The Supreme Court clarified that Sharia Courts have no legal recognition, and any declarations or decisions made by them are neither binding nor enforceable. It stressed that such bodies cannot use any coercive methods to implement their rulings, regardless of their label.
New Delhi: The Supreme Court ruled that courts such as the Court of Kazi, Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat, Sharia Court, and similar entities lack legal recognition. This decision came while allowing a maintenance plea from a Muslim woman under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
A bench comprised of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah stated that any declarations or decisions made by such bodies, regardless of their name, are not binding and cannot be enforced through coercive measures.
The bench remarked,
“The only way such declaration/decision can withstand scrutiny in the eye of law could be when the affected parties accept such declaration/decision by acting thereon or accepting it and when such action does not conflict with any other law. Even then, such declaration/decision, at best, would only be valid inter-se the parties that choose to act upon/accept the same, and not a third-party,”
The court’s ruling relied on the case of Vishwa Lochan Madan Vs Union of India (2014) and addressed a situation where a Muslim man had sought a divorce through the Court of Kazi and the Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat.
The bench was reviewing a plea from Shahjahan, who contested an Allahabad High Court order from August 3, 2018, which had dismissed her revision petition against a family court decision in Jhansi from April 23, 2010, that only granted her Rs 2,500 for her two children.
The couple’s marriage, conducted on September 24, 2002, according to Islamic customs, was the second for both parties.
After hearing arguments from the woman’s counsel and the state government, the bench noted that the appellant claimed her husband had subjected her to cruelty due to her inability to meet his demands for a motorcycle and Rs 50,000.
The family court observed that, since this was their second marriage, any demand for dowry was unlikely, as the man would be focused on maintaining his household.
The bench emphasized,
“Such reasoning/observation by the family court is unknown to the canons of law and is based on mere conjecture and surmise. The family court will do well, henceforth, to bear in mind the observation in Nagarathinam Vs State, through the Inspector of Police (2023) that the ‘…Court is not an institution to sermonise society on morality and ethics …’,”
The Supreme Court also criticized the family court for suggesting that the couple’s 2005 compromise indicated the appellant’s character and behavior led to their marital issues.
The bench pointed out that the compromise deed contained no such admission. The husband’s initial “divorce suit” was dismissed based on this compromise, which stated that both parties would live together without causing complaints.
Therefore, the bench concluded that the reasoning for denying the appellant maintenance was fundamentally flawed.
The court also addressed the issue of when maintenance should be payable whether from the date of the application or the date of the order.
In this case, the Supreme Court noted that the appellant challenged the family court’s decision, which stipulated that maintenance would commence from the date of the order rather than the date of the application.
Referencing Rajnesh Vs Neha (2021), the bench stated,
“Of course, Section 125(2) of the Code empowers the court to award maintenance from the date of the order but the same has to be justified in the background of the attendant facts and circumstances and should not cause unnecessary hardship to the applicant. In our view, Section 125 of the Code is a beneficial piece of legislation which has been enacted to protect the wife and children from destitution and vagrancy and, in the usual course, it would not be appropriate to disadvantage the applicant for the delay in the disposal of the application by the judicial system,”
The bench also noted that the husband was employed as an Aarakshak (Constable) in the BSF and earned Rs 15,000 at the time the application was filed in family court. They emphasized that this situation dated back to 2008-2009 (nearly 16 years ago), suggesting that circumstances may have significantly changed since then.
Ordering that the appellant receive Rs 4,000 per month in maintenance, effective from the date she filed her maintenance petition in family court, the bench concluded,
“We are of the view that maintenance could not have been denied to the appellant-wife under the prevailing circumstances,”
Additionally, the court clarified that the maintenance awarded to the children would also be applicable from the date of the maintenance petition. Given that the daughter has reached adulthood, the Supreme Court specified that her maintenance would only be payable until she attained majority.
The court directed the husband to deposit the maintenance amount in the family court within four months, after accounting for any amounts already disbursed.
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