As we step into February 2026, it’s essential to reflect on the Supreme Court’s most impactful judicial pronouncements in January 2026. This monthly recap below lists a series of significant rulings that have shaped legal discourse across various domains.
NEW DELHI: As we step into February 2026, it’s important to reflect on the most impactful judicial pronouncements of January 2026. This month saw a series of significant rulings that have influenced legal discourse across various fields, including constitutional law, criminal justice, corporate regulations, and human rights. From Supreme Court verdicts establishing new precedents to High Court rulings with wide-ranging implications, these decisions continue to shape and evolve the legal landscape.
In this monthly recap, we examine the most important judgments of January 2026, highlighting their key takeaways, legal reasoning, and potential ramifications.
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Supreme Court Reduces State Bar Council Election Fee for PwD Advocates, Orders Rule Amendment
The Supreme Court heard a plea seeking reservation and reduced nomination fees for specially abled advocates in State Bar Council elections. The bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi considered concerns over representation and the high election fee of ₹1.25 lakh.
Senior Advocate Indira Jaisingh highlighted the financial and structural barriers faced by specially abled advocates. The BCI Chairman, Manan Kumar Mishra, stated that while immediate reservation in councils may not be feasible due to ongoing elections, such advocates could be accommodated in disciplinary committees.
The Court suggested lowering the nomination fee. After deliberation, the BCI agreed to reduce it to ₹15,000 for specially abled advocates.
The Court ordered that:
- Adequate representation of specially abled advocates be ensured by co-opting them into various committees for the current election cycle.
- The nomination fee for specially abled advocates be reduced to ₹15,000, with no extension of this benefit to other categories.
- The BCI initiate amendments to its rules to provide for proper representation in future elections in line with constitutional and welfare provisions.
Case Title: PANKAJ SINHA V BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA AND ORS.
W.P.(C) No. 1261/2025
READ ORDER HERE
Only Because An Order Is Wrong, Judicial Officers Should Not Be Put Through Ordeals: Supreme Court Set-Aside Termination of MP Judicial Officer
In a significant ruling upholding judicial independence, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal of Madhya Pradesh judicial officer Nirbhay Singh Suliya, holding that incorrect or erroneous judicial orders alone cannot justify disciplinary action against judges.
A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan ruled that Suliya, who had 27 years of unblemished service, was removed without due process. The Court ordered that he be treated as having continued in service till retirement, with full back wages, consequential benefits, and 6% interest.
The case arose from allegations that Suliya, while serving as an Additional District & Sessions Judge, inconsistently granted bail in Excise Act cases and failed to refer to statutory provisions. The Supreme Court found the departmental inquiry to be perverse, noting that key witnesses were not examined, the bail orders were legally sustainable, and none were challenged by the State.
The Court held that disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against judges only where there is evidence of corruption, mala fides, or extraneous considerations, and not merely due to errors of judgment. It warned against frivolous complaints and intimidation of trial court judges, observing that fear of such action discourages bail grants and burdens higher courts.
The judgment also cautioned that false allegations against judges may invite contempt action or disciplinary proceedings against errant advocates, while reiterating that strict action must be taken against genuinely corrupt judicial officers.
The Supreme Court directed that the judgment be circulated to all High Courts to ensure protection of honest judges and reinforce judicial independence.
Case Titile: Nirbhay Singh Suliya versus The State of Madhya Pradesh and others
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2026
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Supreme Court Denies Bail to Umar Khalid & Sharjeel Imam, Grants Bail to Five Others in 2020 Delhi Riots Case
On January 5, 2026, the Supreme Court delivered a significant bail ruling in the 2020 North-East Delhi riots “larger conspiracy” case, granting bail to five accused activists while refusing bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam.
A bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria heard appeals challenging the Delhi High Court’s refusal of bail under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). The Court undertook an extensive analysis of Article 21 of the Constitution, prolonged pre-trial incarceration, and the strict bail bar under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
The Court granted bail to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa Ur Rehman, Mohd Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed, noting that they had spent nearly six years in custody, the trial had not begun, and their alleged roles were peripheral rather than central to the conspiracy. Continued detention, the Court held, would be disproportionate and violative of personal liberty, though the seriousness of allegations was not diluted.
However, bail was denied to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, with the Court holding that they stood on a “qualitatively different footing.” The prosecution material, at this stage, disclosed prima facie allegations indicating a more central and influential role in the alleged conspiracy, attracting the statutory bar under Section 43D(5) UAPA. They were granted liberty to renew their bail pleas after further progress in the trial.
The judgment reaffirmed that bail under UAPA cannot be decided mechanically. Courts must adopt an individualised, role-based assessment, balancing statutory restrictions with constitutional safeguards. Prolonged incarceration acts as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny, and pre-trial detention cannot assume the character of punishment.
The ruling sets an important precedent on proportionality, individual culpability, and constitutional oversight in bail adjudication under stringent anti-terror laws.
Case Title: Gulfisha Fatima v. State of NCT of Delhi and connected matters
SLP (CRL.) NO. 13988/2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Supreme Court Allows Adani Power Appeal Against Gujarat HC Order on Customs Duty for SEZ Power Supplies
In a landmark ruling dated 5 January 2026, the Supreme Court set aside a 2019 Gujarat High Court judgment and held that no customs duty can be levied on electricity generated in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and supplied to the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA). The verdict grants relief to Adani Power Ltd. in relation to electricity supplied from its Mundra SEZ power plant.
A bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and N.V. Anjaria ruled that the High Court erred in refusing to follow its own 2015 coordinate bench decision, which had already declared such levy unconstitutional. The Supreme Court stressed that judicial discipline requires coordinate benches to follow binding precedent or refer the matter to a larger bench.
The Court reaffirmed that:
- Electricity generated within India and supplied from an SEZ to the DTA does not qualify as an “import” under the Customs Act.
- Customs exemption provisions cannot be used to impose a tax.
- Any levy without statutory authority violates Article 265 of the Constitution.
- Once a tax is declared unconstitutional, the State cannot retain amounts collected under it.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed:
- Setting aside of the 2019 Gujarat High Court ruling,
- Refund of customs duty collected from 16 September 2010 to 15 February 2016 (without interest),
- Completion of the refund process within eight weeks, and
- No further demand of customs duty for the relevant period.
The judgment reopens and conclusively settles the long-standing dispute, reaffirming the principle of stare decisis and limits on taxation without authority of law.
Case Title: ADANI POWER LTD. & ANR VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.24729/2019
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Bank Fraud Case: Supreme Court Grants Bail to Ex-Amtek Chairman Arvind Dham After Delhi HC Denial
The Supreme Court, through a Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe, granted bail to Arvind Dham, former chairman of the Amtek Group, in a Rs. 2,700-crore bank fraud case being investigated by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). The trial court is tasked with setting the terms and conditions of his bail.
Dham was arrested on July 9, 2024, under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) following FIRs filed by IDBI Bank and Bank of Maharashtra, which accused the Amtek Group of loan fraud, cheating, and misappropriation of funds. The ED’s investigation alleged that funds from over 15 banks were diverted through a complex network of Amtek Group entities, including ACIL Ltd., Amtek Auto Ltd., ARG Ltd., Metalyst Forging, and Castex Technologies.
The Delhi High Court had previously rejected his plea for regular bail, citing the serious nature of the alleged fraud and the potential for asset dissipation or witness influence. Dham had been in custody for over 16 months, during which the investigation related to him was reportedly completed, but trial proceedings had not yet begun.
The Supreme Court emphasized that prolonged pre-trial incarceration without a progressing trial violates the right to a speedy trial and cannot be ignored, even in cases of economic offences. Allegations of influencing witnesses were found incredible given Dham’s custody timeline.
Dham’s trial remains pending in the Rouse Avenue Court, and the ED continues its investigation into the broader Amtek Group money laundering network.
