[Centre Vs. Supreme Court] How The Centre Pre-Empted Adverse Supreme Court Orders: Waqf Act, Sedition Law & Article 370 Cases Explained

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With CJI Khanna set to retire on 13 May 2025, the upcoming hearing on 5 May is expected to set the tone for interim reliefs and possibly the future trajectory of this high-stakes constitutional challenge.

[Centre Vs. Supreme Court] How the Centre Pre-Empted Adverse Supreme Court Orders: Waqf Act, Sedition Law & Article 370 Cases Explained

The Central Government has assured the Supreme Court that it will temporarily pause two controversial parts of the Waqf Act, 2025 — the idea of “waqf by use” and the appointment of non-Muslims to waqf boards.

ALSO READ: Waqf Amendment Act | “Undoing ‘Waqf by User’ Will Create Problems”: Supreme Court

This move came after the Supreme Court indicated it might stay three key provisions of the Act during a hearing on April 16. This isn’t the first time the Centre has stepped back right before a possible adverse court ruling.

A three-judge bench led by Chief Justice of India had orally said it was thinking of staying certain provisions of the new Waqf law.

On 4 April 2025, Parliament passed the Waqf (Amendment) Bill, 2025, following an intense debate—over 12 hours in the Lok Sabha and 14 hours in the Rajya Sabha. The Bill, which significantly amends the Waqf Act, 1995, faced sharp criticism from Opposition parties. The legislation was granted Presidential assent on 5 April 2025, making it official law.

Initially introduced in the Lok Sabha on 8 August 2024, the Bill proposed renaming the existing law as the Unified Waqf Management, Empowerment, Efficiency, and Development Act. The Union government projected the legislation as a major overhaul aimed at improving “efficiency in the administration and management of Waqf properties.”

Notably, the 2025 Amendment abolishes the concept of ‘Waqf by user’ for future waqf properties. It also enhances government oversight over waqf assets and dispute resolution. Another major change mandates the inclusion of non-Muslim members in the Waqf Boards.

While the government claims these reforms will increase transparency and accountability, critics argue that the amendments compromise the religious autonomy of the Muslim community. Opposition leaders have accused the Centre of attempting to turn Muslims into “second-class citizens” and have questioned both the intention and substance of the Act.

After the Bill became law, over 65 petitions were filed before the Supreme Court. The petitioners include politicians, civil rights organisations, and advocates. Among them are:

Asaduddin Owaisi (AIMIM MP)
Amanatullah Khan (AAP MLA)
Arshad Madani (Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind)
Imran Masood and Udit Raj (Congress)
Manoj Kumar Jha (RJD)
Mahua Moitra (TMC)
Mohammad Salim (CPI(M))
Indian Union Muslim League
Shia cleric Syed Kalbe Jawad Naqvi
Anjuman-E-Islam, and many others.
Civil liberties group Association for the Protection of Civil Rights is also a petitioner.

In contrast, six states—Haryana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, and Assam—have come forward in support of the law, defending its constitutionality in the apex court.

With the Union seeking a week’s time to file its affidavit, the three-judge bench, led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna and including Justices Sanjay Kumar and K.V. Viswanathan, adjourned the matter to 5 May 2025 for a preliminary hearing.

“We clarify that the hearing fixed on the next date will be a preliminary hearing and, if required, interim orders will be passed,” the bench stated in its order.

The Centre opposed the Court’s suggestion to issue an interim stay on the denotification of waqf properties, including the concept of ‘waqf-by-user’, and the inclusion of non-Muslims in the Central Waqf Council and State Boards.

The Court granted seven days to the Centre, state governments, and Waqf Boards to file their initial replies to the writ petitions. It also permitted petitioners to file rejoinder affidavits within five days of receiving those replies.

But Solicitor General Tushar Mehta asked for more time and requested the bench to hear two additional lawyers for the Centre. The bench agreed and said it would give a decision after hearing them.

However, on Thursday, Mehta began with a fresh request to defer the hearing so the Centre could file written submissions. But the Court firmly reminded him that changing the status of “waqf by use” land could lead to serious consequences.

