenting opinions.
Justice Roy held that unilateral appointments are not inherently invalid, as long as they do not fall within those prohibited by the Seventh Schedule. Justice Narasimha held that courts should determine whether a specific unilateral appointment of an arbitrator warrants prohibition.
Citation: 2024 INSC 857
Case Title: Central Organisation For Railway Electrification v ECL-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV)
Coram: Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Pamidighantam S. Narasimha, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra
READ ALSO: Supreme Court Yearly Review: Landmark Judgements Of 2024
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