Case Title: Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement
S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 15478 of 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
“Expectation of Higher Price Not Enough”: Supreme Court Says Auctions Can’t Be Cancelled Arbitrarily
The Supreme Court of India ruled that a government auction cannot be cancelled merely because the authority believes a higher price could be obtained later. Setting aside the Allahabad High Court’s orders, the Court restored the auction in favour of Golden Food Products India, the highest bidder for an industrial plot in Ghaziabad.
The Court held that since the bid was above the reserve price and the auction process was lawful and free from irregularities, the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) had no valid reason to cancel it. Expecting better revenue in a future auction or comparing prices of smaller plots with a large plot was found to be an irrelevant and arbitrary justification.
Emphasising fairness and transparency, the Court stated that auction results can be rejected only for serious reasons such as fraud or collusion. It directed the GDA to issue the allotment letter after re-deposit of earnest money, reaffirming that legitimate expectations of bidders must be respected and public authorities must act in accordance with law.
Case Title: GOLDEN FOOD PRODUCTS INDIA vs. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.18095-18096 of 2024
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Part-Time Teachers’ Salary Arrears : Supreme Court Orders WB Education Secretary to Take Fresh Decision
The Supreme Court of India has disposed of contempt petitions filed by part-time contractual teachers against the West Bengal government, directing the Secretary of the School Education Department to reconsider their pending salary arrears claims after giving them a proper hearing.
The Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta noted that the teachers were not allowed to present their case, and relevant school records were not examined. The Court allowed the teachers to file fresh representations within six weeks, mandated a proper hearing, and ordered that all records be summoned and inspected. A detailed decision must be issued within four months, and the teachers remain free to pursue further legal remedies if dissatisfied.
The dispute traces back to 2002, when part-time contractual teaching posts were created. Although these teachers performed duties equivalent to regular staff, they were denied pay parity and regularization. The High Court had earlier directed pay parity for the period 2010–2013, but the State had allegedly failed to fully comply.
Case Title: Gurupada Bera & Ors. v. Binod Kumar & Ors
DIARY NO(S). 18826 OF 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Magistrate Cannot Take Cognizance Without Condoning Delay: Supreme Court Quashes Cheque Bounce Case
On 6 January 2026, the Supreme Court of India held that a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, unless the delay in filing is first condoned.
The case arose from a cheque dishonour complaint filed two days beyond the limitation period. Although the Magistrate took cognizance immediately and later condoned the delay (five years later) based on medical grounds, the accused challenged this procedure. The Karnataka High Court upheld the Magistrate’s actions.
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s decision, ruling that condonation of delay must precede cognizance. Interpreting the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the Court clarified that a time-barred complaint does not legally come on record unless delay is condoned. Taking cognizance before condonation amounts to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court emphasized that cognizance and condonation are not interchangeable procedural acts, and reliance was placed on analogous principles under civil law. Consequently, the complaint was quashed due to procedural irregularity.
Case Title: S. Nagesh v. Shobha S. Aradhya
SLP (Crl.) No. 18127 of 2024
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Reserved Candidate Benefiting From Prelims Relaxation Cannot Claim General Standard in Cadre Allocation: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of India held that a reserved category candidate who avails relaxation at the Preliminary Examination stage cannot be treated as selected on “General Standard” for cadre allocation, even if such a candidate secures a higher rank in the final merit list.
A Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Vijay Bishnoi set aside the decisions of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Karnataka High Court, and upheld the Union Government’s decision to allot the Karnataka cadre to a General category candidate instead of a Scheduled Caste candidate who had benefited from relaxed standards.
The case arose from the 2013 Indian Forest Service Examination. The SC candidate qualified for the Main Examination by availing relaxation in the Preliminary Examination, whereas the General category candidate cleared the Preliminary Examination under general standards. Although the SC candidate secured a higher rank in the final merit list, the dispute concerned cadre allocation, not selection.
Rejecting the High Court’s view that the Preliminary Examination is merely a screening test, the Supreme Court held that it is an integral stage of the selection process. Interpreting Rule 14 of the Examination Rules, 2013 and Paragraph 9 of the Cadre Allocation Policy, the Court clarified that any relaxation at any stage of the examination disqualifies a candidate from being adjusted against unreserved vacancies.
The Court reiterated that once a candidate benefits from relaxed standards at the initial stage, such a benefit carries through the entire process, and the candidate cannot later claim selection on general standards based on superior performance in subsequent stages.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the original cadre allocation and ruled that the SC candidate was not entitled to the General Insider vacancy in the Karnataka cadre.
Case Title: Union of India vs G. Kiran & Ors. (with connected appeal)
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 4743 of 2020
READ JUDGMENT HERE
‘Commencement Means Notice, Not Court Filing’: Supreme Court Restores Interim Relief, Overturns Karnataka High Court Order
The Supreme Court of India set aside the Karnataka High Court’s judgment that had vacated an ad-interim injunction on the ground that arbitral proceedings were allegedly not initiated within 90 days.
A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih clarified that, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, arbitral proceedings commence only when a notice invoking arbitration is received by the other party under Section 21, and not when a Section 11 petition for appointment of an arbitrator is filed.
The dispute arose between Regenta Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and Hotel Grand Centre Point regarding interference in hotel operations under a Franchise Agreement. Regenta Hotels obtained an ad-interim injunction under Section 9 in February 2024 and issued a formal arbitration notice on April 11, 2024. When the respondent refused to appoint an arbitrator, Regenta filed a Section 11 petition in June 2024. The High Court dismissed the Section 9 appeal, holding that arbitration had not been “initiated” within 90 days.
The Supreme Court rejected this view, holding that the filing of a Section 11 petition is only a procedural step and does not mark the commencement of arbitral proceedings. The Court emphasized that the receipt of the arbitration notice by the other party triggers the start of arbitration under Section 21, and Rule 9(4) of the 2001 Rules must be read harmoniously with Section 9. Treating the Section 11 filing as the commencement date would defeat the scheme of the Act.
Since the arbitration notice was received well within the 90 days, the Court held that proceedings had validly commenced. Consequently, the Supreme Court restored the ad-interim injunction granted in February 2024 and set aside the High Court’s and Trial Court’s orders vacating it, directing the High Court to promptly decide the pending Section 11 petition.
Arbitral proceedings commence upon the opposite party’s receipt of the arbitration notice under Section 21, and the Section 11 petition is only a subsequent procedural step; interim protection under Section 9 is valid if notice is served within 90 days.
Case Title: Regenta Hotels Private Limited v. M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point and Others
SLP (Civil) No. 30212 of 2024
READ JUDGMENT HERE
“Interference at Every Stage Will Kill Arbitration”: Supreme Court Warns Courts on Arbitral Awards
The Supreme Court of India reiterated that excessive judicial interference in arbitration defeats the very purpose of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is designed to ensure speedy and effective dispute resolution with minimal court involvement.
A Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Pankaj Mithal set aside a March 2021 judgment of the Madras High Court that had interfered with an arbitral award by deleting a claim granted in favour of a firm engaged in complex dredging operations.
The Court emphasized that arbitration is a special statutory mechanism, and courts must respect arbitral autonomy. Judicial interference is permitted only on limited grounds under Section 34, such as patent illegality. Once an arbitral award has been upheld by a court, the scope for further interference becomes even more restricted.
The Supreme Court cautioned that allowing courts to intervene at every stage and permitting repeated challenges to arbitral awards would frustrate and defeat the objective of arbitration as a fast, cost-effective, and efficient dispute resolution process.
In the present case, the arbitral tribunal had awarded ₹14.66 crore to the firm towards idling charges in a dredging project. While a single judge of the Madras High Court upheld the award, the Division Bench interfered and deleted the claim. The Supreme Court reversed this interference, reaffirming that courts cannot re-examine arbitral findings on merits unless the strict statutory grounds are satisfied.
