The Supreme Court has held that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act cannot prevail over the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted, rendering subsequent transfers subject to the final decree.
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NEW DELHI: In a significant judgment clarifying the interplay between the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Supreme Court of India has held that Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit or proceeding is instituted. Upon institution of a suit, the doctrine of lis pendens comes into full force, rendering all subsequent transfers subservient to the final decree.
The ruling was delivered by a two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, while dismissing Civil Appeals filed against a judgment of the Bombay High Court.
Legal Issue
Whether subsequent purchasers (transferees pendente lite) can resist execution of a decree for specific performance by invoking Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, despite the applicability of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The Bench categorically held:
“The moment a suit or proceeding is instituted by a party to the contract whereafter there is transfer of the suit property, Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act would have to give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, in which event the doctrine of lis pendens would come into force.”
The Court further clarified that executing courts are empowered to determine whether an obstructionist is bound by the decree and whether such obstruction is liable to be removed.
Facts of the Case
The Respondent–Plaintiff agreed to the sale of the suit property with the Defendant, who later became the Judgment Debtor, in the year 1973. Upon the Defendant’s failure to perform his contractual obligations, the Plaintiff instituted a Regular Civil Suit in 1986 and duly registered a lis pendens in respect of the property.
During the pendency of the suit, the Judgment Debtor executed eight separate sale deeds transferring various portions of the suit property to different purchasers, from whom the present Appellants subsequently acquired parts of the property.
In 1989, one such transferee pendente lite constructed a bungalow on a portion of the suit land. The Trial Court ultimately decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiff. Execution proceedings were thereafter initiated, and in 1993, pursuant to orders of the Executing Court, a sale deed was executed by the Court Commissioner in favour of the decree holder.
Although the judgment and decree attained finality, repeated attempts were made to obstruct execution, ultimately leading to the present Appeals before the Supreme Court.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court reiterated that:
- A transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void, but
- Such a transfer is always subject to the outcome of the litigation.
The Court observed:
“It is clear as daylight that the rights of the appellants who are subsequent purchasers are subservient to the rights of the decree holder.”
Once the decree and court-executed conveyance attained finality, the transferees pendente lite had no right to resist delivery of possession.
The Supreme Court clarified that although Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, affords protection to a bona fide purchaser in certain situations, such protection ceases to operate once a suit or proceeding in respect of the property is instituted.
From the moment litigation commences, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 comes into play, and the doctrine of lis pendens overrides the rights claimed under Section 19(b).
Consequently, any transfer made during the pendency of the suit remains subject to the outcome of the litigation, irrespective of whether the subsequent purchaser had notice of the pending proceedings, as the doctrine of lis pendens operates in rem and binds the property itself.
The Court also addressed limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963:
- Article 129 (30 days from the date of obstruction) was applicable.
- The decree holder applied for the removal of the obstruction well within the limitation.
- Article 134 (one year from sale becoming absolute) was held inapplicable.
Taking note of the fact that the decree holder had been litigating for over three decades, the Court issued strong directions:
- The Appeals were dismissed.
- Appellants were directed to hand over actual physical possession by 15 February 2026.
- No further applications or petitions by the Appellants, Judgment Debtor, or anyone claiming through them shall be entertained by any Court.
The Bench observed:
“We consider such a direction necessary to ensure that the decree holder is not subjected to further harassment and to meet the ends of justice.”
Appearance:
Appellants: Senior Advocate Vinay Navare and AOR Shivaji M. Jadhav
Respondents: Caveator-in-person
Case Title:
Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors.
SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27660 OF 2025
READ JUDGMENT
