Finding that a complete chain of circumstances, backed by DNA and medical evidence, pointed only to her guilt, a Kerala Sessions Court has sentenced a woman to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs 50,000 for killing her newborn son in 2014, holding that even if she acted out of fear of society, the act was nothing but murder, and has referred the case to the Government to consider remission.
Thodupuzha: A Kerala court has convicted Rose Mary @ Kuttiyakka, a resident of Marayoor, of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of her newborn baby boy on May 13, 2014, and sentenced her to imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs 50,000, in default of which she must undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year [State of Kerala v. Rose Mary @ Kuttiyakka].
Smt. Ash K. Bal, I Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge under the POCSO Act and Children’s Act, Thodupuzha, pronounced the conviction on September 28, 2026 and the sentence on September 29, 2026 in Sessions Case No. 502 of 2019, arising from Crime No. 283 of 2014 of Marayoor Police Station.
Background of the case
The prosecution case was that the accused, who had been living separately from her husband for several years, secretly gave birth to a male child and, with intention and premeditation to kill him, pressed his neck, wrapped him in a piece of bedsheet, placed him in a plastic cover and left him in the cattle shed near her house. The infant was found alive on the morning of May 13, 2014, and rushed to hospital, but died the same day despite treatment.
The matter came to light after a neighbour informed the then ward member, who reached the spot with his wife and found the baby breathing. A neighbour cut and tied the umbilical cord, and health workers took the child to the Primary Health Centre at Marayoor, from where he was referred onward and finally admitted to the NICU of a private hospital in Adimaly. The accused was found with her clothes soaked in blood and denied that the child was hers. She was taken to hospital herself, arrested on May 19, 2014 and released on bail on June 5, 2015. The prosecution examined 19 witnesses and marked 22 exhibits, while the defence led no evidence.
Medical and DNA evidence
The Court first examined whether the accused had given birth to the child. The doctor at the Primary Health Centre noted that the infant was a full-term baby weighing 2.3 kg with breathing difficulty and a cut umbilical cord tied with thread, and that the accused, examined the same afternoon, showed signs of recent delivery, including a first-degree perineal tear, even though she gave a history denying delivery. A gynaecologist who examined her days later recorded that she was in a postpartum state and would have delivered at least 100 hours earlier. A DNA report from the State Forensic Science Laboratory concluded that she was the biological mother of the deceased child.
On the cause of death, the postmortem doctor deposed that the baby was born alive and died of blunt force injury to the neck, and that such injuries were not possible in a normal vaginal delivery or from a fall, ruling out natural or accidental death. The defence argument on delay in sending samples to the laboratory was rejected, as the serology expert testified that the samples arrived sealed, with seals tallying with the specimen impression sent by the court.
‘Sheer murder’ despite fear of society
Applying the rule on circumstantial evidence laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that the prosecution had established a complete chain of circumstances excluding every hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. It invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, reasoning that once it was proved the baby was born to her, it was for her to explain the injury and how the child came to be parted from her possession, and noted that she instead denied any knowledge of the infant and never disclosed the delivery.
Her mother, examined as a witness, did not support the prosecution but said the husband had abandoned the accused about eight years earlier and that she was unaware of the pregnancy. Dealing with the motive, the Court observed:
“In the said circumstance, when the child was born, she might have done the act due to the fear of the society. Even then the act done by the accused is nothing but sheer murder.”
The Court also noted that the boy who first spotted the infant could not be examined as he was not available, but held that the testimony of the ward member, a neighbour and a social worker, together with the medical records, sufficiently proved that the newborn was found alive and rushed to hospital. Applying the three-stage approach to distinguish murder from culpable homicide not amounting to murder, it held that the facts fell within the fourth clause of Section 300 IPC and attracted none of the exceptions.
Mental condition plea rejected
During cross-examination of the gynaecologist, the defence suggested that the accused may have suffered from postpartum depression. The doctor said she noticed no such symptoms during the accused’s week-long inpatient stay, and the defence led no further material on her mental state at the time of the incident. At the sentencing hearing, the accused sought pardon, saying her 85-year-old mother was alone at home with nobody to look after her.
Her counsel submitted that she was not of normal mental status, but the Court found the claim unsupported by a single document, noted that she gave reasonable answers when interacting with the Court, and recorded that no such contention was raised during the trial or in her examination under Section 313 CrPC.
Sentence and reference to the Government
Holding that the case was not fit for the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, the Court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs 50,000, with one year of rigorous imprisonment in default. Pointing to Rule 131 of the Criminal Rules of Practice, which requires a formal reference to the Government where a woman is convicted of murdering her infant child, and to the Kerala High Court’s decision in State of Kerala v.
Salini, the Court directed that a copy of the judgment and records be forwarded to the Government so that it may consider remission without delay. The Court recalled the High Court’s view that a court has no option but to impose one of the two sentences prescribed for murder, and that:
“…the punishment has to be tempered with mercy, especially in the case of such helpless woman, who is often a victim of exploitation.”
Why The Life Imprisonment Verdict Matters
The ruling shows how courts prove infanticide when no witness saw the act, relying on a combination of DNA evidence to establish parentage, medical opinion to rule out natural or accidental death, the accused’s conduct and denial after the incident, and Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It also illustrates the two-track approach that Kerala courts take in such cases: murder carries a mandatory sentence, so the trial court imposes it, while Rule 131 sends the matter to the Government for a decision on remission. The judgment is a trial court decision and is open to challenge in appeal.
Case Title: State of Kerala v. Rose Mary @ Kuttiyakka [Sessions Case No. 502 of 2019]
Bench: Smt. Ash K. Bal, I Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act and Children’s Act), Thodupuzha
Date of Judgment: September 28, 2026 (conviction); September 29, 2026 (sentence)
Appearances: Additional Public Prosecutor Rajesh P.S. for the State; Advocate John Joseph for the accused