Courts must exercise extreme restraint in arbitration matters, and arbitral awards should not be disturbed unless they fall within the narrow grounds of challenge prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
Case Title: JAN DE NUL DREDGING INDIA PVT LTD VS TUTICORIN PORT TRUST
S.L.P. (C) No. 8803 of 2021
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Supreme Court Slams Andhra Pradesh High Court for Quashing Corruption FIRs, Restores ACB Investigations
The Supreme Court of India strongly criticised the Andhra Pradesh High Court for quashing multiple FIRs in corruption cases on hyper-technical grounds and set aside its earlier judgment, calling the approach a “travesty of justice” and a serious failure of judicial duty.
A Bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma held that the High Court took undue pains to ensure that the FIRs were quashed and directed that it shall not entertain any further challenges to these FIRs or the ongoing investigations.
The case concerned FIRs registered by the Andhra Pradesh Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) between 2016 and 2020 at its Vijayawada unit. The High Court had quashed the FIRs on the ground that the Vijayawada ACB office was not properly notified as a “police station” under Section 2(s) of the CrPC, due to the absence of a formal gazette notification.
Rejecting this reasoning, the Supreme Court held that courts must look at substance and practical compliance, not rigid technicalities. It ruled that insisting on a particular form of notification was legally unsustainable and that the High Court ought to have upheld the jurisdiction instead of terminating corruption probes at the threshold.
The Court also termed the High Court’s refusal to recognise the 2022 clarificatory government order—which confirmed the Vijayawada ACB unit as a police station with statewide jurisdiction—as untenable and contrary to settled legal principles. It clarified that such a clarificatory order does not operate retrospectively but merely explains the existing position.
Setting aside the High Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court permitted the ACB to proceed with investigations, noting that charge sheets had already been filed in some cases. While protecting the rights of the accused to challenge charge sheets on grounds other than jurisdiction, the Court directed that no coercive action be taken where investigations are still pending, provided the accused cooperates.
Corruption investigations cannot be quashed on narrow technical grounds; courts must prevent miscarriage of justice by allowing lawful probes to continue to their logical conclusion.
Case Title: THE JOINT DIRECTOR (RAYALASEEMA), ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU, A.P. vs. DAYAM PEDA RANGA RAO
SLP (CRIMINAL) NOS. 14321-14333 OF 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Common or Trade Parlance Test Must Be Used: Supreme Court Clarifies Key Principles in Tax Classification
The Supreme Court of India laid down important principles on the use of the common or trade parlance test in tax classification disputes, while overturning a CESTAT decision that had classified imported aluminium shelving as “parts of agricultural machinery.”
A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan examined whether aluminium shelves imported by M/s Welkin Foods should be classified under CTI 84369900 (parts of agricultural machinery – nil duty) or CTI 76109010 (aluminium structures – taxable). While customs authorities accepted that other imported items were parts of agricultural machinery, they disputed the classification of aluminium shelving.
The Supreme Court held that aluminium shelving cannot be treated as a part of agricultural machinery, as it neither contributes to the functioning of any machine nor forms an integral or functional unit. The shelves merely provide a surface to support equipment and therefore fall under aluminium structures.
The Court emphasised that classification must primarily be determined by tariff headings, section notes, chapter notes, and the General Rules for Interpretation (GRIs). The common or trade parlance test can be applied only in limited circumstances—where the statute provides no clear guidance and the terms used are neither technical nor scientific.
Key principles laid down include:
- The common parlance test should be used restrictively and not as the first resort under the HSN-based system.
- It cannot override clear statutory provisions or technical meanings.
- General tariff entries may be interpreted using common parlance, but industry-specific entries must be understood in their technical context.
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the mushroom-growing apparatus did not constitute agricultural machinery or a functional unit, and that the aluminium shelves were neither machines nor parts thereof.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal’s ruling, and held that the aluminium shelving was correctly classifiable as aluminium structures under Chapter 76, attracting the applicable customs duties.
Case Title: Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. M/s Welkin Foods
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5531 OF 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
“Civil Verdict Is Not a Shield Against Crime”: Supreme Court Restores Criminal Trial in Family Property Dispute
On 8 January 2026, the Supreme Court of India clarified the limited scope of the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings at the threshold, particularly in cases involving allegations of fraud and forgery arising from family property disputes.
Setting aside a Madras High Court order, the Court held that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil court has upheld the validity of documents arising from the same transaction. Civil and criminal liabilities can coexist, and civil findings do not conclusively determine criminal intent.
The case arose from disputes over three registered settlement deeds executed between 2010 and 2012. While a civil suit challenging these deeds was dismissed in 2023, the appellant had separately lodged a criminal complaint alleging cheating, forgery and conspiracy. The High Court quashed the criminal case, treating the dispute as purely civil and relying on delay and the complainant’s conduct.
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court reiterated that powers under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised sparingly, referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra. The Court emphasized that:
- Quashing at the initial stage is an exception, not the rule.
- Courts should not assess the truthfulness or credibility of allegations while considering quashing.
- Delay alone is not a ground to terminate criminal proceedings.
- Allegations of fraud and misuse of documents must be tested at trial, not at the threshold.
The Court held that the complaint disclosed prima facie allegations of fraud and abuse of vulnerability, which warranted a full trial. Accordingly, it restored the criminal proceedings and directed the trial court to decide the case independently on the merits.
The existence or outcome of civil proceedings does not justify quashing criminal prosecution at the threshold; allegations of fraud must ordinarily proceed to trial.
Case Title: C.S. PRASAD vs. C.SATYAKUMAR AND ANOTHERS
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 140 OF 2026
READ JUDGMENT HERE
“Courts Not Supposed to Be Insensitive”: Supreme Court Reduces Jail Term of 80-Year-Old Convict
The Supreme Court of India modified the sentence of an 80-year-old man convicted in a criminal case dating back to 1992, reducing his punishment to the period of imprisonment already undergone, while upholding his conviction.
A Bench of Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed that courts must act with human sensitivity, particularly when dealing with aged convicts who have already spent substantial time in custody. The Court noted that the appellant, now over 80 years old, had already undergone six years and three months of imprisonment, and sending him back to jail at this stage would be harsh and unnecessary.
The appeal arose from a Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment that had altered the appellant’s conviction from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC, sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment.
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s finding that the incident was a “free fight”, involving a sudden clash between rival groups without premeditation or a common intention to cause death. While affirming the appellant’s guilt under Section 304 Part II IPC, the Court considered his advanced age, prolonged incarceration, and the long passage of time since the offence as mitigating factors.
Accordingly, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already served and dismissed the appeal with this modification.
While conviction may stand, courts can appropriately modify sentences on humanitarian grounds, particularly where an aged convict has already undergone substantial imprisonment.
Case Title: SHRIKRISHNA VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1533 OF 2011
READ JUDGMENT HERE
State Must Abandon Colonial Conception of Itself: Supreme Court Slams Bureaucratic Lethargy
The Supreme Court of India held that the State must shed its colonial mindset of acting as a sovereign that grants benefits at its discretion, and instead act fairly, transparently, and in accordance with the constitutional guarantee against arbitrariness under Article 14.
A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan made these observations while allowing a civil appeal against an Orissa High Court judgment that had denied an industrial unit various incentives under the 1989 Industrial Policy.
The Court ruled that the appellant company was entitled to capital investment and DG set subsidies for its Magneco Metrel Plant (MM Plant). It held that the unit qualified as a new industrial unit, having been set up after the policy came into force, with separate registration, independent power supply, and independent commercial production. The MM Plant was not merely an expansion or modernization of an existing unit.
The Supreme Court criticised the State for bureaucratic delay and arbitrariness, noting that clear representations and assurances had been made through official communications sanctioning the subsidies. These created a legitimate expectation, on which the company relied by investing and continuing operations. Withdrawal of benefits after years, without any misrepresentation by the company, was held to be unfair and unjustified.
Setting aside the High Court’s ruling, the Court clarified that subsidy eligibility is to be assessed unit-wise and not company-wise. It further held that the State could not reverse its earlier decision recognising the MM Plant as a new unit after repeated inspections had confirmed compliance.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the State to disburse the sanctioned subsidies within three months.
State policies and official assurances create enforceable legitimate expectations, and the government must act fairly and non-arbitrarily while implementing industrial incentive schemes.