That’s when Mehta gave the assurance that the Centre will pause the implementation of this provision and also not allow states to appoint non-Muslims to waqf boards.

With CJI Khanna set to retire on 13 May 2025, the upcoming hearing on 5 May is expected to set the tone for interim reliefs and possibly the future trajectory of this high-stakes constitutional challenge.

ALSO READ: LEGAL EXPLAINER| Waqf & The Waqf Amendment Bill 2024: Key Legal Changes & Impact

Sedition Law Verdict in 2022

On 12 September 2023, a three-judge bench led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud referred a series of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the sedition law—Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860—to a larger Constitution Bench. The number of judges on this bench is yet to be finalised, though the Chief Justice mentioned it would include “at least” five judges.

This larger bench will re-examine the landmark 1962 judgment in Kedarnath Singh v State of Bihar, where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 124A. The court aims to test this judgment using constitutional principles developed over the last six decades.

The petitions challenging sedition were first filed in February 2021. In May 2022, a bench led by then Chief Justice N.V. Ramana put a hold on the use of Section 124A, directing the Union government to review the law. Justice Ramana had raised serious concerns about the sedition law’s chilling effect on free speech. Comparing its misuse, he remarked that giving this law to authorities was like giving “a carpenter… a saw to make an item, [who] uses it to cut the entire forest instead of a tree.”

Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal stressed the urgency of hearing these petitions, given the large number of pending sedition cases—867 cases involving over 13,000 accused, as per Article14.com. Sibal offered two possible courses: either a five-judge Constitution Bench could hear the case, or the matter could proceed before a smaller bench without formal referral.

Chief Justice Chandrachud underlined that Kedarnath was delivered in 1962, before major constitutional developments like the doctrine of proportionality and expansive interpretations of Articles 14 and 21. He cited Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (1978) as an example of how Article 21 evolved to protect personal liberty more comprehensively.

He noted that Kedarnath only assessed sedition through the lens of Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech), and not under the broader context of equality, liberty, or proportionality. This formed a strong basis for referring the case to a larger bench.

Attorney General R. Venkataramani and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta urged the Court to delay the referral, citing that the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill, 2023—which aims to replace the IPC—is under review by a parliamentary standing committee. However, many senior lawyers used the opportunity to voice concerns about the new Bill. Arvind Datar noted that sedition still exists in the proposed law under a “new label,” while Kapil Sibal said the revised provision is “far more draconian.”

The Union had made a similar request in May 2022 before the Ramana bench, then also seeking to pause proceedings on grounds of re-evaluating the law. This time, however, Chief Justice Chandrachud firmly stated that the Court was “not inclined to accept” the same argument again.

He further pointed out that even if a new penal code is enacted, it will operate prospectively, not retrospectively. Thus, current prosecutions under Section 124A will remain unaffected unless the law is struck down. He stressed that if the sedition provision is declared unconstitutional, it will be treated as though it never existed—meaning all pending sedition cases would automatically be dismissed.

Section 124A criminalises the act of “exciting disaffection” against the “government established by law”. Under Article 19(2), such a restriction is permitted in the interest of the security of the State. In Kedarnath, the Supreme Court said the “continued existence of the Government established by law is an essential condition of the stability of the State”.

However, the petitioners challenged this reasoning. They argued that “government established by law” and “State” are not the same and must be treated separately. Chief Justice Chandrachud observed that Kedarnath failed to make this distinction. If the larger bench agrees that the two are different, Section 124A would no longer fall within the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2), potentially rendering it unconstitutional.

On 11 May, the Supreme Court ordered both the Central and state governments to put Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code on hold.

This section defines sedition as any act or attempt “to bring into hatred or contempt, or…excite disaffection towards the government”.

The Supreme Court has clarified in several judgments that a speech can be considered sedition only if it incites violence or causes public disorder. As reported by the media, over 800 sedition cases have been registered against nearly 13,000 people in India since 2010.

The very next day, the Centre reversed its earlier stand — which was strongly in favour of the sedition law — and told the Court it wanted to “re-examine and reconsider” the law. Ironically, Mehta had defended the sedition law in the past.

