The Supreme Court clarified that under the SC/ST Act, victims have a statutory right to be heard during bail proceedings, but this right does not guarantee acceptance of every objection raised.
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 15A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) ensures victims are provided an opportunity to be heard, rather than a guarantee of a favorable outcome or a thorough adjudication of every objection raised.
The Court noted that the High Court, by ordering a joint trial at the bail consideration stage, overstepped and limited the statutory discretion of the trial Court.
According to the Bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice R Mahadevan,
“Thus, it is beyond cavil that Section 15A(5) incorporates the principle of audi alteram partem for victims under the SC/ST (POA) Act. Where such a right is conferred, the Court must provide the victim or their dependent an opportunity of audience, either personally or through counsel, including the Special Public Prosecutor. The statutory right to be heard presupposes that the victim is made aware of the proceedings and is not excluded therefrom…At the same time, the scope of Section 15A(5) must be correctly understood. The provision guarantees an opportunity to be heard, not a right to a favourable outcome or to a detailed adjudication of every objection raised by the victim. Once the victim has been notified, permitted to participate, and allowed to place objections on record, the statutory mandate stands satisfied.”
The case arose from Criminal Appeal Nos. 359, 346, 360 and 326 of 2025 and relates to two FIRs Crime No. 39 of 2020 and Crime No. 202 of 2022.
The appellant, challenged the High Court’s decision granting bail to the accused persons, invoking violations under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015.
The Appellant, along with friends, was violently assaulted by the Respondent-Accused and others, who used lethal weapons.
During this incident, the Appellant, a member of the Scheduled Caste community, faced caste-based abuse. Consequently, the Appellant filed an FIR under multiple sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 2015 against the Respondents.
After the Respondents were granted bail, the Appellant claimed that this hindered the trial’s progress.
In the contested order, the High Court granted bail to the Respondents and instructed that a joint trial for the two cases against the Accused be held. The Appellant subsequently filed an appeal.
The Appellant pointed out a troubling pattern: while on bail for prior caste-based violence, the Respondent-Accused allegedly orchestrated a premeditated murder of a key eyewitness, leading to a second case.
The Appellant argued that the High Court neglected this history of witness intimidation and the prior cancellation of bail due to similar threats. The Appellant also opposed the High Court’s decision to merge the two cases, asserting that they were fundamentally different and that combining them was legally inappropriate.
Conversely, the Respondent-Accused claimed that the request to revoke bail stemmed from vindictive motives rather than legal merits. They alleged the Appellant was part of a “land mafia” seeking revenge, even suggesting that the murder of the witness was an internal plot to blame the accused.
They highlighted that 13 out of 16 Accused were already out on bail without infractions and had no criminal history.
Regarding the High Court’s decision to order a joint trial, the Court stated,
“The determination of whether a joint or separate trial should be conducted lies primarily within the domain of the trial Court to be exercised at the threshold of trial upon a reasoned assessment of prejudice, convenience, and judicial economy. By issuing a direction for a joint trial at the stage of consideration of bail, the High Court pre-empted and curtailed the statutory discretion vested in the trial Court. Further, the grant of such a substantive procedural direction at the bail stage travels beyond the limited scope of bail jurisdiction. The High Court could not have directed a joint trial of two distinct cases without following due process of law or recording cogent reasons in consonance with Sections 218 to 223 Cr.P.C and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS.”
The Court referred to its judgment in Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana (2025) and noted that the two cases were initiated from separate FIRs, related to different incidents, and involved distinct allegations and evidentiary bases.
The Court emphasized that the offences did not qualify as the “same kind” and could not be considered as part of a single transaction.
The High Court’s decision did not show consideration of the offenses’ timelines, the nature of the allegations, the accused’s involvement, or the stages of the respective cases. There was no analysis of whether the statutory criteria for a joint trial were met.
Concerning the legality of granting bail, the Court pointed out that the High Court did not sufficiently consider the criminal background of the Respondent-Accused, which had been presented and recorded in the judgment. The relevance of this information to the potential for reoffending, intimidation of witnesses, or interference with justice was overlooked.
The Court remarked that reliance on a civil dispute between the parties did not diminish criminal liability or override significant factors concerning the criminal case, implying a misdirection in law. Moreover, the High Court’s judgment relied on generic statements lacking a reasoned connection to the case’s facts and legal standards for granting bail.
Ultimately, the Court determined that the High Court’s direction for a joint trial was legally untenable and violated statutory guidelines and established precedents.
The Criminal Appeals were thus upheld, the High Court’s order was cancelled, and the bail granted to the Respondent-Accused was revoked, instructing them to surrender to the trial court.
Case Title: Lakshmanan v. State Through The Deputy Superintendent of Police & Ors.
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