Case Title: IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation & Ors.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 66 OF 2026
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Mining & Construction Vehicles Not Liable for Motor Vehicle Tax If Used Only Inside Closed Premises: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of India held that construction equipment vehicles such as dumpers, loaders, excavators, dozers, drills, surface miners, and rock breakers, when used exclusively within factory premises or enclosed industrial areas, are off-road “special vehicles” and are not liable to registration or road tax.
A Bench of Justices Pankaj Mithal and Prasanna B. Varale delivered the ruling while allowing appeals filed by Ultratech Cement Limited, which had challenged the Gujarat High Court’s decisions upholding the State’s demand for registration and road tax under the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958.
The Court observed that such vehicles are expressly excluded from the definition of “motor vehicle” under Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as they are adapted exclusively for use in factories or enclosed areas and are not suitable for public road use. Consequently, taxation under Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule is impermissible, especially in light of Article 265, which bars tax collection without authority of law.
The Bench noted that the vehicles were transported in dismantled form, never driven on public roads, and lacked road-worthiness certification. Expert certificates, including those from the Automotive Research Association of India, confirmed their off-road industrial design. The Court also pointed out that while such vehicles were mentioned in the State tax schedule, no tax rate was prescribed, indicating no legislative intent to tax them.
Relying on earlier precedents, including Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, the Court reiterated that only vehicles suitable for road use can be subjected to road tax. However, it clarified that if such equipment is later found to be used on public roads, it would attract registration, taxation, and penalties under the law.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the Gujarat High Court judgments and allowed the appeals, holding that the vehicles in question are not liable to road tax.
Case Title: Ultratech Cement Limited v. The State of Gujarat And Others
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3352-3353 OF 2017
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Families Invoke POCSO Against Consensual Adolescent Couples: SC Suggests ‘Romeo-Juliet Clause’ to Prevent Misuse
The Supreme Court of India set aside the Allahabad High Court’s directions mandating medical age determination of victims at the investigation stage in all POCSO cases, holding that such directions were issued without jurisdiction and amounted to judicial overreach.
The case arose from a POCSO prosecution in Uttar Pradesh, where, while granting bail under Section 439 CrPC, the High Court directed mandatory medical age testing and gave a medical opinion overriding the value of documentary evidence. The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged these directions before the Supreme Court.
The Apex Court held that bail jurisdiction is limited to deciding the release of the accused and does not extend to framing general rules governing investigation procedures. Issuing such directions while deciding bail was held to be coram non judice.
Interpreting Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, the Court reaffirmed the statutory hierarchy for age determination, giving primacy to school and birth records, with medical tests permissible only as a last resort. It categorically ruled that medical age determination cannot be mandated as a routine practice in POCSO cases.
The Court further cautioned against converting bail hearings into mini-trials, clarifying that final determination of the victim’s age is an evidentiary issue to be decided during trial, not at the bail stage.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal, quashed the impugned directions (including in related cases), but did not disturb the bail already granted. While reiterating the protective purpose of the POCSO Act, the Court also acknowledged concerns about its misuse and suggested legislative consideration of safeguards, including a possible “Romeo and Juliet” exception for consensual adolescent relationships.
Case Title: The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr.
SLP (Crl.) No. 10656 of 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
“Justice Must Serve Welfare”: Supreme Court Quashes Attempt to Murder Case After Husband Assures Care for Wife and Child
The Supreme Court of India held that continuing criminal proceedings does not always serve justice, particularly in matrimonial disputes where a lawful settlement can protect family welfare. The Court quashed a serious criminal case—including charges of attempt to murder—after the husband gave a written undertaking to care for his wife and child.
The case involved an FIR registered in Himachal Pradesh against Bharat Pathania, with charges under Sections 307, 323, 324, 452, 504, and 506 IPC. The Himachal Pradesh High Court had refused to quash the FIR, but the Supreme Court set aside that order and ended the criminal proceedings.
The Bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma noted that while criminal law aims to deter wrongdoing, courts must use discretion based on the facts. The Court emphasized that when a lawful settlement ensures the welfare of the family, continuing prosecution may not further justice. It stated that ending proceedings can promote family stability and responsibility.
During the hearing, the husband and wife appeared before the Court. The husband provided a written undertaking promising to take care of his wife and child and not harm them. The Court recorded the undertaking and warned that any breach would have serious consequences.
Using its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court quashed the criminal case but clarified that this decision was based on the unique facts of the case and should not be treated as a precedent.
Case Title: Bharat Pathania v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
SLP (Crl.) No. 12798 of 2025
READ ORDER HERE
Mere Apprehension of Repeat Offences Cannot Justify Preventive Detention: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of India has held that preventive detention cannot be justified merely because a person might repeat offences if released on bail. In a Telangana case under the Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986, the Court quashed the detention of a woman accused in multiple NDPS cases.
The Court stressed that preventive detention is an extraordinary power, and mere suspicion or apprehension cannot substitute regular criminal procedure. It noted that the detention order failed to show how the alleged drug offences affected public order, and instead relied only on generic statutory language.
The Bench also clarified that law and order violations do not automatically amount to a threat to public order, and authorities cannot use preventive detention to bypass bail or cancel it without due process.
The Supreme Court therefore set aside the detention order and ordered the woman’s immediate release, unless her custody is required in any other case.
Case Title: Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana & Others
SLP (CRL.) NO.18223 OF 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
CLB Doesn’t Have Power U/S 5 Limitation Act to Condone Delay: Supreme Court on Companies Act Appeals
The Supreme Court has held that the Company Law Board (CLB) has no power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for appeals filed under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. Setting aside the Calcutta High Court’s judgment, the Court ruled that in the absence of an express statutory provision, a quasi-judicial body like the CLB cannot extend limitation periods.
The Court clarified that the Limitation Act applies only to courts, unless a statute specifically empowers a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority to invoke it. Section 433 of the Companies Act, which allows the NCLT and NCLAT to apply the Limitation Act, cannot be extended by implication to the CLB.
It further held that limitation periods under Section 58(3) are mandatory and not merely directory, and delay cannot be condoned based on equitable principles or inherent powers. Since the respondent’s remedy was already time-barred, the CLB’s condonation of a 249-day delay was without jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and overturned the High Court’s decision.
Case Title: The Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 92 OF 2026
READ JUDGMENT HERE
“Courts Are Not Supposed To Be Insensitive”: Supreme Court Cuts Jail Term Of 80-Year-Old In 1992 Homicide Case
The Supreme Court reduced the sentence of an 80-year-old convict in a homicide case to the period already undergone, observing that courts must not be insensitive while dealing with elderly persons. The Bench of Justice N.V. Anjaria and Justice K. Vinod Chandran held that sending the appellant back to prison at such an advanced stage of life would be harsh and inadvisable.
The appeal arose from a Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment which had altered the appellant’s conviction from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC and imposed a sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC, noting that the incident stemmed from a sudden quarrel and free fight without premeditation. The appellant had inflicted only a single lathi blow on the head of the deceased, and while he knew that such an act could cause death, there was no intention to commit murder.
Considering the appellant’s advanced age, the passage of more than three decades since the incident, and the fact that he had already undergone over six years of incarceration, the Court held that further imprisonment would serve no meaningful purpose. Accordingly, the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone.
The appeal was dismissed with modification of sentence, and all pending applications were disposed of.
Case Title: Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1533 OF 2011
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Constitutional Validity of Section 17A PC Act: Supreme Court Delivers Split Verdict; Justice Nagarathna Calls It Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court delivered a split verdict on the constitutional validity of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which requires prior approval before initiating any inquiry or investigation against a public servant for decisions taken in the discharge of official duties. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger Bench.
The two-judge Bench comprising Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice B.V. Nagarathna delivered divergent opinions in a writ petition filed by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation.
