A woman of about 60 was convicted of murder by the High Court as the only one of four accused, though the other three stayed acquitted. The Supreme Court has set that aside, holding that no lone conviction can stand without an independent Section 302 charge, and has restored her acquittal by the Sessions Court.
New Delhi: Of four family members tried together for the 2005 burning death of a daughter-in-law, three kept their acquittals and one, her mother-in-law, was convicted alone. On Thursday, November 5, 2026, the Supreme Court set aside that life sentence, holding that when all accused are charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the co-accused are acquitted, one accused cannot be convicted of murder on her own unless an independent charge under Section 302 was framed against her [Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. State of Maharashtra].
A Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar allowed the criminal appeal in a judgment authored by Justice Chandurkar and reported as 2026 INSC 1196. It quashed the Aurangabad Bench’s judgment of September 28, 2017 and restored the Sessions Court’s acquittal.
No independent charge, no lone conviction
The Bench noted that the High Court had leaned on the defence’s own statement that the appellant was the only person at home with the victim. That defence, the Court said, was given in answer to a joint charge of common intention, and could not be turned into a fresh accusation against her alone. It observed:
“It is required to be stated that the defence raised by the accused was in response to the charge framed against all of them. The charge was that A1 to A4 in furtherance of their common intention, at the same date, time and place had caused the death of the victim by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire, thus, committing an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. There was no independent charge framed under Section 302 of the Penal Code against any of the accused.”
Relying on Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that the acquittal of three of the four accused, whether on rejection of the evidence or on benefit of doubt, means in law that they took no part in the offence. It added:
“Of the four accused tried for the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, the acquittal of three out of said four accused was maintained by the High Court. The appellant, A3 alone has been convicted for the substantive offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, a charge that was never framed against her.”
Convicting only one of them in the absence of an independent charge, the Bench said, “would definitely be prejudicial to the appellant” on the facts of the case.
How the case came up the ladder
According to the prosecution, the deceased was married to the appellant’s son, Shamkant (A1), and lived with him, his father Waman (A2), his mother Kamalbai (A3, the appellant) and his younger brother Jeejabrao (A4). It was alleged that all four ill-treated her because she had no child from the marriage, that there were dowry demands, and that on April 10, 2005, at about 10 a.m., they set her on fire in furtherance of their common intention. She was taken to the Civil Hospital with burn injuries and died on April 15, 2005.
Three dying declarations were recorded. In the first, recorded at 10.30 a.m. on the day of the incident (Exhibit 56), she named the appellant as having thrown kerosene on her and set her on fire. Two later statements, recorded by an Assistant Sub-Inspector and a Special Executive Magistrate (Exhibits 44 and 48), described A1 and A4 tying her hands and legs, the appellant pouring kerosene and A2 setting her on fire.
All four were tried under Sections 498A, 342, 406 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The Sessions Court acquitted them all, citing the inconsistencies between the dying declarations and the prosecution’s failure to examine the man who took her to hospital. In the State’s appeal, the High Court upheld the acquittal of A1, A2 and A4 on every charge, but convicted the appellant alone under Section 302 IPC, relying on Exhibit 56, and sentenced her to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs 25,000.
A dying declaration standing alone
Assessing the evidence afresh, the Court applied the principles on multiple dying declarations in Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi): where the statements are inconsistent, the court must look for corroboration in other evidence. The High Court had discarded Exhibits 44 and 48, a finding the State did not challenge, but then accepted Exhibit 56 without any corroboration.
The Bench also found that Vishwas Desle, who rescued the victim, took her to hospital and was present when Exhibit 56 was recorded, was a material witness, yet the prosecution never examined him or explained why. It noted that the victim was about 30 and the appellant about 60, an age gap that was “a relevant factor to be considered especially while reversing the appellant’s acquittal.”
Rejecting the High Court’s reliance on the appellant’s failure to explain the burns, the Court held, citing Anees v. State Govt. of NCT, that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act “would come into play only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden pointing to the involvement of the concerned accused.” It also noted that the High Court had not heard her on sentence after reversing the acquittal, as Section 386(a) CrPC requires.
The acquittal returns
Concluding that the Sessions Court’s view was neither perverse nor illegal, the Bench held:
“The Sessions Court was correct in holding that in view of inconsistency in the three dying declarations, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt. The High Court, while considering an appeal against acquittal, ought to have given due consideration to this aspect before proceeding to reverse the judgment of the Sessions Court. The presumption of innocence in favour of the appellant was in fact enhanced by her acquittal by the Sessions Court.”
The High Court’s judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2008 was quashed, and the appellant was directed to be set free forthwith if not required in any other case.
Why the judgment matters
Appellate courts reversing acquittals sometimes pick one accused out of a group charged with common intention and convict that person for the substantive offence. The ruling makes clear that this cannot be done without an independent charge, because the accused never had notice of, or a chance to defend against, a case that she alone committed the murder. It also restates that a lone dying declaration, contradicted by others, needs corroboration, and that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot fill gaps in the prosecution’s own proof.
Case Title: Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. State of Maharashtra
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018
Citation: 2026 INSC 1196
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar (author)
Date of Judgment: November 5, 2026
For the Appellant: Dilip Annasaheb Taur (AOR), Amol V. Deshmukh
For the State: Raman Yadav, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande (AOR), Shrirang B. Varma, Deepsea Chakraborty
Impugned: Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) judgment dated September 28, 2017, in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2008