Article 370 Case Verdict in 2023

On 11th December 2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark ruling on the constitutional validity of the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A. The Court upheld the Central Government’s 5th August 2019 decision to revoke Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, declaring it a move towards strengthening the sovereignty and integrity of India.

It observed that the abrogation aimed at promoting constitutional integration—not disintegration. The Court also clarified that Article 370 was never intended to be a permanent feature of the Constitution.

What Was Article 370?

Article 370 granted special autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, a region claimed by India, Pakistan, and China. Introduced in 1949 as a ‘temporary provision’, it was drafted by N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar in the Constituent Assembly. Under this Article, J&K had its own Constitution, flag, and autonomy over all areas except defence, foreign affairs, and communications. The provision was rooted in the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947, following Pakistan’s invasion of the princely state.

Supreme Court’s Key Findings

Article 370 Was a Temporary Provision

The Court firmly held that Article 370 was transitional in nature. It served two main purposes:

To act as a temporary arrangement until J&K framed its own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly.
To facilitate the state’s smooth integration into the Indian Union during the conflict-ridden period of 1947.

The Court also ruled that Jammu and Kashmir did not possess internal sovereignty.

Governor Can Perform Roles of State Legislature

Relying on the precedent set in S.R. Bommai v Union of India (1994), the Court upheld the authority of the President (through the Governor) to exercise “all or any” powers of the State Legislature during President’s Rule. Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud noted that such powers should only be judicially reviewed in exceptional circumstances.

No Need for State Government’s Concurrence

The Court declared that the President can independently revoke Article 370 under Article 370(3) of the Constitution. It ruled that the concurrence of the State Government was not required, as the provisos to Article 370(1)(d) do not apply in this context.

2019 Reorganisation Law Valid

The Court upheld the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which bifurcated the state and created the Union Territory of Ladakh. It clarified that the views of a State Legislature on such reorganisation are advisory and not binding on Parliament.

Parliament Has Executive Powers During President’s Rule

CJI Chandrachud asserted that during President’s Rule, Parliament is not limited to law-making. It also holds executive powers, and decisions taken by the Union Government on behalf of the State are essential for governance. The Court warned that questioning every such decision could result in “chaos and uncertainty.”

Restore Statehood, Hold Elections by Sept 2024

The Court directed that statehood must be restored to Jammu and Kashmir as soon as possible. It also ordered that legislative assembly elections be conducted by 30th September 2024.

Proposal for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

In a concurring opinion, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul recommended the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, similar to South Africa’s post-apartheid model. This Commission would investigate human rights violations committed by both state and non-state actors in Jammu and Kashmir since the 1980s.

“The Solicitor General stated that the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir will be restored (except for the carving out of the Union Territory of Ladakh). In view of the statement we do not find it necessary to determine whether the reorganisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir is permissible under Article 3.”

This allowed the Centre to dodge a verdict that might have limited Parliament’s future powers.

ALSO READ: Waqf Amendment Act Challenge | “We Will Not Appoint Non-Muslims To Waqf Boards, De-Notify Existing Waqf For Now”: Centre Tells Supreme Court

Safoora Zargar Bail in 2020

On June 23, 2020, Safoora Zargar, an accused in the Delhi riots case, was granted bail by the Delhi High Court after Mehta said he had no objection to her release on purely “humanitarian grounds.” This came after the government had earlier opposed her bail, arguing:

“There is no exception carved out for pregnant inmate who is accused of such heinous crime to be released on bail merely because of their pregnancy.”

But the Court seemed inclined to grant her bail based on her condition. The police had even remarked:

“The very fact of rearing of life ought to have been a check on activities which had a potential to cause, and which did in fact cause, large-scale destruction of life and property.”

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Delhi Police, told the court that the State had no objection to granting bail to Zargar on “humanitarian grounds”. However, he clarified that the “merit of the case” was yet to be examined and her release “should not be considered a precedent.”

All these events show a pattern by the Central Government: when it senses that the Supreme Court might rule against it, it changes its position or gives an assurance to delay or avoid an adverse judgment. These tactics have helped the Centre retain control over controversial laws or provisions while buying time to possibly make political or legal adjustments later.