Justice K.V. Viswanathan upheld the constitutional validity of Section 17A, holding that it operates as a screening mechanism rather than a blanket shield for corruption. He distinguished it from the earlier struck-down Section 6A of the DSPE Act, observing that Section 17A protects honest officers from frivolous and reputation-damaging investigations. Emphasising the importance of dignity and reputation, he noted that misuse of investigative powers can cause irreversible harm, particularly in the age of social media.
Justice Viswanathan directed that complaints under Section 17A must be routed through the Lokpal or Lokayuktas, who would act as independent gatekeepers. He held that statutory timelines must be strictly followed and reasons must be recorded while granting or refusing approval. He concluded that striking down the provision would be regressive and contrary to constitutional balance.
In contrast, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, in her dissent, struck down Section 17A as arbitrary and violative of Article 14. She held that the provision resurrects the unconstitutional prior-approval regime invalidated in Vineet Narain and Subramanian Swamy. According to her, Section 17A unjustifiably shields higher public servants, even barring preliminary inquiries, thereby undermining the fight against corruption.
Justice Nagarathna rejected the interpretation that the term “government” could include Lokpal or Lokayuktas and expressed concern about the provision’s operation if the Lokpal Act were repealed. Holding that protection of honest officers cannot override the objective of eradicating corruption, she directed that the matter be placed before a larger Bench.
Case Title: Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India
W.P.(C) No. 1373 of 2018
READ JUDGMENT HERE
An Undertrial Cannot Be Kept Behind Bars Indefinitely: Supreme Court Orders Bail For GST Accused After 8 Months In Custody
The Supreme Court granted bail to Amit Mehra, holding that an undertrial cannot be kept in custody indefinitely. A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Alok Aradhe observed that Mehra had been in judicial custody for over eight months, while the trial had not even commenced and charges were yet to be framed.
The Court was hearing a special leave petition challenging the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s refusal to grant regular bail in a case initiated by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) for alleged offences under the CGST Act and IGST Act.
While acknowledging the seriousness of the allegations, the Bench noted that the offences are triable by a magistrate and carry a maximum punishment of five years. The Court further observed that even if the trial were to begin soon, it was unlikely to conclude within a year, making continued incarceration unjustified.
Exercising its discretion, the Court directed Mehra’s release on bail on terms to be fixed by the trial court, clarifying that the GST authorities are free to seek appropriate conditions to safeguard their interests.
The special leave petition and all connected applications were accordingly disposed of.
CASE TITLE: AMIT MEHRA VERSUS UNION OF INDIA
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.20996/2025
READ ORDER HERE
Once a Moratorium Has Been Declared, All Execution Modes Stand Interdicted: Supreme Court on Section 71 of Consumer Act
The Supreme Court held that once a moratorium is declared against a judgment-debtor company, execution proceedings under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 stand prohibited, including attachment and sale of property, attachment of bank accounts, or withdrawal of decretal amounts from the company’s accounts.
A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Augustine George Masih dismissed appeals filed by an association of homebuyers seeking to execute consumer forum orders against the directors and promoters of M/s Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. (ACIPL).
The Court clarified that execution proceedings must strictly conform to the decree. Since the final consumer orders were passed only against ACIPL, and not against its directors or promoters, execution could not be extended to them. The directors were neither judgment debtors nor guarantors, and no independent liability had been adjudicated against them.
The Court further ruled that once a moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is in force, all modes of execution contemplated under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act are interdicted. Execution cannot be permitted indirectly against individuals who were not parties to the decree.
Reaffirming settled principles, the Bench held that:
- An executing forum cannot go beyond or behind the decree.
- A company is a distinct legal entity, and directors cannot be held personally liable in the absence of statutory liability, personal guarantees, or findings of fraud.
- Liability cannot be imposed without pleadings, evidence, adjudication, and recorded findings.
- The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot be invoked at the execution stage without prior determination based on specific pleadings and proof.
Finding no legal error in the NCDRC’s refusal to proceed against the directors, the Supreme Court upheld the impugned order and dismissed the appeals, holding that the decree bound only ACIPL.
Case Title: Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association (Regd.) v. M/S Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8465-8466 OF 2024
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Section 19(b) Specific Relief Act Cannot Prevail Doctrine of Lis Pendens Under Section 52 TPA: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that once a suit relating to immovable property is instituted, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (doctrine of lis pendens) overrides Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Consequently, subsequent purchasers during the pendency of litigation cannot resist the execution of a decree for specific performance.
The ruling was delivered by a Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, dismissing appeals against a Bombay High Court judgment.
The Court clarified that although transfers pendente lite are not void, they remain subordinate to the final decree. Once litigation begins, all subsequent transfers are subject to the outcome of the suit, irrespective of the purchaser’s bona fides or notice of the proceedings.
Rejecting the appellants’ reliance on Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, the Court held that the protection available to bona fide purchasers ceases upon institution of the suit, as the doctrine of lis pendens operates in rem and binds the property itself.
The Court further held that executing courts are competent to determine whether obstruction by transferees pendente lite is legally sustainable and to order the removal of such obstruction. It also ruled that Article 129 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applied to the case, and the decree holder had acted within the limitation.
Noting that the decree holder had been litigating for over three decades, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, directed the appellants to hand over physical possession by 15 February 2026, and barred any further proceedings by the appellants or persons claiming through them.
Case Title: Alka Shrirang Chavan & Anr. v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale & Ors.
SLP (CIVIL) NO. 27660 OF 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Widowed Daughter-in-Law Becomes Dependant After Father-in-Law’s Death: Supreme Court Allows Maintenance Claim from His Estate
The Supreme Court held that a daughter-in-law who becomes a widow even after the death of her father-in-law is a “dependant” under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and is entitled to claim maintenance from the estate of her deceased father-in-law.
A Division Bench of Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice S.V.N. Bhatti upheld the High Court’s ruling which had restored a maintenance petition filed by the widow of the deceased’s son.
The Court examined Section 21(vii) of the Act, which defines dependants to include “any widow of his son”, and rejected the argument that the term applies only to widows whose husbands predeceased the father-in-law. The Bench held that the statute deliberately omits the word “predeceased”, making the timing of the son’s death immaterial.
Applying the literal rule of interpretation, the Court reiterated that where statutory language is clear, courts cannot add or subtract words. It further held that differentiating between widowed daughters-in-law based on when they became widows would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14, and would also undermine the right to dignity under Article 21.
The Court distinguished Section 19, which concerns maintenance during the father-in-law’s lifetime, from Section 22, which governs maintenance of dependants from the estate after his death, and clarified that a claim under Section 22 arises only post-death.
Concluding that a widowed daughter-in-law squarely falls within the definition of “dependant” under Section 21(vii), the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and directed that the maintenance claim be decided on merits by the Family Court.
Case Title: Kanchana Rai vs. Geeta Sharma & Ors. (Connected with Uma Devi vs. Geeta Sharma & Ors.
SLP(C) Nos. 1544-1545 of 2026
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Complete Disclosure in Government Jobs Is Mandatory, Not a Formality: Supreme Court on Hiding Criminal Cases During Recruitment
The Supreme Court held that truthful and complete disclosure in applications for government employment is a fundamental requirement rooted in integrity and public trust, and not a mere procedural formality. Suppression of material facts, particularly regarding criminal cases, cannot be cured by later disclosure or subsequent acquittal.
A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh allowed the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, setting aside the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and upholding the cancellation of the respondent’s appointment to the post of Sahayak Samiksha Adhikari.
The Court noted that the respondent had twice falsely stated in attestation and verification forms that no criminal cases were pending against him, despite multiple cases being under investigation at the relevant time. The Bench held that repeated non-disclosure reflects deliberate concealment, striking at the core of fairness and transparency required in public service.
Rejecting the High Court’s view that the offences were “trivial,” the Supreme Court observed that subsequent acquittal or voluntary disclosure cannot erase the initial act of suppression. Once material facts are concealed, later developments cannot validate the candidature.
The Court emphasised that recruitment to public posts demands strict adherence to honesty, as large numbers of candidates compete under equal conditions, and any dilution would undermine the credibility of the selection process. Sympathy or hardship, the Court held, cannot override clear legal requirements.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the cancellation order and dismissed the respondent’s claim for appointment.
