ICC Can Probe POSH Complaints Against Employees From Any Department: Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court ruled that an ICC formed at a woman’s workplace can handle POSH Act complaints even when the accused works in a different government department. The Court affirmed that ICCs can conduct factual inquiries across departmental lines.

New Delhi: The Supreme Court determined that the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) established at a woman’s workplace is authorized to address complaints under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act), even if the accused is an employee from a different department within the Government of India.

A Bench consisting of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Vijay Bishnoi dismissed an appeal filed by an Indian Revenue Service (IRS) officer, affirming that the definition of workplace in the POSH Act is broad, and the Act should be interpreted to fulfill its social welfare goals.

The Court clarified that the phrase “where the respondent is an employee in Section 11 serves as a procedural guideline rather than a jurisdictional limitation.

The legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the ICC in one government department could investigate sexual harassment claims against an officer from a different department.

The Appellant, an IRS officer, contested the authority of the ICC of the Department of Food and Public Distribution (where the complainant was employed) to investigate him, arguing that only the ICC of his own department (Department of Revenue) held the jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, upholding the rulings of the Delhi High Court and the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT).

This case emerged from a complaint filed by a 2004 batch Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer, who alleged that the Appellant a 2010 batch IRS officer sexually harassed her on May 15, 2023, at her workplace in Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi.

Following the incident, she filed a First Information Report (FIR) and subsequently lodged a complaint under the POSH Act with her department’s ICC on May 24, 2023. The ICC notified the Appellant on June 13, 2023.

The Appellant challenged this notice before the CAT, arguing lack of jurisdiction, but the CAT dismissed his plea on June 23, 2023, which was later upheld by the Delhi High Court on June 30, 2023. He then approached the Supreme Court.

Senior Advocate Vipin Sanghi, representing the Appellant, argued that for civil servants, the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, provide a complete framework. He asserted that Section 11 of the POSH Act mandates that inquiries be conducted by the ICC at the workplace of the respondent.

He emphasized that only his own department could take disciplinary actions against him, suggesting that the ICC of the Department of Food and Public Distribution lacked the necessary jurisdiction. He further contended that under Section 19(h) of the Act, if the accused is not an employee at the complainant’s workplace, the only recourse is to initiate action under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

In contrast, Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, representing the Union of India, argued that the Appellant’s interpretation would undermine the purpose of the POSH Act. She indicated that the Act’s extensive definitions of workplace and employer reflect legislative intent to ensure that all complaints are considered.

She noted that under Section 13(3), the ICC can recommend actions to the respondent’s employer, thus bridging inter-departmental gaps.

The Supreme Court conducted a thorough textual and contextual analysis of the POSH Act.

The Court dismissed the Appellant’s reliance on the term where in Section 11(1).

The Bench noted that where indicates a situation or condition rather than a specific physical location.

The Court stated,

“The use of the phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ is essentially a procedural trigger, directing the ICC to apply the service rules which are applicable to the ‘respondent’; it is not a jurisdictional constraint limiting a particular ICC to hear the complaint,”

The Court emphasized Section 2(o)(v) of the POSH Act, which broadens the definition of “workplace” to encompass “any place visited by the employee arising out of or during the course of employment.”

The Bench remarked,

“If we were to interpret the provisions of the POSH Act to hold that only the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ has the jurisdiction to entertain complaints… it would defeat the purpose of such an expanded scope.”

They further argued that compelling an aggrieved woman to approach the ICC at the respondent’s workplace would create “procedural and psychological barriers.”

Addressing the issue of disciplinary authority, the Court referenced the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) Office Memorandum dated July 16, 2015. It explained that the inquiry process for government employees consists of two stages:

  1. Fact-Finding Inquiry: The ICC at the woman’s workplace conducts a preliminary inquiry to validate the allegations.
  2. Formal Disciplinary Inquiry: If the allegations are substantiated, the report is submitted to the respondent’s Disciplinary Authority, which may initiate a charge sheet, leading the ICC of the respondent’s department to conduct formal proceedings under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The Court concluded,

“It is merely the factual inquiry which is to be conducted by the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman… The fact that ultimately disciplinary action against the ‘respondent’ has to be taken by his employer and his department cannot be an impediment for the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman to take up the fact-finding inquiry.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the ICC of the aggrieved woman’s department has the authority to conduct the fact-finding inquiry.

The Court ordered that the ICC’s report, previously kept confidential, be forwarded to the Appellant’s department for further action according to service rules.

The Court concluded,

“The phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained in Section 11 of the POSH Act, cannot be interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against a ‘respondent’ may only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent.’”

Case Title: Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India & Anr.

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