Case Title: State of U.P. v. Dinesh Kumar
Special Leave Petition(C) No.20292 of 2025
READ ORDER HERE
Elementary Education Is a Fundamental Right: SC Directs States to Frame Binding Rules for 25% RTE Quota
The Supreme Court held that private unaided schools are mandatorily required to admit children from Weaker Sections (WS) and Disadvantaged Groups (DG) under Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Education Act, 2009, and that this obligation cannot be diluted by the absence of binding statutory rules.
A Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar ruled that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by child rights bodies do not have the force of law and cannot substitute enforceable rules framed under Section 38 of the RTE Act.
The Court observed that dependence on non-binding SOPs has resulted in serious implementation failures, effectively undermining the fundamental right to education under Article 21A. It held that without clear and enforceable rules, the 25% reservation mandate would remain ineffective.
While the individual grievance before the Court had become infructuous due to the passage of the academic year, the Supreme Court examined the issue to prevent recurrence. It noted systemic barriers such as online-only admission processes, digital illiteracy, language constraints, lack of transparency in seat availability, and ineffective grievance redress mechanisms, which exclude eligible children.
Emphasising that elementary education is a positive fundamental right, the Court held that governments, schools, and authorities have a corresponding duty to ensure meaningful access. It further observed that the neighbourhood school model is a constitutional tool to promote equality, dignity, and social integration.
Accordingly, the Court directed States and Union Territories to frame enforceable rules under Section 38 of the RTE Act, in consultation with child rights bodies, for the effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c). The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights was impleaded for compliance and monitoring, and the matter was directed to be listed for further consideration on 6 April.
Case Title: Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar vs. State of Maharashtra
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 10105 OF 2017
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Supreme Court Rejects Tiger Global’s Tax Plea: No Exemption, Liable to Pay Tax on Flipkart Share Sale
The Supreme Court upheld the rejection of advance ruling applications filed by Tiger Global entities in relation to the sale of their Flipkart shares, ruling that transactions prima facie structured for tax avoidance attract the statutory bar under the Income Tax Act.
A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan held that once tax authorities form a prima facie view that a transaction is designed to avoid income tax, the proviso to Section 245R(2) applies, and the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) is not required to examine the merits of taxability.
The dispute arose from investments made by Mauritius-based Tiger Global International II, III and IV Holdings in Flipkart’s Singapore entity between 2011 and 2015. Following Walmart’s acquisition of Flipkart in 2018, the entities sold their shares and sought a nil withholding tax certificate, claiming exemption under the India–Mauritius DTAA’s grandfathering clause.
The Revenue Department and AAR rejected the claim, characterising the Mauritius entities as conduit companies controlled by Tiger Global Management LLC (USA), and concluded that the structure was aimed at tax avoidance. While the Delhi High Court set aside the AAR’s ruling, the Supreme Court reversed that decision.
The Court held that treaty benefits do not automatically negate tax avoidance and clarified that possession of a Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) does not bar scrutiny, particularly after the introduction of Section 90(2A) and Chapter X-A (GAAR). It emphasized that treaty interpretation must align with legislative intent to prevent abuse.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Pardiwala stressed the importance of tax sovereignty, stating that taxing income arising within India is an inherent sovereign right and that artificial arrangements threaten national economic interests.
Concluding that the Revenue had established a prima facie case of impermissible tax avoidance, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and held that capital gains from the post-2017 share transfers are taxable in India under domestic law read with the DTAA.
Case Title: Authority of Advanced Ruling v. Tiger Global
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 262 OF 2026
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Student Suicides Must Be Reported Without Delay: Supreme Court Issues Strict Nationwide Directions to Colleges and Universities
The Supreme Court issued comprehensive directions to all Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) across India to address student suicides and unnatural deaths with seriousness and accountability, reiterating that colleges and universities have a non-negotiable duty to ensure a safe, inclusive and supportive environment for students.
A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan directed that every HEI must immediately report any suicide or unnatural death of a student to the police, irrespective of whether the incident occurs on campus, in hostels, private accommodations, or elsewhere, and regardless of the mode of study. Such incidents must also be reported annually to the UGC and relevant regulatory bodies, or to the Department of Higher Education in applicable cases.
To ensure prompt medical response, the Court mandated round-the-clock access to qualified medical professionals in all residential HEIs, either on campus or within a one-kilometre radius.
Noting widespread faculty shortages, the Court ordered that all vacant teaching and non-teaching posts be filled within four months, with priority to reserved posts, including those for persons with disabilities. Similar timelines were prescribed for filling key administrative positions such as Vice-Chancellors and Registrars.
The Court also directed HEIs to submit annual accountability reports on vacancies and recruitment to the Central and State governments.
On scholarships, the Court ordered that all pending disbursements be cleared within four months and that future payments follow transparent timelines. It strictly prohibited institutions from penalising students for delays, including denying exams, hostel access, classes, or withholding degrees.
Emphasising that student suicides reflect deeper systemic failures, the Court reiterated strict compliance with anti-ragging regulations and directed centralised maintenance of data on student suicides. It reaffirmed the role of the National Task Force on student mental health, stressing that the constitutional obligation of HEIs extends beyond academics to the mental health, dignity and well-being of students.
Case Title: AMIT KUMAR & ORS. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1425 OF 2025
READ JUDGMENT HERE
Impeachment Motion Row: Supreme Court Rejects Justice Yashwant Varma’s Plea Against Inquiry Panel
The Supreme Court dismissed Justice Yashwant Varma’s plea challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker’s decision to set up a three-member inquiry committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act to examine impeachment charges against him.
A Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma delivered the decision after reserving its verdict on January 8.
Justice Varma had earlier told a Parliamentary panel that no cash was recovered from his official residence during a March 2025 fire, saying he had “absolutely no role.”
He had approached the Supreme Court opposing the Speaker’s move to form the committee, arguing that identical impeachment motions were simultaneously filed in both Houses, raising constitutional issues.
Senior Advocates Sidharth Luthra and Mukul Rohatgi argued that the Rajya Sabha Deputy Chairman’s powers under Article 91 did not apply to impeachment matters and warned of conflicts of interest. They claimed both Houses could not reach different outcomes on the same allegations.
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta defended Parliament’s actions, stating the Judges (Inquiry) Act prevents multiple committees and gives no vested rights to judges. He argued that excluding the Deputy Chairman from acting would disrupt the statutory scheme and that the law aims to balance judicial independence with accountability.
Throughout the hearings, the Bench questioned whether the petitioner showed any real prejudice and stressed that constitutional institutions cannot stay functioning due to temporary vacancies. The Lok Sabha Speaker admitted the motion on August 12, 2025, while the Rajya Sabha motion was never accepted.
Justice Varma came under scrutiny after burnt cash bundles were found at his Delhi home following a fire on March 14, 2025. An internal committee set up by then–CJI Sanjiv Khanna found him guilty of misconduct. After he refused to resign, impeachment proceedings moved forward, and the Lok Sabha Speaker formed a three-member inquiry committee of Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, and senior advocate BV Acharya.
Senior advocates Luthra, Rohatgi and Jayant Mehta represented Justice Varma, while SG Tushar Mehta represented officials of both Houses.
Case Title: X v. O/O Speaker of the House of the People
READ JUDGEMENT HERE
30% Women’s Reservation Applies to Punjab and Haryana Bar Council Election: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has allowed 30% reservation for women in the upcoming Punjab and Haryana Bar Council elections, since the election process has not yet begun and only the voters’ list is finalized. A Bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi clarified that its earlier order dated 8 December 2025, which excluded Punjab and Haryana from women’s reservation, would now be modified. The elections are scheduled for 17–18 March 2026.
The Court said that since the election process has not started, the direction removing Punjab & Haryana from reservation “is liable to be deleted,” and therefore the 30% reservation must apply to these elections as well. The Bench also sought help from Attorney General R. Venkataramani and ASG Aishwarya Bhati.
Earlier, on 8 December 2025, the Court had refused to apply reservation in four States Andhra Pradesh, Punjab & Haryana, Telangana, and Uttar Pradesh because their election process had already begun.
The case arises from a PIL filed by Yogamaya M.G., an SCBA member, highlighting the lack of representation of women and other marginalized communities in State Bar Councils. The petition argues that this underrepresentation violates Articles 14, 15, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. It notes that councils in several states, including Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and Haryana, currently have no women members.
The petitioner has urged the Court to make Bar Council elections more inclusive, stating that many women lawyers cannot contest due to high costs, politicized campaigning, and lack of resources. The PIL relies on landmark rulings like NALSA (2014) and Vishaka (1997), and points out that male-dominated Councils often ignore essential infrastructure needs such as gender-neutral washrooms, crèches, and sexual-harassment mechanisms.
Earlier, the Supreme Court had already directed that 30% of seats in every State Bar Council, including office-bearer posts, must be reserved for women, and declared that the relevant rules are “deemed to have been amended” to give immediate effect.
The Supreme Court refused to exclude Punjab and Haryana from implementing 30% women’s reservation in their upcoming Bar Council elections. CJI Surya Kant clarified that no election notification or nomination process had begun, so the election process had not started.
He rejected the argument that implementation should wait until the next cycle, adding that he wanted to remain neutral and not appear to favour his home state, saying: “I do not want to discriminate. People will say that I favored my state.”
Case Title: Yogamaya M.G. v. Union of India & Ors. W.P.(C) Nos 581/2024
Read 8th December Order
“Frivolous and Intrusive”: Karisma Kapoor Pushes Back in Supreme Court as Priya Kapur Seeks 2016 Divorce Records
Actor Karisma Kapoor has opposed an application before the Supreme Court that seeks certified copies of records from her 2016 divorce proceedings with late industrialist Sunjay Kapur.
The matter was heard in chambers by Justice AS Chandurkar, who issued notice and granted her two weeks to file a reply.
Karisma’s lawyers, Ravi Sharma and Apoorv Shukla, argued that the plea is frivolous, legally unsustainable, and an attempt to reopen confidential matrimonial proceedings that were conclusively settled nearly a decade ago.
They stressed that divorce cases are treated with strict confidentiality and cannot be casually accessed, especially when the applicant, Priya Sachdev Kapur, already possesses the divorce decree and consent terms.
Priya Kapur, represented by Senior Advocate Maninder Singh and Advocate Smriti Asmita, has sought the complete record of a 2016 transfer petition filed by Sunjay Kapur, including all petitions, annexures, orders, notings, and settlement documents.
The transfer petition itself had become infructuous after Sunjay and Karisma settled their disputes and obtained a mutual-consent divorce.
Taking note of the objections raised, the Supreme Court refrained from issuing any interim order and will examine Karisma Kapoor’s detailed reply before deciding whether any further access to the records is justified.
The request for the divorce documents arises from an ongoing inheritance dispute before the Delhi High Court regarding Sunjay Kapur’s estate. Karisma Kapoor’s children, Samaira and Kiaan, along with Sunjay’s mother, Rani Kapur, have alleged that Priya Kapur forged Sunjay’s will to gain control over his assets.
Priya has denied these allegations as “bogus,” arguing that the will is valid and that it is customary for a husband to leave his assets to his wife.
The High Court is currently examining competing claims over Sunjay’s multi-million-dollar estate, and it has allowed Priya to submit details of his movable and immovable properties in a sealed cover.
Case Title: Sanjay Kapur v. Karisma Kapur
Agreement to Sell Does Not Convey Title, Stamp Duty Applies Only When Possession Is Delivered Under the Agreement: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has ruled that an agreement to sell between a landlord and a tenant is not a deemed sale for stamp duty purposes if the tenant’s possession continues only as a tenant and not as a buyer.
The Court set aside the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Trial Court orders that wrongly treated the agreement to sell as a conveyance deed and imposed stamp duty and penalties.
The Court found that:
- The tenant had been living in the property for 50+ years, and his possession never changed into that of a buyer.
- There was no surrender of tenancy, either express or implied.
- An eviction order passed later proved that the landlord continued to treat him as a tenant.
- Therefore, the agreement did not amount to a sale under Explanation I to Article 47A of the A.P. Stamp Act.
The Supreme Court held that the appellant is not required to pay stamp duty or penalties, and directed the Trial Court to mark the agreement as evidence and finish the case within six months.
Case Title: Vayyaeti Srinivasarao vs. Gaineedi Jagajyothi
Read Judgement
HT Media Ltd Not Liable to Pay Service Tax Under Reverse Charge: Supreme Court Rules on Payments to Foreign Speakers
The Supreme Court ruled that HT Media Ltd is not liable to pay service tax under the reverse charge mechanism for fees paid to overseas agents who arranged foreign speakers for its Leadership Summit.
A Bench led by Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan overturned the earlier CESTAT ruling, holding that such payments do not qualify as “event management services” under the Finance Act, 1994. The Court clarified that reverse charge applies only if the service is taxable under the Act.
The service tax claim pertained to October 2009 to March 2012, amounting to around Rs 60 lakh. Based on CBEC circulars and statutory provisions, the Court concluded that hiring foreign speakers through agents does not fall under taxable event management services.
The Court cancelled the tribunal’s order and allowed HT Media’s appeal, ending the service tax proceedings.
The petitioners were represented by Ashok Dingra, Karan Bharihoke, and Sonia Gupta, while the respondents were represented by VC Bharathi, Gurmeet Singh Makker, SK Singhania, PV Yogeshwaran, and Annirudh Sharma.
Case Title: HT Media Limited Vs Principal Commissioner GST
Read Judgement
Diploma in Pharmacy Is Essential Qualification for Post of Pharmacist: Supreme Court Upholds Bihar Rule
The Supreme Court of India has upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) of the Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024), confirming the State of Bihar’s power to require a Diploma in Pharmacy (D.Pharm) as the essential qualification for recruitment of pharmacists.
A Bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dismissed appeals by candidates with B.Pharma and M.Pharma degrees who lacked a diploma.
Key Points:
- No Repugnancy: The Bihar Rules do not conflict with the Pharmacy Act, 1948, or Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015, as the Act regulates practice, not public recruitment.
- Employer’s Authority: The State can prescribe essential qualifications; higher degrees do not automatically substitute for a diploma.
- Rational Basis: Diploma holders receive 500 hours of mandatory hospital training, justifying their targeted recruitment. Degree holders remain eligible if they also hold a diploma.
- Articles 14 & 16: No violation of equality or public employment rights; the classification is rational and non-arbitrary.
Rule 6(1) is constitutional; the diploma requirement is valid, and appeals by degree holders without a diploma are dismissed.
Case Title: Md. Firoz Mansuri & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
SLP (Civil) No. 12236
Read Judgement
Wait-Listed Candidates Have No Indefeasible Right of Appointment Except as Rules Permit: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of India ruled that candidates on a waiting or reserve list have no legal or indefeasible right to appointment, unless recruitment rules explicitly allow appointments under exceptional circumstances. This judgment arose from three consolidated appeals filed by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) against Rajasthan High Court orders directing appointments from the waiting list.
The Court emphasized:
- No right of appointment: A wait-listed candidate does not have a better claim than a main merit list candidate, who themselves have no guaranteed right.
- Appointment only if rules allow: Candidates can be appointed from the waiting list only if the recruitment rules permit it, the list is still valid, and the appointing authority unreasonably refuses appointment.
- Expired lists cannot be revived: Writ petitions are not maintainable once the waiting list expires (typically six months under Rajasthan Service Rules).
The Supreme Court allowed RPSC’s appeal, set aside the High Court orders, and clarified:
- Waiting list candidates cannot claim any appointment right unless expressly allowed by rules.
- High Courts erred in directing appointments from expired waiting lists.
Case Title: Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer v. Yati Jain & Ors., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 273 OF 2026
Read Judgement
SC/ST Act| Abuse Must Be Caste-Based or the Caste Name Must Be Hurled as an Abuse: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court ruled that merely using or mentioning a caste name without intent to insult or humiliate does not constitute an offense under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, quashing ongoing criminal proceedings.
A bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Alok Aradhe observed that for Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act to apply:
- The insult or intimidation must be intentional and linked to the victim’s Scheduled Caste/Tribe status.
- Mere membership in a Scheduled Caste/Tribe or mentioning a caste name alone is insufficient.
- The abuse must be in public view and clearly intended to cause caste-based humiliation.
The case arose after an FIR was filed against the appellant for alleged caste-based insults at an Aanganwadi Center in Bhagalpur. The High Court had refused to quash the prosecution, but the Supreme Court found the FIR vague and lacking essential elements of the offenses.
The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings.
AOR Preetika Dwivedi represented the Appellant, while AOR Samir Ali Khan appeared for the Respondents.
Case Title: Keshaw Mahto@ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar & Anr. ,SLP(Crl.) 72999/2025
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Rules Of The Game Cannot Be Altered Once The Game Has Begun: Supreme Court Quashes Punjab Medical Admission Change
The Supreme Court ruled that the principle “rules of the game cannot be altered once the game has begun” applies to both recruitment and educational admissions. A bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and Alok Aradhe held that admission processes must be transparent from the start, and midstream changes that benefit specific individuals are unacceptable.
The case arose from Punjab’s modification of its sports quota for MBBS and BDS admissions under NEET UG-2024, which allowed achievements from any class instead of only Classes XI and XII. The court found that Ramesh Kumar Kashyap had sought this change to favor his daughter, Kudrat Kashyap, without disclosing his personal interest, making the policy modification invalid.
The court emphasized that undue haste or ambiguity in rules can lead to arbitrariness and nepotism, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. It ordered that the seats initially allocated to Kudrat Kashyap and Mansirat Kaur be given to appellants Divjot Sekhon and Shubhkarman Singh, while Kudrat and Mansirat take seats at another college.
The Court also allowed other affected students in the 2025 session to approach the High Court through proper proceedings to seek remedies.
Case Title: Divjot Sekhon Vs State of Punjab And Others
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PC Act| Section 17 Does Not Exclude or Prevent the State Police From Investigating Central Govt Employees: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court ruled that state police can investigate and file cases against central government employees for bribery and corruption under the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act without prior CBI approval.
A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Satish Chandra Sharma clarified that Section 17 of the PC Act allows either state or central agencies to investigate such offenses, provided the investigating officer meets the required rank. Lower-ranked officers can investigate only if authorized by a First Class Magistrate or the State Government.
The Court noted,
“Section 17 does not exclude or prevent the state police or a special agency of the state from registering a crime or investigating cases relating to bribery, corruption and misconduct against central government employees.”
It affirmed the Rajasthan High Court’s decision, which upheld the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan ACB to investigate a central government employee, stating:
“It is incorrect to say that it is only the CBI who could have instituted the prosecution.”
Case Title: Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K. Meena v. State of Rajasthan (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 71)
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Illegal Mining Causes Irreversible Damage: Supreme Court Stays 100-Metre Definition, Orders Expert Committee on Aravalli Hills Case
The Supreme Court of India resumed hearings in the landmark case concerning the definition and protection of the Aravalli Hills, a key ecological region spanning Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. The matter addresses illegal mining, environmental degradation, and the controversial 100-metre elevation criterion previously used to define the range.
The bench, headed by Chief Justice Surya Kant along with Justices J.K. Maheshwari and Augustine George Masih, suspended the earlier 100-metre definition, citing ecological concerns and widespread objections. The Court emphasized that no fresh writ petitions should be filed on the issue, urging parties to focus on the main legal questions.
Highlighting rampant illegal mining in Rajasthan, the Court warned that such activities are criminal and must be stopped immediately to prevent irreversible environmental damage. It also directed the formation of a high-powered expert committee, comprising eminent environmentalists and forest specialists, to operate under court supervision and review the Aravalli definition.
Amicus Curiae K. Parameshwar has been granted four weeks to submit a detailed note addressing the key issues and proposed solutions. The Court clarified that the terms “forest” and “Aravalli” will be examined separately due to their distinct legal and ecological implications, and hinted at the possibility of a court-supervised independent monitoring mechanism.
The Aravalli Hills play a crucial role in groundwater recharge, climate regulation, wildlife protection, and air quality improvement in the Delhi-NCR region. Environmental experts argue that a narrow height-based definition could leave lower-lying but ecologically vital stretches unprotected.
Notices have been issued to the Union Government and the states of Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. The Court has scheduled the next hearing after four weeks, once the expert committee report and the amicus note are submitted.
Case Title: In Re: Definition of Aravalli Hills & Ancillary Issues
SMW(C) No. 10/2025
Compensatory Allowances Fall Within ‘Ordinary Rate of Wages’ Under Factories Act: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has ruled that compensatory allowances like House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA), and Small Family Allowance (SFA) must be included while calculating overtime wages. These allowances fall under the “ordinary rate of wages” as defined in Section 59(2) of the Factories Act, 1948.
A bench of Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Manmohan upheld the Madras High Court’s judgment, rejecting the Union of India’s attempt to exclude these allowances based on office memoranda and executive instructions.
The case arose when employees of Heavy Electricals Factory Employees’ Union challenged the exclusion of these allowances from overtime calculations. While the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Madras sided with the Union of India, the Madras High Court reversed the decision, holding that Section 59(2) clearly mandates inclusion of such allowances.
The Supreme Court observed:
- Section 59(2) explicitly excludes only bonus and overtime wages, not other allowances.
- Executive instructions or circulars cannot override a parliamentary statute.
- Historical practice had included these allowances in overtime calculations, making their sudden exclusion legally unsustainable.
- Powers to frame rules or grant exemptions under the Act lie with the State Government, not the Central Government.
The Court concluded that the Union of India’s appeal lacked merit, upholding the High Court’s interpretation and reinforcing that statutory provisions cannot be diluted by executive instructions.
Case Title: Union of India v. Heavy Electricals Factory Employees’ Union (Neutral Citation 2026 INSC 74)
“Law Is Born Only in the Gazette”: Supreme Court Says Govt Notifications Are Invalid Until Official Publication
The Supreme Court of India has clarified that a notification issued under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 becomes legally binding only after it is published in the Official Gazette, not merely when uploaded online.
A Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe overturned the Delhi High Court’s 2018 ruling that DGFT website uploads were sufficient to bind importers. The Court held that the “date of notification” refers to the Gazette publication date, which ensures legal validity, accessibility, and accountability.
The case involved importers of mild steel products who had opened Letters of Credit on February 5, 2016, before the DGFT notification introducing a Minimum Import Price was published in the Gazette on February 11, 2016. The Supreme Court ruled in their favor, holding that the MIP could not apply to imports backed by Letters of Credit opened before the Gazette publication.
Justice Alok Aradhe stated,
“Law, to bind, must first exist. And to exist, it must be made known in the manner ordained by the legislature… The requirement of publication in the Gazette is not an empty formality.”
The Court concluded,
“The Notification acquires the force of law only upon its publication in the Official Gazette. The expression ‘date of this Notification’ must necessarily mean the date of such publication.”
Case Title: Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Anr
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‘States Must Act Now’: Supreme Court Orders Uniform Policy for Police Media Briefings Across India
The Supreme Court of India has directed all State governments to create a clear policy for police media briefings to ensure responsible and fair communication that does not violate individual rights. The order was issued by a Bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, following the preparation of a detailed “Police Manual for Media Briefing” by Amicus Curiae Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan.
The Court expressed dissatisfaction with States that failed to act on previous directions and mandated that all States frame their policy within three months. The Supreme Court Registry has also been directed to upload the manual on its website within two weeks.
The move aims to standardize police communication, prevent misuse of media briefings during investigations, protect fair trial rights, and maintain accountability and transparency in interactions with the press. All pending cases related to this issue have been disposed of.
Case Title: Peoples Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
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